Is it possible to attain meaning in art? And what exactly are we asking with this question? Edgar Wind’s entire research activity can probably be considered as a continuous confrontation with these two problems, as an attempt to define what it is to call an object a work of art, as an endeavour to determine the boundaries of a possible artistic experience, to investigate the cognitive aspects which enable us to circumscribe a ‘phenomenon of art’. This perspective may at first appear to be an explicit call for an absolutely rational approach to the world of art. As I will show in this article, it is not.

From Wind’s early work, on which I am focussing in this article, it will become clear that his proposal is much more a transcendental investigation into our way of considering what we call art. Better put, it is a transcendental definition of the a priori conditions of our experience of artistic phenomena. Bearing in mind Immanuel Kant’s transcendental foundation of a real world of phenomena, Wind tries to provide the bases for a transcendental foundation of our approach to art, to organize it into a reliable system which could enable us to establish a real world of artistic phenomena and to have access to it, preserving its particularity. This article aims at a critical reading of Edgar Wind’s early work, to unearth the deep roots of his thought and to bring to light the important philosophical and methodological questions at the basis of his work. The focussing on Wind’s investigation of some Rieglian key concepts has several justifications. The most obvious is that Wind regards Alois Riegl’s work as the first decisive contribution towards a redefinition of art history as an autonomous discipline governed by original rules.

It is well-known that, in the second decade of the twentieth century, the discipline of art history was almost exclusively dominated by a concern for form. Heinrich Wölfflin’s entire work may be defined as a search for a principle which could enable him to interpret a work of art and yet give an account of the transformation of art. He was looking for a constant which could justify the changes in style. Following Wind’s considerations, the risk which the art historians incurred was to commit themselves to a too formal, psychological or physiological approach, as for instance in the case of Wölfflin.

In *Das Problem des Stils in der bildenden Kunst* (1915) and *Der Begriff des Kunstwollens* (1920), Erwin Panofsky demonstrated that Wölfflin’s concepts were dependent upon empirical observation of individual works and lacked any guarantee...
that such observations were critically pertinent. ‘The problem was to turn those remarks about visible and historical objects into interpretative remarks about works of art. Panofsky attempted to construct such an authoritative viewpoint, one which would show how the various factors within a work of art cohered and the work took on the distinctive meaning *qua* work of art’.2

For a critically relevant investigation of art, as Panofsky conceived it, content and form, the two roots of style, must be considered in their inevitable interrelation, in their unitary common sense (*Sinn*), which is immanent in art, as the transcendental condition of our approach to art, and which must be investigated by means of transcendental categories that are specific for art interrogation and different from the causal nexus, which must rather be used for the investigation of the natural phenomena. According to Panofsky, the coherent unity and the unitary character that we recognize in an artistic phenomenon, or in a certain style or between different styles, does not derive from a principle inherent in the artistic objects or styles, and cannot therefore be obtained and explained by investigating their merely material or merely formal aspects. Rather, the unity and the unitary character that we recognize in an artistic phenomenon must be sought in our way of approaching art. And this, again, as for Kant in relation to the investigation of nature and of our knowledge in general, must necessarily be based, in the particular case of the artistic, on a transcendental principle of unity of the artistic experience. This unity is defined by Panofsky - borrowing and interpreting the famous Riegelian concept - as the *Kunstwollen*.3

The entire analysis of Riegl’s thought carried out by Panofsky was explicitly related to the problem of the definition of a unitary transcendental principle which could act as a principle of internal coherence for art interrogation. This concept, this transcendental principle fundamental to a coherent art interrogation and, at the same time, transcendentially determinable by the categories of the *Kunstwissenschaft* is the meaning - or sense - (*Sinn*). It was precisely in his Der Begriff des Kunstwollens4 that Panofky proposed to use the Riegelian conceptual pairs - first of all the *haptisch-optisch* pair - as possible categories for the determination of *Kunstwollen*, and it is in this context that the spark of Edgar Wind’s early reflections on art has to be sought.

In Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme,5 Wind demonstrates that precisely the opposition-relation between the concepts of content and form, of fullness

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5Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme’, *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, 18, 1925, 438-486. Unless differently specified, all the translations in this article are mine.
(Fülle)⁶ and form (Form), is the fundamental interpretative category, the Ur-problem, for the interrogation of the inherent meaning (Sinn, Kunstwollen) of the artwork. Against this background, I believe, the Windian conceptual pairs I have mentioned - i.e. the necessarily opposed and related concepts - reach their status of categories that are a priori valid. The particularity of these pairs emerges in Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft with the definition of the artistic problems (künstlerische Probleme), which are for Wind different from mathematical problems. So, as I shall show, they somehow introduce a difference - already implicit in Wind’s thesis, between a logical grammar and a grammar specific to the comprehension of the artistic, i.e. not aimed at a merely abstractive description of artistic events.⁷

In Theory of Art versus Aesthetics Wind quotes Alois Riegl’s affirmation that the best art historian was the one who had no taste.⁸ Far from being merely humorous, this sentence is taken quite seriously by Wind. As long as we do not identify ‘no taste’ with ‘bad taste’ this is not paradoxical. By postulating a sharp separation between aesthetic pleasure and theoretical judgment, Riegl’s aphorism represents for Wind the inevitable conflict which every art historian experiences in his work ‘and which he must overcome if he intends to be a conscientious worker: the conflict between contemplation and analysis, between aesthetic feeling and scientific judgment’.⁹ Instead of an art history based on the strong personalities or personal preferences of individual historians of art, Wind proposes a scientific history of art, a new discipline, no longer based on what impressions pictures make on human souls, but on the observation of works of art as a preformed material¹⁰ whose particular inherent coherence, immanent meaning (Sinn) needs to be respected and understood. As linking points between concrete material and intuitive (anschaulich) formal content,¹¹ works of art need to be investigated in respect of both these premises. This drives Wind to the proposal of a system of a priori theoretical instruments which can be used a posteriori, retrospectively, in order to obtain a description of the concrete¹² work of art and an appreciation of its particular artistic value independent from any aesthetic feeling.

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⁶I translate the word Fülle by the word fullness. This term means for Wind the totality of the concrete element of the work of art (its material and expressive content). Despite its ‘concreteness’, this term does not mean anything empirical and is rather to be understood as the ideal counterpart of the other element necessary for a critical interrogation of art: the form (Form). Together, in their indissoluble opposition-combination (Ausgleich), fullness and form represent for Wind the fundamental interpretative category for art interrogation. Further on the difficulties of this word, in Panofsky’s work, see Allister Neher, ‘The Concept of Kunstwollen’, 41-51, Erwin Panofsky, ‘On the Relationship of Art History and Art Theory’, 43-71 and Katharina Lorenz and Jas’ Elsner, ‘Translators’ Introduction’, 33-42.

⁷It would be a great temptation to try to make a comparison between Wind’s project of a Kunstwissenschaft and Riegl’s Historische Grammatik. But this is impossible in this context, first of all because, by about 1922, Wind probably did not have access to the text of Riegl’s lectures which were only published in 1966, by K.M. Swoboda and Otto Pächt, under the title of Historische Grammatik der bildenden Künste.


¹⁰As regards Panofsky’s and, in particular, Wind’s project of a Kunstwissenschaft, the consideration of the work of art as a preformed material is always a matter of transcendental reflection. In this sense, ‘preformation’ does not have to do with individual or collective intention (on this see also supra and Panofsky’s Der Begriff des Kunstwollens) but, rather, with our way of approaching the nature of art. It is precisely after this preliminary kunst- wissenschaftlich consideration that a historical-documentary investigation of art - on the basis of regulative principles - can be possible.


¹²Ideally considered as being an already given concrete combination of form and matter.
It is precisely in \textit{Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme} that Wind shows that every time we investigate an artwork \textit{qua} artwork (and not as a merely natural object) we express a judgement on it in terms of form and content. We ideally set a coherent and balanced unity of these two elements every time we investigate art. This coherent unity is presupposed as a necessary general rule for art investigation. It is a general condition for the investigation of art, but it is also, in particular, the goal of every investigation of an artwork. To put it in other words, we cannot think an artistic style in general without presupposing a principle of unitary coherence of content and form, but we also cannot investigate a specific artwork without looking in it for a particular coherence of content and form.

For Wind, developing Panofsky’s thesis, this general and particular unity, this unitary principle of coherence, is the \textit{Kunstwollen} and represents the condition of any possible stylistic investigation of art, and the horizon against which styles and artworks can be objectively investigated, and compared, in their particular, unitary and coherent articulation of form and content.

Wind refers - explicitly and often implicitly - to the thinker-artist parallelism, to the need for a \textit{Kunstwissenschaft} which is able to give to art interrogation the instruments which a linguistic grammar\textsuperscript{13} can give to the study of a language. For instance, Wind insists on the relation between sensuous sound and the conceptual - formal - content of a language. His considerations are not to be regarded as empirical. Rather, talking for instance about art, he shows how the \textit{sensuous} and the \textit{formal} elements, \textit{Fülle} and \textit{Form}, must be considered, a priori,\textsuperscript{14} as two necessary ideally opposed, and, at the same time, related, elements of a categorical opposition inherent to our way of approaching art.\textsuperscript{15}

By investigating the rules of coherence of art, Wind sets a linking point between the work of the artist and the work of the historian of art. We could call these rules a kind of common language which must be respected: by the artist if he wants the free expression of his ideas to be understood, and by the art historian if he wants to be honest to the artist’s intentions and to the particularity of his work. By the individuation of the rules of art Wind doesn’t want to set a norm for the artist, but only a condition.\textsuperscript{16} ‘The artistic imperative - he says - has not the categorical but the hypothetical form’.\textsuperscript{17} Wind’s art theory does not claim to say what the artist must do or not do; it merely postulates an internal coherence and legality (\textit{Gesetzlichkeit}) of the artist’s free work. It merely wants to demonstrate ‘the conclusions of the artist’s free decision’ by analyzing the system of rules which regulates that decision, by studying

\textsuperscript{14}I would say that for Wind the determination of the \textit{meaning} (\textit{Sinn}) as a merely empirical consideration would never work, since it would never show these two opposite elements in their necessary relation and so it could never get over a merely emotional appreciation of art. And the same would apply for Wind with a merely formal approach to art: it would never get over the limits of a merely abstractive description. It must be noted that Wind’s \textit{Kunstwissenschaft} is not merely ideal. It is a) \textit{concrete} (\textit{konkret}) and b) \textit{ideal} at the same time: a) it considers also the material content, the sensuous fullness (\textit{die sinnliche Fülle}), as a fundamental element of the artistic phenomenon; b) it considers fullness and form only in their ideal opposition-relation, as the two elements of a purely conceptual antithesis.
\textsuperscript{15}I have in mind here Wind’s rereading of Panofsky’s interpretation of Riegl’s \textit{haptisch-optisch} opposition.
\textsuperscript{17}Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 358. In fact, in order to respect the particularity of the artistic object, Wind’s transcendental \textit{Kunstwissenschaft} is \textit{re-constitutive} and not constitutive.
Consolato Latella  Wind and Riegli: ... a ‘problematical’ grammar

‘the problems which make the decision necessary’.18

In this article I will show what these artistic problems are and how it is possible - and what it means - to have a system of them. I will try show how Wind carries out his plan of a systematic study of art (Kunstwissenschaft) confronting the important heritage of the thought of Alois Riegl. It is my ultimate intention to illustrate the models and the conceptual categories early developed by Wind, evidently following, and largely completing, Panofsky’s problematic approach, and to pay attention to how Wind, with his thesis, gave a fundamental theoretical contribution19 to the project of a transcendental foundation of art investigation - particularly of visual art investigation - under the light of Kunstwollen.

I shall show how Wind’s fundamental artistic problems correspond to those fundamental categories of art interrogation required by Panofsky as absolutely necessary for the coherent investigation of art in accordance with - and for the determination of - the necessarily unitary principle of Kunstwollen.20 In this way, I shall focus on the logical-transcendental aspects and on the specific visual character of Wind’s early art-investigative thesis, in order to point out the cues, the solutions, the unresolved difficulties and the developments of this first stage of Wind’s particular research methodology which, in 1950, Wind himself will define as ‘a method of interpreting pictures which shows how ideas are translated into images, and images sustained by ideas’.21 By doing so, I will show that the Kunstwissenschaft developed by Wind has both a critical and a regulative intent and helps, as a compass, the art historian with their historical investigation. It does not pretend to define the essence of art, but shows how we can approach art without depriving it of its autonomous character.

The ‘artistic problems’ (die »künstlerischen Probleme«)

In order to understand what it means, for Wind, to investigate art starting from systematic fundamentals - i.e. within a kunstwissenschaftlich approach - it is necessary to carry out an in depth analysis of what he calls the ‘artistic problems’ (die »künstlerische Probleme«),22 bearing in mind that, according to him, our way of approaching art always rests on a necessary transcendental antithesis, a necessary polarity, an opposition-combination between two opposite and at the same time necessary orders: Fülle and Form.

Wind himself found it necessary to give an account of the particular function of the artistic problems at the beginning of his Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, distinguishing them from what he calls the ‘pre-artistic assignments’ (die »vorkünstlerischen Aufgaben«),23 which, according to him, consist in general aspects of

18 Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 358. See also Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 471-474, where Wind writes about the importance of his mediating scheme that is described later in this article.
artistic activity, such as the technique or the theme chosen for the realization of an artwork. In order to introduce the meaning of *artistic problems* - which I would call the ‘instruments’, the interpretative categories, of Wind’s *Kunstwissenschaft* - I would summarise by saying that for Wind they consist in pairs of opposite-related transcendental concepts - for instance *Fülle* and *Form* - which must be used for the interrogation of art by regarding the work of art as a specific already given conciliation of their opposition.

In order to illustrate his own concept of *artistic problem*, Wind takes the distances from the habit - frequent in his time - of defining as *history by problems* (*Problemegeschichte*) the research that Wölfflin himself used to define as *history of art without names* (*Kunstgeschichte ohne Namen*).24 Wind maintains that the analysis of *problems* does not have anything to do with the search for variations “in the use of light and shadows, in the perspective and the representation of space”25 nor with the indication of changes “in the portrayal of figures, dresses or trees”.26 Rather, whoever carries out this kind of observation ‘still only takes care of the formal qualities of the artwork, of the characteristics of its outer appearance”27 and, like the botanist (*wie der Botaniker*),28 proceeds by means of descriptions and morphologic comparisons, even if he does not order the objects in classes by kinds and species, but on the basis of a linear chronological succession.29 So, as Wind himself maintains,

> however necessary and unavoidable this way of observing may be for the progress of the formulation of systematic judgments on art, it does not directly touch the problems themselves, although every investigation of problems must move from it and must finally be able to recall to it; the appearances (*Erscheinungen*) as such are not yet ‘problems’; rather, these begin precisely where the ‘interpretation’ takes the place of the mere ‘description’.30

But, for Wind, there is something much more worrying than a misuse of the term ‘problem’ due to a lack of terminological precision. Much more worrisome for him is the case in which, behind the linguistic inaccuracy, there is also a substantial exchange between the terms of his distinction: ‘pre-artistic assignments’ and ‘artistic problems’. Both of them are for Wind beyond the appearances (*Erscheinungen*)

25 ‘›der Licht- und Schatten-behandlung, der Perspektive und Raumdarstellung‹’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 438. For a much more readable typographic appearance, within this article I have chosen always to use *italic* characters instead of Wind’s expanded letter-spacing for the highlighting of important words and expressions (both for the original German text and for the English translation). Unless differently specified, the *italic* character within quotations from Wind’s text is due to this aim.
themselves, although in very opposite directions.\footnote{Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439.}

The first class, the pre-artistic assignments (vorkünstlerische Aufgaben), are obtained through the reconstruction of the facts preliminary to the artistic, which consist of material and ideal components: a wall of a certain dimension, inside a determined space, to be painted with colours in a precise combination, and a subject, a theme, to be represented, for instance, a battle. In this sense, as Wind himself maintains, both the material and the ideal components are still shapeless and completely non-intuitive (unanschaulich), but at the same time, for exactly this reason, both are suitable for use as points of comparison for different picture formations (Bildgestaltungen),\footnote{Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439.} since it is then ‘in the position statement on the common preliminary conditions’ that ‘the intuitive particularity (anschauliche Besonderheit) of the artwork expresses itself.’\footnote{Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439.} If the documents relative to an eventual commission or a contest of contract are not available to us, the preliminary facts (der Tatbestand) have to be reconstructed from the works of art themselves through abstraction (Abstraktion), i.e. putting aside the specific sensuous appearance of the finished work of art, and only determining the technique as such,\footnote{For instance - in relation to the previous example - the fresco.} the choice of the topic\footnote{For instance the representation of a battle.} and the other similar general aspects. Then, it is possible to refer to these abstractions the most different concrete formations (Gestaltungen).\footnote{Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439.}

Totally different is the case of artistic problems. As I have said above, the Fülle-Form antithesis is the fundamental artistic problem. The ideal formulation of the problem related to the relationship between the formal element and the element related to the sensuous data, to the plenum of experience, is the starting point of Wind’s investigation of art.\footnote{Moreover, it is precisely when a system of problems is found that the Kunstwissenschaft becomes a Systematik.} According to Wind, they represent no empirical facts at all and, therefore, can be determined neither through abstraction nor through reconstruction. Their function is to allow an interpretation of the artwork, and they must therefore have an origin immanent in the artistic (immanent-künstlerisch).\footnote{Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439.} So, the Windian artistic problems must have a transcendental origin, i.e. an origin immanent in our way of approaching and interrogating art.

They also differ structurally from the pre-artistic assignments: these last, in fact, acting as external points of comparison, must necessarily have a univocal or even schematic character, while artistic problems, as interpretative instruments, point to an internal division (Spaltung),\footnote{Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439.} since ‘in order to see something as an ‘artistic performance’\footnote{Um etwas als «künstlerische Leistung» zu begreifen, muß ich es als Lösung eines vorher Ungelösten ansehen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 440.} we have to ‘consider it as the solution to something which was previously unsolved’,\footnote{Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439.} i.e. we must ‘set a conflict which in the artistic appearance

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
  \item[31] Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439.
  \item[33] In der Stellungnahme zu den gemeinsamen Vorbedingungen äußert sich die anschauliche Besonderheit’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439.
  \item[34] For instance - in relation to the previous example - the fresco.
  \item[35] For instance the representation of a battle.
  \item[37] Moreover, it is precisely when a system of problems is found that the Kunstwissenschaft becomes a Systematik.
  \item[38] Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439.
  \item[40] Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 439.
\end{itemize}}
(Erscheinung) presents itself as ‘conciliated’, which, more explicitly, means that ‘in the thought we must set the problem whose solution must be found only in the intuitive’.  

As we have seen, the setting of a ‘problem’ means, for Wind, something like a transcendental activity of thought, like the formulation of a transcendental conceptual antithesis, and this explains why for Wind it does not have an empirical status. The only way to understand the sense of Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft is to keep in mind that, for him, the setting of a ‘problem’ is something inherent in our way of approaching art: whatever the artistic object may be, the subject - the kunstwissenschaftlich transcendental subject - cannot do anything but approach art considering the artwork as a coherent combination of a material and a formal element. But both of these elements - it is important to recall this here - are for Wind nothing empirical: they are just two necessarily opposed-related elements constituting a transcendental category which the subject must apply in order to see - and, then, to interrogate - something as an artistic performance. In this sense, the artistic problems, these antithetical pairs, must be inherent to the artistic (immanent-künstlerisch).

There is yet another important Windian passage which requires to be correctly understood and which could help in illustrating how Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft is supposed to work, how his conceptual transcendental devices should operate. I am referring to the place where Wind says that ‘therefore, the mutually opposed principles cannot be logical-conceptual ones’, and that, at the same time, ‘vice versa, the opposition itself cannot be comprised if not logically’. Once again Wind clarifies his own position through a distinction, this time between two different types of problems: he asserts that artistic problems ‘hold in themselves an antithetical conflict which is set by the thought, but which is, however, not an antithetical conflict for the thought’, and adds that ‘an ‘artistic problem’ always subsists [...] - as a problem - only for the thought of a systematic investigation of art: nevertheless, it is an artistic problem and not a thought problem’. The following, Wind’s own example, sheds light on this difficult passage:

43‘Im Denken muß also das Problem gesetzt sein, dessen Lösung nur im Anschaulichen zu finden ist’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 440. As to an interpretative translation of this Windian passage, it can be worth referring to what Silvia Ferretti writes in her Silvia Ferretti, ‘Edgar Wind: dalla filosofia alla storia dell’arte’, La Cultura, 1991, 349: ‘La soluzione del problema artistico si trova solo nell’intuitivo, ma il problema in se stesso, il conflitto presente nell’attività artistica, deve essere posto in sede logica’ (transl: ‘The solution to the artistic problem lies only in the intuitive, but the problem in itself, i.e. the conflict present in the artistic activity, must be set in the logical field’).
44For this, see also further in this article and Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 458.
45Considered in their pureness (Reinheit). This also explains the reason why Wind maintains that ‘the totality of what is artistic belongs to the region of the concrete-intuitive, so the antithetical conflict must refer to this intuitive sphere (‘alles Künstlerische aber der konkret-anschaulichen Region angehört, so muß sich die Antithetik auf eben diese anschauliche Sphäre beziehen’), Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 440.
46Exactly in their being opposed and, at the same time, necessarily related.
48die Prinzipien, die miteinander im Widerstreit liegen, dürfen also keine logisch-begrifflichen sein’ and ‘umgekehrt kann aber der Widerstreit selbst nicht anders als logisch verstanden werden’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 440.
Every mathematical problem is set by the mathematical thought for the mathematical thought, so that the ‘problem’ constitutes the first thesis to which the further thought refers. On the other hand, an ‘artistic problem’ is set by the thought of the systematic study of art for the artistic work, - not in such way that the problem precedes the solution, but, on the contrary, so that the problem is just sought-after - by means of a reflection - for the interpretation of the solution. So, it happens the paradoxical case that given the solution - i.e. the artwork\(^{51}\) - the problem is posed, - posed so that the solution is conceived as ‘solution’.\(^ {52}\)

It is important to bear in mind the particular meaning of this passage: Wind here confronts the fact that the work of art is a given object which has to be investigated. His strategy is to see it, retrospectively, as if it were the solution of an unsolved conceptual antithetical problem made up of the categorical opposition Fülle-Form, the a priori instrument which we cannot help applying transcendentally in the interrogation of art. Nevertheless, at precisely this point, the difficulty of claiming a parallel between logical grammar and kunstwissenschaftlich grammar arises. Wind himself admits the difficulty of claiming to investigate the meaning of real objects with merely - albeit transcendental - instruments. As it appears from this passage, the work of art - the solution, as Wind calls it - does not belong to the conceptual world, although we try to investigate it in accordance with our particular point of view. In fact, although something - for instance an artistic object - can be seen as a solution to an ideal opposition, this solution itself is never conceptual, i.e. it is always absolutely different compared to thought. It is exactly this problematic relation between our ideas and the object we try to interpret that marks the starting point for Wind’s further developments of his own theory, for his encounter with American pragmatism and the new way of reading Kant considering the mutual interaction between a priori structures and given facts of experience.\(^ {53}\)

However, on these premises, I think it is evident why for Wind the procedure

\(^{51}\)Seen as a solution to the fullness-form problem.

\(^{52}\)Jedes mathematische Problem wird vom mathematischen Denken für das mathematische Denken gestellt, und zwar derart, daß das »Problem« die Anfangsthese ist, an welche das weitere Denken anknüpft. Ein »künstlerisches Problem« dagegen wird vom kunstwissenschaftlichen Denken für das künstlerische Schaffen angesetzt, - aber nicht derart, daß das Problem der Lösung vorhergeht, sondern so, daß es zur Deutung der Lösung erst gesucht wird. Es liegt also der paradoxen Fall vor, daß die Lösung gegeben, das Problem aufgegeben ist, - aufgegeben, damit die Lösung als »Lösung« begriffen werde', Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 440.

\(^{53}\)The experimental way, as I would describe Wind’s further theories, leads to a new conception of the role of the investigative instruments. Wind’s instruments will no longer be ideal but physical: the validity of our ideal hypotheses on our non ideal world (either physical or artistic) will be tested exactly in their applicability in an instrument belonging to the absolutely non ideal world. The physicist investigates the world in this way: if his hypothesis is able to be embodied in an instrument, i.e. if an instrument is constructed in accordance with his theory, his theory itself will reveal itself as valid. Wind will illustrate how this particular approach based on the use of historical - rather than ideal - instruments, this jump from ideality into history, is possible and even necessary for the investigation of both historical documents and artistic objects as well. On this see Wind in Edgar Wind, ‘Experiment and Metaphysics’, Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy at Harvard University ..., 1926, Brightman, 1927, 217-224, and in Edgar Wind, Das Experiment und die Metaphysik. Zur Auflösung der kosmologischen Antinomien, Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1934. New German ed.: Edgar Wind, Das Experiment und die Metaphysik. Zur Auflösung der kosmologischen Antinomien, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001. English transl.: Edgar Wind, Experiment and Metaphysics. Towards a Resolution of the Cosmological Antinomies, Oxford: European Humanities Research Center of the University of Oxford, Legenda, 2001.
for the setting of the ‘artistic problems’ cannot be reconstructive or based on an abstraction.54 Certainly, this procedure cannot be the result of a pure - I would say ‘elaborative’ - thought unfolding in itself, as the thought which - according to Wind’s example - is at the basis of the formulation of mathematical problems. Rather, the ‘artistic problems’ are the result of a speculative reflection (spekulative Reflexion), of a thought which ‘from ready given facts ‘goes back’ to problems’,55 and which ‘for the interpretation of the appearances tries to go beyond them and does not ‘abstract’ from the appearances’.56

In this paragraph, I have tried to outline the fundamental aspects of the two opposite methods of art interrogation described by Wind. I have shown how for Wind the abstractive reconstruction (abstraktive Rekonstruktion)57 only reaches the definition of the pre-artistic assignments, while the speculative reflection (spekulative Reflexion)58 sets the artistic problems, the instruments which enable the interpretation of the artwork, i.e. which enable us to consider it in its unitary coherence and attain its inherent meaning (Sinn). I have shown how Wind focuses on the speculative reflection, on the production of a conceptual antithesis to which the work of art can be seen as a particular solution, on the study of the antitheses aimed at the interpretation. What I shall try to show in the next paragraph is how Wind problematically refers to Riegl’s thought for the definition of the instruments and of the principle of his own transcendental approach.

The two Riegl’s visions of history: significance (Bedeutsamkeit) and effectiveness (Wirksamkeit).

In Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme,59 Wind refers several times to Alois Riegl. In particular, he points out as a fundamental characteristic of Riegl’s thought the tendency to identify ‘latent oppositions’ (»latente Gegensätze»), ‘problems requiring reconciliation’ (»Probleme zur Versöhnung»), constantly generating one from the other. He investigates Riegl’s particular methodology of art interrogation - based on the study of pairs of antithetical concepts (Antithetik) - developed by Riegl in his Spätrömische Kunstindustrie. In Wind’s opinion, Riegl’s problems do not only have an interpretative function as means of systematic interpretation (Deutung).60 Rather, for Wind, Riegl sees his own conceptual pairs much more as historical factors, i.e. as ‘determinations serving not so much to interpret the appearances as such, as to interpret their development’.61 In this sense, the development immanent in art represented in this way by Riegl is purer than that shown to us by Wölfflin, since the Riegelian version does not have a psychological but a logical origin, since it is the ‘logic in the succession of the ‘artistic problems’ themselves which gives to the development its own sense: every new ‘solution’ produces necessarily new ‘problems’, and, in this way,

54For Wind, only the setting of the ‘pre-artistic assignments’ (vorkünstlerische Aufgaben) is based on abstraction and reconstruction. Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 440-441.
60Which I think would have made them evidently much more similar to Wind’s own problems.
the individual form of the development is understood directly from the logic; while, for the psychological interpretation, the process gets something ‘plausible’ only once it can be covered by a general formula’. 62

In fact, as Wind explicitly tells in his paper of 1925, several critiques were aimed at Riegl, some of them based on factual considerations, others pointed at the principles ruling Riegl’s logic of development, i.e. against the possibility of applying a logic to the development. According to Wind, the first critiques were based on the fact that it would be possible to locate phenomena which are not classifiable within the Riegelian logic. The others were built on the consideration that the principles ruling such a logic would denaturalize historical life (das geschichtliche Leben). In particular, Wind’s statements are aimed at refuting the value of these last critiques, 63 which according to him are formulated on the unjustified idea that the development can be understood as a real-psychological process (als realpsychologischen Prozeß). 64 On the contrary, in fact, Wind is sure Riegl’s artistic problems are ideal: ‘So, since the ‘problems’ are by nature ideal constructions, their sequence cannot be understood as a real event. When we talk about the ‘logic’ of their sequence, we cannot mean the lawlikeness65 of a real course, but only the ideal consistency with which every solution of a problem gives rise to the creation of a new problem’. 66

Although Riegl’s language - caught up in the psychological theories of his time - might conceal at some point this important distinction, according to Wind, Riegl almost always avoided the risk of allowing a confusion between the artistic problems and the really operative forces. 67 This can be demonstrated by considering the strong contrast set by Riegl between Kunstwollen and artistic problems, which are not classed with Kunstwollen, but rather set opposite it. 68 This strong opposition is highlighted by Wind when he maintains that Riegl explicitly placed particular emphasis on the autonomous efficacy (autonome Wirksamkeit) of Kunstwollen. In fact, according to Wind, although Riegl saw the Kunstwollen as a real force (reale Kraft), 69 he also stressed that it


64 ‘In dem »Kunstwollen« erblickt er in der Tat eine reale Kraft; aber ausdrücklich betont er ihre autonome Wirksamkeit‘, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 443.
cannot be determined by any external conditions, which means that it cannot be affected by the artistic problems.70 ‘The problems [...] do not affect the Kunstwollen, they only constitute ideal substructures built in order to be the points where to start from for the comprehension of the particular Kunstwollen. Riegl constructs the ‘problematic situation’ in order to measure the Kunstwollen against it, not in order to deduce the Kunstwollen from it’.71

At this point it begins to be clear - and also vital for the comprehension of Wind’s interpretation of Riegl’s thought - that what Wind is presenting in his paper of 1925 is what he believes is the double-sided nature of Riegl’s reflection on art. According to Wind, it is evident that Riegl’s conception and investigation of the development of art in history presents two absolutely different and at the same time coexisting visions. The first is represented by the region of artistic problems and their solutions, the region of theoretical significance (Bedeutsamkeit). The second consists in the region of Kunstwollen, the region of psychological effectiveness (Wirksamkeit)72 which, as Wind reminds us, has to be regarded as undetermined73 and, therefore, cannot be defined as a logic of development.

For Wind, the region to which the problematic situation (Problemilage) belongs is evidently that of theoretical significance (Bedeutsamkeit), where the artistic appearances are conceived by Riegl as ideal contents, interpretable by means of a particular study of pairs of antithetical concepts - a doctrine of contrasts (Antithetik) - and where their succession is seen by him as an immanent-logic development.74 On the other hand, when Riegl looks for the force which, in each individual case, causes (bewirkt) the solutions, Riegl is - according to Wind - interpreting the development of art as a dynamic-psychological process, which no longer relates to a Logos (»Logos«), but only to an ultimate aim (»Telos«).75 So, while in the first sphere the development - and I would add understanding of the development - is based on merely logical and coherent necessity, on the fact that every new solution provokes (»provozierte«) new problems, in the second sphere, the dynamic-psycological,76 Kunstwollen is no longer something which can be measured against the problems, but rather something with its own objectives (Zielsetzungen) and its own aspirations (Strebungen) so that what can be asked here is only to which direction the Kunstwollen is inclined (»tendiere«).77 The contemporaneous presence of these two different scopes within Riegl’s investigation of the history of art does not represent, for Wind, a contradiction, but only a double-sidedness, a conflict which escaped the critics of Riegl and misled them. In fact, they

73It cannot be determined by external conditions. See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 443-444.
76Thus called by Wind in opposition to the first which is, rather, related to the objects in their ideality (ideal-gegenständliche Sphäre). Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 444.
77Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 444. In particular, Wind refers as an example - in a footnote - to Riegl’s Das holländische Gruppenporträtt (222), where according to him a particular Telos is implied by Riegl in Rembrandt’s development. See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, n. 1, 444.
missed ‘the dualism of ‘ideal contents’ and ‘efficient forces’’, and hurriedly attributed the idea of ‘logic’ - and I would add of logicality - to the efficient forces. So, for Wind, Riegl’s successors are those scholars who, consciously or not, neutralized this dualism by choosing one of the two aspects, and rereading and developing the Rieglian theory in either logical or psychological key.

According to Wind, Panofsky managed to carry out the logical qualification (logische Weiterbildung) of Riegl’s thought, and gave the first sample of the systematic interrogation of art called by Wind himself ‘speculative reflexion’ («spekulative Reflexion»). By stressing the importance of ideality in art investigation, and by moving Kunstwollen, in full consciousness, from the field of purely psychological effectiveness to the field of theoretical meaning - i.e. by considering Kunstwollen and artistic problems in the same ideal sphere - Panofsky obtained the result that Kunstwollen was no longer the real force which produces the solution, but, rather, the ideal sense (Sinn) of the solution itself.

The second possible approach, clearly opposed to the former perspective, is the psychological interpretation (psychologische Auffassung) of Riegl’s doctrine. This position is described by him as based on an unconscious veiling of Riegelian dualism and starts from a psychologistic (psychologistisch) rereading of Riegl’s ‘artistic problems’. These no longer have, under this light, their character of ideal constructions (ideale Setzungen), but are, on the contrary, marked as efficient factors (wirkende Faktoren). In fact, for Wind, trying to establish the importance - the significant space (bedeutenden Raum) - of these artistic problems within artistic creation, and trying to investigate whether these artistic problems are objectively determinable can only make sense if these artistic problems are considered as psychological facts (psychologische Realitäten) requiring reconstruction (Rekonstruktion).

I believe that on this point Wind is very clear. He means that, while a logical-theoretical interpretation of Kunstwollen and of artistic problems consists in approaching the artworks and the development in art by means of ideal instruments, i.e. with a speculative reflection, a psychological interpretation of artistic problems and Kunstwollen consists in interrogating art by means of instruments which are not at our immediate disposal, and must be reconstructed. So the method which leads to the determination of psychological factors involved in an artistic creation is the same method by which the pre-artistic facts are attainable: the abstractive reconstruction. In fact, since the psychological factors are still not available, this reconstruction must be based on an abstraction, exactly as in the case when the non-given real facts (Tatbestand), the non-given pre-artistic assignments (vorkünstlerische Aufgaben) - since the decisive documents are missing or somehow corrupted - require reconstructing. For

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79 Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 445. As Wind says, ‘For the discovery of both of them - i.e. for the discovery of the Kunstwollen and of the artistic problems - the same conditions must be decisive’ (‘Für die Entdeckung beider mußten die gleichen Bedingungen maßgebend sein’), Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 445.
85 Transcendentally valid, since they are immanent in our way of approaching art.
86 Since they are not immanent in our way of approaching art.
this reason the scholars who see the *problems* as facts have a great appreciation of the abstractive method. This predisposition to abstraction is emblematically exemplified by Wind in quoting Hans Tietze, who says: ‘There is no systematic ready network of questions, [...] rather, there are only concrete problems, which are partly ready, i.e. consciously given (!), partly the abstraction (!) of a really existing connection’.87

In this way, Wind considers the *ideality* of the artistic problems definitely recognized and established. The other option would be to investigate art in a psychological and abstractive way, but this approach would only lead again to a methodology far distant from Wind’s proposal and implicitly focussed only on pre-artistic assignments.88 In my opinion, the psychological interpretation of Riegl’s doctrine would be only focussed on what precedes the artistic, losing the chance to discover what is immanent in the artistic, i.e. the categories and the principle that we put into play when we call an object an *artistic* object. In this last possibility Wind’s proposal consists: since it is the transcendental investigation of our way of approaching art, it does not require us to care about the temporal succession of the problems. Wind is now sure he can omit every specifically historical meaning (*Bedeutung*) acquired by the ‘*problems*’ within Riegl’s own doctrine: ‘It is possible to disregard the temporal succession of the problems, it is possible to omit to consider through which preceding solution the problem under discussion is ‘provoked’’.90

According to Wind, it will always remain the fact - the systematic, basic fact (*Grundfaktum*) - that every artistic appearance in general (*künstlerische Erscheinung überhaupt*) is based on a ‘problem’, and that this problem rests on a ‘latent opposition’ (*»latenten Gegensatz«*).91

But, in my opinion, moving the plane of the discussion to a higher -transcendental - level does not free Wind from the obligation to reconsider in a systematic way the previously merely historical observation.92 The historically perceptible succession of artistic phenomena, the historically perceptible fact that every new solution ‘provokes’ new problems, becomes - in the perspective of the systematic organization attempted by Wind - the ascertaining of the presence of ‘an enormous number of different problems, which can always be joined by new ones’,93 and with

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88From which, as Wind has particularly stressed, the artistic problems need to be *frequenter* distinguished.

90Transcendentally considered, i.e. paying attention to the condition for possibility of the *artistic object* in general.

91Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 446.

92See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 446.

which the *kustwissenschaftlich* art historian has somehow to deal. This consideration
involves for Wind a new question: ‘but, then, do these problems have any root in a
priori at all? Do principles exist which are basic to them all alike? - if because of its
psychological realism we have attacked the sentence of Tietze just quoted - perhaps his
first words are, however, legitimate: “There is no systematic ready network of
questions, [...] rather, there are only concrete problems”’.\(^9\) As I anticipated, Wind’s
proposal is based on the location of the fundamental problem, the categorical antithesis
fundamental to art interrogation: *Fülle-Form*.

The systematic root of the artistic problems: the *Fülle-Form* antithesis and the
*Kunstwollen*

Wind’s *Kunstwissenschaft*, as a transcendental systematic study of art, claims to be
merely a reflection on the possible way of approaching art, preserving the particularity
of the artistic object in general, and without trying to reduce the particular nature of art
to the mere product of different non-artistic factors.\(^9\) At the same time, it is now clear
that Wind’s quest for the systematic root of the artistic problems is aimed at
considering the problematical and antithetical pairs introduced by Riegl as ideal
instruments, and not as a loose sum of concrete individual data.\(^9\)

In this sense, the *Fülle-Form* opposition-relation is for Wind the key to the
approach to art. He does not claim that *Fülle* and *Form* are the seminal elements
actually producing a work of art, since this would rather be a psychological approach
to art. Philosophical aesthetics may claim to get to the efficient causes of art and of the
artistic objects. Wind does not claim to have found the *philosopher’s stone* for the
determination of art: i.e. for the individuation of either the formal-conceptual or
historical-empirical or psychological factors producing art. His *Kunstwissenschaft* is not
a recipe for a universal and univocal interpretation of every artistic phenomenon.
Rather, within Wind’s investigation of our way of approaching art,\(^9\) the *Fülle-Form*
antithetical pair is the transcendental category which we inevitably apply in every
interrogation of art and artistic objects in general.

Wind is not trying to classify artworks under general abstracted ideas, as
Wölfflin did by proposing to choose the general concept which we may think better
fitting for the formal description of the works of art of a period. Wölfflin’s concept of
style was descriptive and merely morphological, i.e. based on an option between two
contrasting general concepts deduced by means of an abstractive empirical-
psychological art investigation; Wind’s concept of style is absolutely different. *Fülle*
and *Form* are not options, not concepts aimed at grouping artworks. Developing
Panofsky’s early proposal for a transcendental investigation of our way of

\(^{94}\) ‘Haben diese Probleme aber dann überhaupt eine Wurzel im Apriori? Gibt es Prinzipien, die ihnen allen
in gleicher Weise zugrunde liegen? - Wenn wir den oben zitierten Satz Tietzes wegen seines
psychologischen Realismus angriffen, - vielleicht bestehen seine ersten Worte dennoch zu Recht: »Es gibt
kein systematisch bereitete Netz von Fragen, [...] es gibt nur konkrete Probleme [...]?«, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur
Systematik’, 446.

\(^{95}\) For Wind maintains that the instruments (the artistic problems) we have to use in art interrogation are
immanent in the artistic, i.e. are transcendentally immanent in our way of approaching art.

\(^{96}\) See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 446.

\(^{97}\) Cf. what Panofsky says, using Wind’s doctoral dissertation’s model for a *Kunstwissenschaft*, in Erwin
interrogating art, Wind considers art a necessary composition between both the element of form and the element of content. His approach to art is thus not based on a choice but, rather, on the transcendental consideration that, when we look at an artistic object, we do not determine its style by an option between two general formal descriptions of the object itself, but rather by approaching the artwork as if it were a balance (Ausgleich) between the two opposite and (at the same time) necessary elements constituting the artistic object in general: Fülle and Form.

For Wind, then, style is not to be defined by choosing between two opposite general concepts aimed at describing the mere form of a work of art. Rather, for him, the style of a work of art can be defined only by approaching the artistic object as if it were a specific, particular, coherent and necessarily unitary balance (Ausgleich) between two opposite albeit necessary elements, whose necessary opposition-combination is not abstract, but transcendental, i.e. immanent in our way of looking at art and therefore immanent in art. As I have shown, Wind does not approach the concreteness of the artistic object by abstracting a merely formal element from the concrete object. Rather, he considers the two elements, Fülle and Form, as both constituting the conditions of objectivity - this is the sense of Wind’s concept of concreteness - of the artistic object. And this concreteness is obviously not empirical, but considered by Wind only in its pureness, i.e. transcendentally.

It is evident at this point how Wind’s concepts of style, Kunstwollen and immanent Sinn are closely connected and - as I would dare to say - interchangeable. I would say that for Wind the style of an artistic appearance can be determined only if we consider the elements of the artistic problems in their purity, i.e. as two ideal - although absolutely opposite - elements, both necessary and coherently combined for the objectivity of the work of art. We can determine the style of an artistic object if we interrogate it as if it were a coherent balance (Ausgleich) between these opposite ideal elements. This means that, in order to see an object as a work of art, we have to assume it to be governed by a rule of coherence, we have to approach it by considering it, ideally, as if it were a coherent and unitary combination of formal and material elements. So, for art interrogation to be possible, we have to assume the presence of a principle of logical internal coherence, which we can call a general Kunstwollen or, more accurately, the Kunstwollen, the immanent Sinn immanent in the artistic object in general. And this principle of internal coherence is immanent in the artistic object in general only because it is immanent in our way of approaching art. Each time, we have to investigate this necessary coherence by means of the Fülle-Form categorical antithesis. But then, each time that we try to determine a style, we could also say - borrowing Wind’s own words - that we measure the general and immanent Kunstwollen against the fundamental artistic problem, in order to comprehend the particular Kunstwollen (das jeweilige Kunstwollen). And this perfectly illustrates how Wind

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99See also Panofsky’s problematic illustration of the relation between form and content in art in Erwin Panofsky, ‘Das Problem des Stils’, 460-467.
100As we, as finite beings, can know it.
103For a comparison between the Kantian transcendental unity of experience and what I would call the ‘Windian transcendental unity of artistic experience’ see supra.
104In a way that reminds us of the Kantian use of the cause-effect relation.
105See supra and Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 443: ‘The problems [...] do not affect the Kunstwollen, they
developed Panofsky’s complex and problematical statement that the interrogation of a work of art implicitly requires a coherent unitary principle, an immanent Sinn, which at the same time can only be determined by a category particular to art interrogation.106

The surprising synonymity which I have tried to show between the concepts of Kunstwollen, style and Sinn in Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft sheds more light on the systematic root of Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft. It sheds more light on Wind’s preference for a logical interpretation of Riegl’s concept of the Kunstwollen, and explains what Wind means by suggesting that we bring the Kunstwollen within the logic-ideal transcendental sphere, where the artistic problems are also supposed to be located. But it shows too the fundamental importance of the Fülle-Form antithesis, which now really reveals itself as the logical keynote of Wind’s transcendental approach to art, and, at the same time, as the key to Wind’s early art interrogation. Wind called it the Urantithese or the Urproblem.107 The Fülle-Form antithesis lies behind108 what Wind calls the fundamental concept (Grundbegriff)109 of the entire theory of art, behind the concept (Begriff) of the ‘concretely-intuitive’ (des »Konkret-Anschaulichen«). At this point, it is thus even more evident how urgent is, for Wind, a deduction and a systematization of the problems, the principles, which can offer guidance in art interrogation, in stylistic comparisons and in art documentary investigation.

only constitute ideal substructures built in order to be the starting points for the comprehension of the particular Kunstwollen. Riegl constructs the ‘problematic situation’ in order to measure the Kunstwollen against it, not in order to deduce the Kunstwollen from it (‘Die Probleme - so dürfen wir daraus schließen - wirken nicht auf das Kunstwollen ein, sie bilden nur ideale Substruktionen, die man errichtet, um von ihnen aus das jeweilige Kunstwollen zu erfassen. Riegl konstruiert die »Problemlage«, um das Kunstwollen an ihr zu messen, nicht um es aus ihr abzuleiten’).106

The single and individual (das Eine) [work of art] presupposes the use and the determination of the concept of Kunstwollen: [it demands] that any interpretation aimed at the inner significance of an artistic phenomenon must comprehend that phenomenon as a unity: [it demands] that (daß) formal and imitative elements (in contrast to Wölfflin’s doctrine of the ‘double root of style’) need not be reduced to separable and, on their part, irreducible concepts. They must be understood as different manifestations of a common fundamental tendency, the comprehension of which, in this particular sense (als solche), is precisely the task of the real ‘fundamentals of art history’, in Erwin Panofsky, ‘The Concept of Artistic Volition’, Critical Inquiry, 8: 1, 1981, 26, translation modified. The German text: ‘Denn das Eine setzt ja der Gebrauch wie die Bestimmung des Begriffes Kunstwollen voraus: daß jedes künstlerische Phänomen für eine auf seine innere Bedeutsamkeit abzielende Interpretation als eine Einheit erfaßbar sei: daß „formale“ und „imitative“ Elemente - entgegen der Wölfllinschen Lehre von einer „doppelten Wurzel des Stils“ - nicht auf gesonderte und ihreite irreducible Begriffe gebracht zu werden brauchen, sondern als die verschiedensten Äußerungen einer gemeinsamen Grundtendenz begriffen werden können, einer Tendenz, die als solche zu erfassen eben die Aufgabe wirklicher „Grundbegriffe der Kunstgeschichte“ ist’, in Erwin Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’, 321-339 (here in Erwin Panofsky, Aufsätze zu Grundfragen der Kunstwissenschaft, Berlin: Volker Spiess, 1980, 35).


109The Windian evocation - although implicit and in a different interpretative context - of this Wölfflinian term loads the Windian Kunstwissenschaft with a particular meaning: Wind’s transcendental systematic study of art can be seen as the development and definitive fulfillment of Panofsky’s discussion of Wölfflin’s Grundbegriffe. For Panofsky’s position see Erwin Panofsky, ‘Das Problem des Stils’, 460-467 and Erwin Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens, 321-339.'
The a priori deduction

The investigation of the artistic proposed by Wind rests on the localization or, more accurately, on the conceptual setting of latent problems in the work of art. The fullness-form antithesis is, as we have seen above, the Urproblem, the interpretative category on which the possibility of finding an horizon of sense (Sinn) in art is founded. The question arising in Wind’s mind, at this point, is evidently this: how can this Kunstwissenschaft regulate the art historian’s job? To put it in other words, Wind is impelled to show how the transcendental foundation of a systematic study of art can really be followed by the deduction of a system, a table, of problems or principles coherently connected, which can be considered as the golden compass for the documentary study of art. Even more fundamentally, the question is: how can a stylistic objective comparison take place?

The first attempt in this sense is made by Wind in testing the value of the pairs of antithetical concepts which Panofsky suggested be borrowed from Riegl and used as categorical tools for art interrogation: haptical-optical haptisch-optisch and subjectivistic-objectivistic subjektivistisch-objektivistisch. As we have seen above, for Wind, the opposite elements constituting these antithetical pairs can be neither empirical nor psychological. So, as Wind explicitly maintains, his first attempt to define the system of regulative principles for art interrogation is an a priori deduction.

The true origin of the optisch-haptisch opposition is sought by Wind in a transcendental context. He locates this opposition by reflecting on the fundamental concept of the whole theory of art, ‘which really reveals the region of the artistic to thought: the concept of the ‘concretely-intuitive’’. This last concept, as we have seen above, is brought back by Wind to the fundamental opposition for the investigation of art in general: fullness-form (Fülle-Form), which, ‘in order to be specifically marked for the figurative arts, needs two intuitive orders - both related, and, at the same time, opposed, to each other - expressing the sensuous-elementary condition of this art’. Thus the antithetical conceptual pair optical-haptic (optisch-haptisch) is not a really fundamental category, but only the first level of specification of the fullness-form antithesis for the investigation of the visual art.

Optical and haptic are no longer the terms of an option but, rather, the absolutely different but, at the same time, necessary orders of the visual intuition mirroring, in the specialized investigation of the visual art, the role played by form and fullness in the investigation of the artistic field in general: they are two opposite and at the same time necessary elements for the forming of the visual artistic object, i.e. the sensuous-elementary conditions of art in the field of the visual. It could be said, then, that we can confront an object and see it as a work of visual art, only by asking

110 In particular, they cannot even refer to two different psychological orders. For instance, in the case of Hagia Sophia, the church built by Justinian, Wind notes that the opposition between the longitudinal element and the transversal must have a purely ideal value, since this opposition needs to be absolute. Otherwise, we would only have a kind of intersection between the two elements, not a truly categorical opposition, which is the research object of Wind.


ourselves how it resolves the problematic antithesis between the haptic and the optical elements, which are consequently ideal tools of investigation, i.e. a specialized version, for the visual field, of the Fülle-Form antithesis.

In the visual appearance (Erscheinung) - as with the categorical antithesis between form and fullness - we find neither an absolute tactile value nor an absolute optical value. There is not the purely haptic, i.e. the purely formal element, deprived of every optical determination, totally abstract as a geometric figure - something intuitive but nothing concrete. Nor is there the purely optical, the purely concrete element, deprived of every haptic element and hence of every formal limit, totally amorphous as pure light - something concrete, but not intuitive. In the appearance, in fact, both of these values must lean on each other in order to constitutively earn meaning, since 'only their connection concretely constitutes an intuitive shape', 'only the mutual relationship between both of them lends each one of them the character of an intuitive order'.

A methodological indication, an exemplification of the path to follow in order to interrogate a work of art, is expressly furnished by Wind at the end of page 449 of Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, where he writes: 'It is the task of thinking to establish tension and to consider it as the ideal condition of all forming. However, the forming itself reveals itself in the conflict between the two poles. The 'meaning' of the different morphological characters can be sought in the fact that they represent - each one in its own manner - a balance between the optical and the haptic orders'. This means, then, that we can get the Sinn - or, if we prefer, the style, of a work of visual art by interrogating it as if it were a determined solution to the problematic opposition between the two ideally opposite orders: optical (optisch) and haptic (haptisch). By approaching a work of art in this way, we would set its individuality in an horizon of meaning.

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114 Edgar Wind, 'Zur Systematik', 449.
118 That is, in order to reach an interpretation (Deutung) of the work of art, abandoning the merely morphological approach and thereby placing the artwork within a horizon of meaning.
120 As I have shown above, in Wind's Kunstwissenschaft, Sinn and style, and also Kunstwollen, are synonyms: he understands style as a transcendental unitary principle of coherence, i.e. as the Sinn, that we transcendentally presuppose each time that we consider something as artistic. Style is no longer a characteristic of a work of art or of a period, but a transcendental horizon of meaning (Sinn) immanent in our way of approaching any object of the Kunstwissenschaft.
121 I.e., as he also says, 'a determined balance (Ausgleich) of them'.
122 To be perhaps pedantically precise: within the horizon defined by the relation-tension between haptisch ed optisch values, which would be obviously missing in a merely morphological approach. See, for instance, the following Windian example: 'What the morphological single-description calls 'dissolved contour' now receives its own particular meaning (Sinn). Leonardo’s 'sfumato' is interpreted as a certain form of the 'balance' ('Was bei der morphologischen Einzelbeschreibung etwa »aufgelöster Kontur« heißt, erhält nun seinen besonderen Sinn. Leonardo's »sfumato« wird als eine bestimmte Form des »Ausgleichs« gedeutet'), Edgar Wind, 'Zur Systematik', 450.
At this point, however, since the Riegelian optical-haptical antithesis is reduced by Wind to what clearly appears as the first step of an investigation of visual art, and, since this opposition is evidently based on the general antithesis between fullness and form, it is evident that this visual antithesis cannot be suitable as the categorical antithesis sought by Wind - following Panofsky - for the transcendental foundation of art interrogation and for investigation of the necessarily inherent Sinn. Rather, all these considerations only enforce and make more evident what we already know: that Wind has to choose the fullness-form opposition as the transcendental categorical antithesis. Evidently, the point is that the discussion led Wind back to his starting point: to the Urproblem. An a priori deduction, in fact, only shows that this problem, the optisch-haptisch opposition, can be traced back to the fullness-form categorical opposition. In this sense, for the specific purpose of Wind’s inquiry, an a priori deductive method seems to be ineffectual.

However, Wind was determined, and, although the first attempt proceeded in the wrong direction, another was made with the other conceptual pair proposed by Panofsky, i.e. the other important Riegelian antithesis: subjectivistic-objectivistic (subjektivistisch-objektivistisch). According to Wind, this last pair, introduced by Riegl in the field of artistic research, seem to be, prima facie, particularly suitable for the formulation of the categorical antithesis, since it spreads to all the possible single regions, remaining, at the same time, applicable to each of them. In Riegl’s theory, for instance, as Wind accurately summarises it, the haptical and the optical values also refer to this other conceptual pair: the haptic values, as formal values, constitute the ‘primary qualities’ and can therefore be called objectivistic; the optical values, on the other hand, are the ‘secondary qualities’ and can be called subjectivistic. The reason for this correspondence between haptic-optical values and objectivistic-subjectivistic values evidently derives from Riegl’s conception of the objective as being what marks the object as outside the mind, and of the subjective as what marks the mind’s projection upon the object outside it. Impressionism, in this sense, is, for Riegl, an example of optical art, allowing forms to merge, taking into account the viewer’s conditions of perception and the inward emotional life of what is depicted. Egyptian art, by contrast, is an example of haptic art, tactile, representing things as self-contained. Wind explains: ‘As well, the intuitive depth-values are only phenomena of a subjective consciousness, while the surface-relations can be mathematically determined’.

Nevertheless, Wind does not hide his perplexities on the subject-object relationship as formulated by Riegl, which he judges ‘epistemologically dubious’. According to Wind, in fact, ‘one can say of the psychophysical subject only that - as bearer of particular qualities - it spatially ‘faces’ the objects’. In this Riegelian sense, the subject turns out to be a fact (Faktum) inside the real world, and, expressed in this material (dinglichen) way, the subject-object opposition therefore constitutes only an

empirical premise and not an a priori one.128

Once again, in conformity with the choice of an a priori deductive method, Wind believes that a solution can be found to these difficulties by setting the discussion on a transcendental level. In fact, bringing the question of the subject-object relation onto this other level means that what was before merely a distinction between the determinations (Bestimmungen) localized in the subject and those in the object, merely an opposition between the observing subject and the object observed, is now not entirely lost, but only transformed.129 Speaking in a Kantian manner (Kantisch zu reden), the subject-object relationship can be transformed from a psychophysical into a transcendental relation by understanding it as a distinction within the way of looking at things.130 Thus, we will face the fact that ‘the objectivistic’ and the ‘subjectivistic’ qualities lead back to two different functions of the consciousness’.131 One of these functions may be called ‘sensation’ and the other one ‘intuition’; in any case the first one corresponds to the ‘sensuous fullness’ of the object, and the other one to its ‘formal determination’.132

In this sense, the procedure carried out by Wind looks much more like a kind of transcendental deduction of the category - the categorical antithesis - for art interrogation than a deduction of a system capable of regulating art interrogation. Seeking an antithesis to which all the artistic problems can be traced back, one which is not empirical but a priori, Wind excludes the subject-object relationship because of its psychophysical aspects, and prefers to trace this last relationship too back to the fullness-form antithesis, which is then definitely indicated by him as the categorical original antithesis (Urantithese). As he says: ‘for this [antithesis] the necessary connection with the artistic can easily be proved’,133 since, ‘as soon as one understands it as a polarity, i.e. as soon as one sets fullness and form reciprocally one against the other, one gets the problem of the concretely-intuitive representation, and with it the region of the artistic reveals itself’.134

Certainly, as Wind himself admits, the fullness-form antithesis belongs to other fields of the spirit (Geistesgebiete) too, but only for the systematic science of art does it represent a fundamental categorial interrelation.135 The knowledge of nature, for instance, does not consider ‘both concepts as equivalent opponents’,136 but rather ‘it has as its goal dissolving fullness into form’.137 Fullness and form are classified as separate spheres and ‘the problem is not in their reciprocal penetration, but rather, on the

134’sobald man sie als Polarität faßt, d. h. sobald man Fülle und Form wechselseitig aufeinander bezieht, erhält man das Problem der konkret-anschaulichen Gestaltung, und damit eröffnet sich die Region des Künstlerischen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460.
contrary, in their *detachment* from each other, in the liberation of form from fullness*.138 However, even if the *union* of fullness and form is not the goal of the knowledge of nature, it constitutes the point of departure of the research, and, in this sense, it seems to Wind that, at least in its point of departure, the science of nature touches the reign of the artistic (das Reich des Künstlerischen).139 The common element lies, ‘however, precisely in what is pre-scientific relative to the whole science of the nature, [in what is] pre-artistic to every work of art: [it lies] in that bare ‘aggregate’ which remains behind, if, by virtue of an intellectual abstraction, one excludes all synthetic interpretation from the sensuous’.140 This sensuous aggregate does not have any form of legality (Gesetzlichkeit) - neither a concretely-intuitive one nor a legality belonging to the field of the science of nature: ‘it is rather the quintessential lawless, ‘meaning-free’, which lies prior to every way of posing problems’.141

However, for Wind, this *aggregate* is able to get a meaning, since it can be pervaded by the law of nature; this happens only when the thought of the science of nature places that aggregate under its own categories in order to dissolve the fullness into the form.142 Equally, a work of art too remains a simple aggregate deprived of meaning, ‘as long as one does not look at the connection of fullness and form as a problem’,143 while ‘only by means of the position of this problem’,144 i.e. by understanding the connection of fullness and form as a problem, ‘one subsumes (unterstellt) the object under the fundamental category of the thought of the systematic science of art’145 and inserts it, therefore, within a horizon of meaning.146

The path followed by Wind, however, i.e. the attempt, carried out on the basis of an a priori deduction, to show the principles of art interrogation, led him back to a further consolidation of the importance and the validity of the fullness-form antithesis as a category for approaching art. Wind definitely shows that, through this categorical antithesis, and therefore under a kunstwissenschaftlich consideration, the artwork is in fact no longer seen as a mere aggregate. At the same time, as has previously been shown, the artwork is no longer at risk of being determined under other categories (as, for instance, the causal nexus) not pertaining to art. This was the result of Wind’s a priori deduction. However, the question at stake, as we have seen, was different. As Wind explicitly states, it is clear that the categorical original fullness-form antithesis (Urantithese) cannot yet have a concrete application (konkrete Anwendung) and the a priori deduction is not enough: ‘one cannot immediately ‘interrogate’ a picture about

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139 *Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460.*
140 *jedoch gerade in dem, was an aller Naturwissenschaft vorwissenschaftlich, an allen Kunstwerken vorkünstlerisch ist: in jenem bloßen »Aggregat«, das zurückbleibt, wenn man kraft einer gedanklichen Abstraktion alle synthetische Deutung aus den Sinnlichen ausschließt*, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 460-461.
143 *solange man die Verbindung von Fülle und Form nicht als Problem ansieht*, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 461.
the attitude it has to the polarity of ‘fullness’ and ‘form’.

At this point, Wind is aware that, in order to find the principles for an objective art interrogation, the path must be different. As he maintains, ‘in order to find a response in the intuitive, one must descend into the region of the intuitive’. So, the application of the transcendental category to the concretely-intuitive requires a medium: the scheme.

The need for a medium: the scheme

The principle of coherent unity is absolutely essential for a comprehension of the meaning of Wind’s schematism. This internal coherence, which makes our art interrogation possible, must be also traced at a much more particularized level: not only as the condition of the possibility of our approach to art in general, but also as the condition of objectivity for an artistic appearance in a particular sphere - for instance, in the visual. So, the necessary rule of coherence, according to which we approach art, needs to be investigated in visual art by seeing how, in particular, the elements of the visual can be seen as ideally articulated.

Seeking unity and interrogating art and the artistic object in general as if they were ideally ruled by an organizing principle, as if they were a balance between both Fülle and Form, entails that we also have to interrogate the conditions of objectivity of each particular kind of art by specializing this investigative principle of articulation. By using the term style, or Kunstwollen, in the Windian sense, I would say that, when we interrogate an object as an artistic performance, we presume it to be ruled by a stylistic organization. So, I believe it can be said that, for Wind, every time we interrogate a given artwork, for instance, a visual one, we measure its stylistic organization at two different levels: in general, as an artistic performance, by means of the a priori deduced antithetical pair Fülle-Form; and in particular, for instance, as a visual artwork, by considering how the a priori categorical opposition can be translated within the field of objectivity - and, in Wind’s particular case, within the field of visual objectivity - by means of a scheme of particular opposite pairs.

In the third paragraph of Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, entitled Fundamental features of a systematic deduction, Wind is again reflecting on the essence of the ‘artistic problem’. He reminds us that the problem is constituted by the antithesis


149 As I have shown, the Fülle-Form categorical antithesis is for Wind the starting point, the inescapable transcendental category which we apply to an object the moment we want to see it as an artistic performance. The artistic object in general is ideally a balance, an articulation, between Fülle and Form, because a coherent unitary principle is presupposed by our way of approaching art. Seeking a balance between Fülle-Form in approaching an artistic appearance adds up to saying that we seek internal coherence, a coherent unity.

150 I.e. in the sense of the logical principle of necessary unitary and immanent coherence.

151 As I have shown, this stylistic organization, this style necessarily ruling the artwork in general, is a necessary principle of transcendental logic and not the result of an abstract description of a work of art. The style is neither a formal abstraction nor an empirical-psychological or historical factor. Style is for Wind the general condition of the work of art in general: the logical principle of internal coherence immanent in our way of approaching art and therefore immanent in art. Style is the condition of possibility of art investigation and, at the same time, the object of art interrogation, since, each time, we have to measure this transcendentially immanent unitarian coherence by means of the fundamental artistic problem - the Fülle-Form categorical antithesis - and, as we shall see, by means of the scheme of particular artistic problems.

between two intuitive orders, but he also states the fundamental need for the two orders to meet up on the same level, on the same layer, so that opposition can take place.\footnote{Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 458.} This means that, ‘therefore, besides the antithetical form, every problem has still its particular place. Through this place, i.e. through the position on which the antithetical conflict happens, it is different from the remaining problems’.\footnote{‘Außer der antithetischen Form hat also jedes Problem noch seinen besonderen Ort. Durch diesen Ort, d. h. durch die Stelle, an der die Antithetik sich abspielt, ist es von den Übrigen Problemen unterschieden’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 458.} So, to summarise, one could say that while the ‘problems’ share the same distinguishing categorical form of the tension (Form der Spannung), they also differ from each other through this place (Ort), specific to each one of them.

These last considerations beautifully introduce the sense in which Wind elaborated his own scheme which we will analyse in depth in the following pages. Wind states that it is necessary to locate a middle element (Medium) in order to turn the antithesis into the concrete (ins Konkrete) and to make it suitable for handling the object. Close to the categorical antithesis, therefore, it is necessary to find ‘a regional scheme showing us, in the concretely intuitive, the positions on which the category is to prove itself’.\footnote{‘ein regionales Schema, welches uns im Konkret-Anschaulichen die Stellen zeigt, an denen die Kategorie sich bewähren soll’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 461-462.} These places, these positions, cannot be something specifically artistic, since, as simple regions of the artistic, they only furnish the ground (Boden) for it; nevertheless, for the existence (Bestand) of the work of art, they must (müssen) be as necessary as the categorical antithesis, since ‘they contain the conditions on which it [the categorical antithesis] must be particularized in order to be applicable to the appearances’.\footnote{‘sie enthalten die Bedingungen, unter denen diese spezifiziert werden muß, um überhaupt auf Erscheinungen anwendbar zu sein’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462.}

The regions of the visual: places for an objective confrontation of styles

According to Wind, once the ‘the categorical condition for the interpretation of the phenomenon as an artistic performance’\footnote{‘kategoriale Voraussetzung für die Deutung eines Phänomens als künstlerische Leistung’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462.} has been detected within the categorical antithetical conflict (Antithetik), it is necessary to deal with the ‘artistic appearance conditions’,\footnote{‘Bedingungen der künstlerischen Erscheinung’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462.} i.e. with the ‘conditions according to which artistic performances in general become objective’.\footnote{‘Voraussetzungen, unter denen künstlerische Leistungen überhaupt gegenständlich werden’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462.} These conditions for the objectivity of the artistic, however, cannot be anything but the ‘general conditions of objectivity in general’,\footnote{‘allgemeinen Bedingungen der Gegenständlichkeit überhaupt’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462.} and this takes Wind’s research back to the analysis of the phenomenology of the sensory fields (die Phänomenologie der Sinnesgebiete)\footnote{Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462.} in which ‘works of art appear’.\footnote{‘Kunstwerke in Erscheinung treten’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462.} Now, it is necessary to distinguish between the different arts depending on the sensory spheres to which they belong.\footnote{Whereas for the search for the categorial antithesis this has not been necessary. See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462.} So, although in some footnotes Wind shows a particular care
for the interdisciplinarity, by trying to apply his own method to other fields also - above all music - his attention remains focussed on the visual sphere (*visuelle Sphäre*), which, as we have seen above, is divided by Wind into three further spheres, each one consisting of three regions.

It can hardly escape the reader how the mode of proceeding proposed by Wind is similar, if not identical, to the strategy adopted by Panofsky, in 1925, in his essay *Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie*. Panofsky himself admits to owing Wind much, and I have already had the opportunity to stress and illustrate some crucial points of contact between the two authors. We have seen how Wind develops the proposal of a transcendental and systematic art investigation (*Kunswissenschaft*), by giving an answer to the questions left open by Panofsky in his essay of 1920.

As has been said of Panofsky’s paper of 1925 on the relationship between *history* and *theory* of art,

the most general, inclusive antithesis in art is, according to Panofsky, that between ‘fullness’ and ‘form’. This line of thinking leads Panofsky to formulate the system of three layers of opposed values present in every work of visual art: 1. elementary values (optical-tactile, i.e. space as opposed to bodies); 2. figurative values (depth-surface); 3. compositional values (internal links-external links, i.e. internal organical unity as opposed to external juxtaposition). In order for a work of art to be created, a balance must be struck within each of these scales of value. The absolute poles, the limiting values themselves, are outside of art: purely optical values characterize only amorphous luminous phenomena. Purely tactile values characterize only pure geometrical shapes deprived of any sensual fullness. A solution which determines the position of the work of art at some point on any given scale at the same time determines its position on the other scales. To decide for surface (as opposed to depth) means to decide for rest (as opposed to movement), for isolation (as opposed to connection) and for tactile values (as opposed to optical ones): a typical example confirming the analysis quoted above may be the Egyptian relief. The individual work of art is not, as claimed by Wölfflin, defined by one antithetical category or the other, but is situated at some point on the scale between the limiting values.

This synthetic general description of the Panofskian approach in 1925 to the artistic field perfectly suits what Wind wrote in his doctoral dissertation in 1922 where, in fact, he was still far from reaching a complete definition of his own scheme. For Panofsky in *Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie*, as for Wind in his doctoral dissertation, the scheme still only consisted of a single sphere of the visual, divided into three layers of opposed values according to which a visual artwork is to be

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interrogated. I believe there is probably a very good reason why Panofsky sticks to the first sphere of the three which I am going to illustrate: Wind will only develop the rest of his scheme - adding the part relating to the other two spheres of the visual - in 1925, in Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, in the same volume as Panofsky’s paper, while Panofsky, at that time, could only use for his article the conclusions of Wind’s doctoral dissertation of 1922.

The complete scheme, developed by Wind in 1925, is based on the localization of three necessary spheres for the transposition of the fullness-form categorical antithesis into the phenomenological (phantomenologisch) conditions of the visual, for the conversion of the Fülle-Form antithesis - the Urantithese - into the concrete (ins Konkrete), into a multitude of concrete problems (in eine Vielheit konkreter Probleme). Wind’s own words: ‘as the categorical antithetical conflict contains the conditions for the interpretation of a phenomenon as artistic performance, so we now come across the conditions under which the artistic performances in general (überhaupt) become real (gegenständlich).’ At the same time, as I have partially anticipated above, by transposing the categorical antithesis under the phenomenological conditions under which the artistic performance appears, Wind wants to show how the principle of the necessary and harmonious balance between two opposite values also rules our whole investigation of the artistic field. For Wind, we approach the work of art as if it were an articulation between two opposite elements. Precisely this articulation must be sought in order that artistic language may be understood within its particularity, i.e. by ideally seeing the artwork as the result of a balanced encounter of a formal and a material element in the artist’s activity, and not as a merely physical object. So, too, when we investigate the most particular aspects of the work of art, i.e. its conditions of objectivity, we are transcendentally forced to read them as balances (Ausgleiche) between opposite elements. I believe this means that, for Wind, once more, when we interrogate art we always look for stylistic unity, or, rather, we can interrogate a work of art only according to a principle of stylistic unity, i.e. only as if all its aspects were each time the result of a particular articulation among formal and material elements. And this means that, in Wind’s theory, the stylistic unity which must be assumed to be ruling the work of art in general does not have a descriptive origin or even a voluntaristic one. Rather, it is precisely the ideal immanent sense, the Kunstwollen which we measure each time through artistic problems, when we interrogate the artwork as if it were a determined solution (Lösung) or a determined balance (Ausgleich) of the

169 However, in 1922 Wind had already carried out the deduction and a partial systematization of the principles for a reliable art interrogation (Edgar Wind, Ästhetischer und kunstwissenschaftlicher Gegenstand, 198-203) - almost with the same words as it is carried out by Wind in 1925 (Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 458-461). Again, this probably explains why that dissertation was so important to Panofsky.

170 In contrast, it should be said that in Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme Wind had the chance to comment upon Panofsky’s article Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie, despite the fact that both the articles were published in the same volume in 1925. On this see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 448 n. 2 and, in particular, 461 n. 1.


problematic opposition - set on purpose by the thought, by the kunstwissenschaftlich thinking - between the two ideally opposite orders. In this way, we seek the particular principle of internal coherence of the artwork, its particular style, its Kunstwollen.

As Wind himself says:

The art historian analyzes, for instance, the form of space which is inherent in a certain picture by asking: How does this form of space reconcile the antagonism between the dimensions of plane and depth - For there exists a natural conflict between the visual qualities of these two dimensions, a conflict and at the same time a necessary relation. I cannot emphasize the qualities of depth without reducing the importance of the plane, and vice versa. But on the other hand, I must relate the qualities of depth to those of plane, in order to make them visible; and I must relate the qualities of plane to those of depth, in order to distinguish them. This is what I call an artistic problem in which the artist has to make a decision. It is not the only one. I may ask as well: What is the difference between painting a line and painting a spot? And I can answer: The line presents a certain value of form and limitation, while the spot presents a certain value of tone. Now I cannot draw a line without giving it a certain tone; for otherwise it would not be visible; it would be merely a geometrical concept. On the other hand I cannot make a spot without giving it a certain form. Otherwise it would be nothing. But by using the tone only for making a line visible, I disqualify its intrinsic values, I use it merely as a means. And by using the form in order to shape a spot, I also reduce its independent value. This is the conflict between intensive and extensive qualities. A third example of an artistic problem is the relation of the work as a whole to its individual elements, its details. I cannot speak of these individual elements without regarding their connection to the whole; and there is no sense in speaking of a whole without assuming the presence of individual elements. But the more an artist emphasizes the importance of the details, the more the value of the whole is reduced to a mere form of connection. The whole turns out to be a composition. On the other hand, the more he emphasizes the importance of the whole, the more the details lose their independent qualities. The details turn out to be differentiations. To exemplify the contrast of possible decisions we may refer, on the one hand, to Egyptian art, where all emphasis is given to the single figures, while their connection is reduced to a mere rule of sequence; on the other hand, to the modern art of impressionism, where the picture is conceived as a unity whose details have no independent meanings.176

It is in this sense that we have to understand Wind’s scheme. In Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, he traces a kind of map onto which he places the categorical antithesis in relation to the phenomenological conditions of objectivity of the artistic in the visual field: he builds a scheme of fundamental artistic problems according to which it is possible to interrogate a visual artwork. Each one of these problems, each one of these antithetical pairs - nine, grouped by three in three spheres - is located in a different region (Region), i.e. in a different place (Ort) in which the categorical antithesis fullness-form is applicable to the visual art. So, Wind identifies nine layers, places

Consolato Latella  Wind and Riegl: ... a ‘problematical’ grammar

(Orte), of the visual, where the immanent Sinn, the style, the Kunstwollen, can be tested. As he writes in his Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, his scheme is based on the analysis of three spheres - i.e. of three levels - of the whole field of the visual: 1) the sphere of the ‘qualitative appearance’ (die Sphäre der »qualitativen Erscheinung«), 2) the sphere of the ‘appearing thing’ (die Sphäre des »erscheinenden Dings«) and 3) the sphere of the ‘self-expressing life’ (die Sphäre des »sich äußernden Lebens«). Then, as mentioned above, each sphere of this tripartite scheme is again divided into three further regions.

Before moving on to the analysis of the scheme, I think it important to stress that Wind is not describing different particular examples from art history in order to generalize by means of abstract concepts. Rather, as we have already seen in the case of the comparison between Egyptian art and Impressionism, he is delineating the common loci on which, particularly within the sphere of the visual, it is possible to imagine an objective confrontation between different or chronologically distant styles. Each one of the antithetical pairs examined by Wind, and constituting part of his scheme, is articulated, at the same time, in each style; or, more accurately, each style can be seen as a different particular articulation of each of the antithetical pairs. In this sense, the references to Egyptian art and Impressionism, or to Greek art, are not to be understood as examples referring only to one or other specific contrast: Rather, they serve the purpose of illustrating how each one of the antithetical pairs, the principles for a regulated art interrogation, can be used to regulate our interrogation of visual art, and, at the same time, they serve the purpose of showing how the particularity of each style can be objectively respected in a confrontation no longer based on taste or empirical conditions, but, rather, on our way of approaching art.

1) In ‘the sphere of ‘qualitative appearance’’ (Die Sphäre der »qualitativen Erscheinung«), Wind delineates only the first level of the visual: the level of the purely sensuous forming (rein sinnliche Gestaltung). In this sphere, the appearance (die Erscheinung) is considered in a qualitative sense. I believe this consideration does not particularly relate to the fact that the elements - both formal and material - of the conceptual pairs grouped under this sphere are pure, i.e. considered as a pair of two ideal opposite elements. The ideality, in fact, is supposed to be shared by all the elements of the conceptual pairs proposed by Wind: they are all ideally considered: they result from a speculative reflection, whatever their sphere or their region may be. In particular, I believe that the qualitative sense Wind gives to this first sphere is much more related to the fact that here he is only considering the conditions of the visual in their pure usage, i.e. he is not considering the concept of a particular emerging thing, which, as I shall show later, is going to be the object of the second sphere of the visual.

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177Which we suppose to be ruling an object when we interrogate it as a work of art.
178Just as we can interrogate a work of art in general (überhaupt) only by seeing it as a solution to an ideal problem set by the thought, so, according to Wind, for the interpretation of the figurative art it is possible and necessary to point out also the places where the fundamental categorical antithesis is applicable to the visual sphere.
180Concerned with the analysis of the elementary values and the elementary layers of the visual sphere. It was already introduced by Wind in his doctoral dissertation and explicitly borrowed by Panofsky in his essay Erwin Panofsky, ‘Über das Verhältnis’, 129-161.
181Both spheres 2) and 3) refer to less elementary levels of analysis of the visual sphere.
So, at this preliminary stage, Wind shows how the fundamental investigative category Füll-form takes the shape of three different layers of opposed values for the investigation of the visual, three layers on which the investigation of the visual art can be carried out: a) articulation (Artikulation); b) spatiality (Räumlichkeit); c) organization (Gliederung). None of them, as Wind underlines, has ‘yet any real significance’; they ‘belong to that first level of the visible which does not yet ‘contain’ anything objective, although the objects ‘exhibit’ themselves in it’.

a) In the first region of the first sphere of the visual - the region called by Wind the region of the Artikulation - Wind sets the preliminary adaptation of the categorical antithesis in the visual field: he is concerned with the relation between the haptic and the optical values. As I have shown, Wind deduces, a priori, the fundamental antithetical category fullness-form from the necessary opposition-combination between the two functions of the consciousness, i.e. between sensation (Empfindung) and intuition (Anschauung). So, in this different context, I believe that he is perfectly and coherently proceeding in the opposite direction, since he is now explicitly showing that the first step of the schematic conversion of the fullness-form category into the field of the visual necessarily relates to the opposition-relation between visual sensation (Empfindung) and visual intuition (Anschauung). The first ‘sticks to the simple ‘presence’ of the sensuous contents as such’, the other ‘goes beyond, to what the contents objectively ‘mean’’. So, borrowing a term from phonetics, Wind defines their relationship as ‘articulation’, asserting that ‘when the intuition is focussed in this way on something objective, which ‘exhibits’ itself in a sensuous way, but absolutely without being absorbed by the sensuous, it [the intuition] causes an articulation within the sensuous itself, since only through this can an organization of the sensuous be made possible’. ‘In the linguistic field the sensuous sounds prove to be suitable for the exhibition of words only because they let themselves be organized into determined objects (the symbols of the concept), but, on its part, this organization requires, as a condition, that the sounds be among themselves in a regulated relation’. The same thing also happens within


190geht darüber hinaus auf das, was die Inhalte gegenständlich »besagen«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 462.

191I.e. ‘a classification [of the sensuous] into the objective’, or ‘an arrangement [of the sensuous] into the class of the objective’.


193The German word is Darstellung, which could also be translated by the word representation.

the visual field, where ‘the regulated understanding of objects is tied to a regulation of
the sensuous as such’. So, this articulation, this purely sensuous order (rein sinnliche
Ordnung), is the preliminary basic condition for any exhibition of objects. What Wind
is maintaining is that the sensuous material must already be purely articulated - i.e.
regulated as such - by the Anschauung, logically before any exhibition of an object and,
precisely, in order to make the exhibition of an object possible. This articulation, as
Wind says, ‘is based, within the visual field, on the realization of a determined balance
between haptical and optical values’. Every distinction between a line and a spot, or
between tracing two lines instead of two spots, every determination of this kind has its
particular form in a balance between the two poles of haptical and optical values.

This sheds some light on why Wind calls the optical-haptical antithesis the principle of
the ‘sensuous-elementary values’ (das Prinzip der »sinnlich-elementaren Werte«):

In this sense, as we read in Wind’s Theory of Art versus Aesthetics, ‘by
determining his standpoint between these principles the artist creates a rule of
articulation’; this means that the choices of the single artist, are grouped by Wind by
resorting to the notion of style, through which he thinks that the aesthetic object turns
into an object of Kunstwissenschaft since ‘the style [...] gives to the whole of the
phenomena a legislation - in which also the individuality of the artistic fact finds a
place - and carries out an objectifying function’. There are various gradations of the
rule of articulation, one for every style, and the same variety is also found in the other
rules of coherence defining the relation between the elements of the other antithetical
pairs investigated by Wind. Every balance between the terms of the determined
antithesis, every decision taken by the single artist, is led back by Wind to a more

190’hängt [...] das geregelte Erfassen von Gegenständen mit einer Regelung des Sinnlichen als solchem
195‘Das Wort »Element« schützt vor der falschen Vorstellung, als ob wir es mit »bloßen Empfindungen« zu
tun hätten; denn Elemente gehören stets einem Systemzusammenhang an. Das Beiwort »sinnlich« aber
weist darauf hin, daß dieser Systemzusammenhang selbst wiederum desseits alles Gedanklichen oder
Dinglichen liegt. Denn zum Wesen der Artikulation gehört es, daß sie sich rein im Sinnlichen entfaltet;
wenngleich sie eben dadurch Gebilde hervorbringt, die sich dank ihrer gesetzmäßigen Bestimmtheit auf
197‘ritiene che l’oggetto estetico si trasformi in un oggetto di Kunstwissenschaft’, Silvia Ferretti, ‘Edgar Wind:
dalla filosofia alla storia dell’arte’, 348.
198‘lo stile [...] dà all’insieme dei fenomeni una legislazione in cui trova posto anche l’individualità del fatto
artistico, e adempie a una funzione oggettivante’, Silvia Ferretti, ‘Edgar Wind: dalla filosofia alla storia
dell’arte’, 348.
comprehensive balance corresponding to a precise stylistic choice.\textsuperscript{204}

Justifying himself by the problematic nature of Riegl's approach to art, Wind refers again to the Riegelian work for examples which can help him illustrate his own proposal to find a possible objective ground for the confrontation of styles. So, Egyptian art, for instance, which is clearly addressed towards the haptic - i.e. formal - values, does nevertheless require contours and colours - although it does not accord any value to them - in order to make the formal values concretely intuitive (\textit{konkret-anschaulich}).\textsuperscript{205} Greek art proposes ‘an intermediate balance between these two orders’, between the optical and the haptic, and differs from late Roman art, ‘in which optical values dominate’.\textsuperscript{206}

b) The second layer of the first sphere of the visual is the region of spatiality (\textit{Räumlichkeit}) and is based on the antithetical pair surface-depth (\textit{Fläche-Tiefe}).\textsuperscript{207} Starting from the statement that all the visual contents develop in space and that every chromatic phenomenon is tied to an extension, Wind refers back to his remarks about optical and haptic values, i.e. that the visual content does not have to be understood as a mere sensation (\textit{als bloße Empfindung}) but, rather, as an articulated structure (\textit{ein artikuliertes Gebilde}).\textsuperscript{208} Accordingly, we inevitably have to consider ‘also its [the visual content’s] spatial complex as \textit{structured’}.\textsuperscript{209} For this second region too, in fact, and the same is true of the third, Wind does not neglect to emphasize that his investigation is still proceeding within a qualitative scope, still avoiding any real significance (\textit{jeder dinglichen Bedeutung}). So, ‘the assessment of the spatial values - which is based on their position between surface and depth - goes hand in hand with the valuation of the sensuous qualities - which is based on their proportion to the optical and the haptic’.\textsuperscript{210} Both are to be estimated on the basis of their balance between the pair of opposite poles.

The concretely intuitive (\textit{konkret-anschaulich}) space differs from the geometric

\textsuperscript{204}As Wind writes: ‘Thus, as every style makes its decision between haptic and optical, surface and depth, between distinct individual values and amorphous unitary values, so it also catches a particular balance between schematic and individual components of the ‘thing’’ (‘Wie nun jeder Stil zwischen Haptischen und Optischen, Fläche und Tiefe, zwischen distinkten Einzel- und amorphen Einheitswerten seine Entscheidung trifft, so schafft er auch einen besonderen Ausgleich zwischen der schematischen und der singulären Komponente des »Dings«’), Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464-465. It is important to stress here that the subject of this sentence is \textit{style}. Clearly, this does not relate to a highly improbable psychological turn in Wind’s interpretation of style. Rather, if we hold to the interpretation of the notion of style as a logical unitary principle, it is possible to see that Wind again means that each time we have to measure the immanent unitary principle - we can call it \textit{style} or \textit{Kunstwollen} - by means of the pairs of antithetical values. Every balance between each of the antithetical pairs can be seen as the result of a stylistic choice. We can attribute this choice to the artist. But, actually, from a transcendental point of view, this way of approaching art always relates to the fact that we interrogate an artwork seeing it as the result of a choice, as a solution to a \textit{problem} which - to be honest with ourselves - we ideally pose in order to see the artwork as a solution, i.e. in order to be able to interpret the object as an artwork. Nevertheless, it is evident that the artist too has to respect these ‘linguistic’ rules.

\textsuperscript{205}Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 450.

\textsuperscript{206}‘bei welcher die optischen Werte dominieren’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 450.


\textsuperscript{208}Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464.


\textsuperscript{210}Hand in Hand mit der Bewertung der sinnlichen Qualitäten nach ihrem Verhältnis zum Optischen und Haptischen geht also die Abschätzung der Raumwerte nach ihrer Stellung zwischen Fläche und Tiefe’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463.
Consolato Latella  
Wind and Riegl: ... a ‘problematical’ grammar

particularly because of its bidimensionality.2\textsuperscript{11} According to Wind, within the visual intuition of space (Raumanschauung) there is no extension in the first dimension as there is in geometry: ‘Here, the awareness of the extension begins only with the surface, and the actual form of the space displays itself in the relation between this lowest concretely intuitive dimension and the immediately higher, i.e. in the relation between the superficial values and the values of depth’.2\textsuperscript{12} This distinction between geometric space and concretely intuitive space shows how the connection between the two dimensions, between surface and depth - the connection from which the intuitive form of the space results, has to be understood: ‘it brings [..] a balance between two opposite orders’.2\textsuperscript{13} Surface (Fläche) and depth (Tiefe) are heterogenous and absolutely not comparable. In their correlation, none of them can be defined as a ‘widening’ of the other, nor as a development from a lower level to a higher (as happens in geometry, where we have the widening of the line into surface, and of the surface into solid).2\textsuperscript{14}

For spatiality (Räumlichkeit) too, Wind proposes some examples.2\textsuperscript{15} The first is Egyptian art, where we find a radical preference for the surface (Fläche) and a radical devaluation of the background, of the depth (Tiefe). In this case too, as before with the relation between haptical and optical values, it is not possible to have only a single pole of the antithesis. We can only talk about a ‘conflict between ‘pattern’ and ‘background’’2\textsuperscript{16} since, even if deprived of every value, the background turns out to be always necessary: otherwise, the figures would not be distinguishable. Classic Greek art, then, shows emancipation of the depth and takes the antithesis surface-depth to a point of equilibrium. The pyramidal construction, in the compositions (Kompositionen)2\textsuperscript{17} of the Renaissance must also be understood as a balance between values of the surface and of the depth.

c) The third region regards the values of the organization (Gliederung), i.e. ‘the relation between ‘whole’ and ‘part’’,2\textsuperscript{18} the opposition between ‘distinct single values and amorphous unitary values’,2\textsuperscript{19} between division (Zerteilung) and merging (Verschmelzung).2\textsuperscript{20} According to Wind, for the valuation of the sensuous-elementary values - articulation (Artikulation) - and of the spatial values - spatiality (Räumlichkeit) - it was possible to concentrate either on a single detail or on the totality of the work. But ‘the question of the ‘settlement’ goes beyond the balance between optical and haptical, between superficial values and values of depth’.2\textsuperscript{21} In fact, although the organization is demonstrated by the sensuous and spatial elements, there is in this case a new separated problem which needs to be explicitly formulated.2\textsuperscript{22} ‘Of course, this does not

\textsuperscript{211}Zweidimensionalität, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463.
\textsuperscript{212}Hier fängt das Bewußtsein der Ausdehnung erst mit der Fläche an, und die eigentliche Raumgestalt entfaltet sich in der Beziehung dieser niedernsten konkret-anschaulichen Dimension zur nächst höheren, d. h. in dem Verhältnis von Flächen- und Tiefen-werten’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 463.
\textsuperscript{214}Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464.
\textsuperscript{215}Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 451 ff. I shall limit my analysis to some of them.
\textsuperscript{216}Auseinandersetzung zwischen »Muster« und »Grund«’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 452.
\textsuperscript{217}Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 452.
\textsuperscript{220}Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464.
\textsuperscript{222}Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 464.
detract from the fact that the decision about the values of organization is a direct consequence of the particular form of the balance between the optical and the haptic, or between surface and depth'.223 Rather,

after we have assigned to each one of the antithetical elements - both the haptic and the optical - its particular 'place',224 and after we have obtained in this way a polarity of the spatial values, we must now ask: Which form of the 'union' corresponds to the haptic order, and which one to the optical? The answer rests on the polarity of the 'values of the organization', which are divided into distinct and amorphous, into single values and unitary values.225

'Again, - in the case of this other rule of coherence - the individual morphological appearances can be interpreted as ‘balances’ between the two orders',226 It is important to keep in mind that all the layers and all the spheres analysed by Wind are logically interconnected. This is what Wind himself states in Theory of Art versus Aesthetics when he asks himself:

What are these rules of coherence in art? The artist also presents first of all a certain material of perception, sounds or colors - a conglomeration which is nothing, as long as it is not articulated. As far as visible arts are concerned, the problem of articulation is now identical with the problem which we formulated before;227 the reconciliation of intensive and extensive values, of

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224It is important to note that in this Windian passage the word 'place' (»Ort«) appears in double quotes, so we have to take it in a particular sense. I believe that this detail is important for the comprehension of Wind’s theory since it avoids misunderstandings of Wind's text. Here (on 453), Wind is clearly not talking about the place (Ort), or region (Region) in which the opposition-relation takes place, i.e., for instance, about the region of articulation or of spatiality. He is not talking about the place - the particular layer of the visual - to which the categorical antithesis can be applied. He is merely considering the fact that both the haptic and the optical values correspond respectively to specific 'places', i.e. to two different dimensions (surface and depth), which means that seeing a work of art as a particular balance between the haptic-optical values necessarily involves the fact that we also have to see it as a particular balance between the opposed 'places' (i.e. dimensions) to which haptic and optical values ideally belong. The place in which these two dimensions ('places') are opposing is spatiality. Despite this, I suggest we stick to the contextual interpretation since, for instance, on page 473 Wind uses quotes and writes 'places' (»Orte«) although, there, he evidently refers to the layers of the visual and not to the dimensions. I have to admit that my interpretation - aimed at avoiding possible misunderstandings - results much more from the context of Wind’s text than from what might be defined as the ‘rule of quotes’, which is not always respected by Wind. However, in corroboratation of my interpretation, I refer to what Wind writes about the second layer of the second sphere of the visual, in Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 465-466, discussed infra, 2),b). In this last passage Wind does not use quotes and only double-spaces the word Orten (only on page 465 and not on page 466 where he simply writes Orte without the double-space). Again, at the bottom of page 469, Wind uses the word 'places' (»Orte«), in double quotes, with the sense of dimensions (see infra 3),b)) as on page 453 (applying the rule I have called above the ‘rule of quotes’).


227Just before this passage, Wind was reflecting about the articulation in phonetics and, consequently,
form and tone, of line and spot. By determining his standpoint between these principles, the artist creates a rule of articulation. This rule necessarily involves a similar decision on the problem of space. The more an artist decides in favor of the line, the more he must decide in favor of the plane. This is why Egyptian art, which is the most linear art we know, is also the most flat in space. In order to develop its wonderful relations in the plane, it must disregard the third dimension. On the other hand, the more an artist decides in favor of the spot, the more he must decide in favor of depth. This is why impressionistic art excels in those open and airy landscapes where the space seems infinitely deep. Articulation and space being mutually related to each other, involve a certain kind of grouping: An artist who by working in spots creates a depth of space, cannot form details except by differentiation. An artist who by working in lines develops his figures in a plane, cannot form a unity except by composition.228

In Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, referring to Egyptian art and considering it as a balance between the values of the organization, Wind shows how it represents the triumph of separation over merging:229 it avoided as much as possible the unitary element, 'partly by structuring in a 'parallel' way the figures facing each other, obtaining in this way a configuration where any binding strength was missing, - partly by taking the closely related figures from the beginning as a 'structure of continuous mass', closed in itself, so that no connecting medium was called for'.230 Greek art, on the other hand, 'brings with the emancipation of 'background' also the emancipation of unitary values'.231 By freeing the distinct elements from their isolation and mitigating them with amorphous values (mit amorphen Werten), Greek art obtains an intermediate balance between unity and detail.232 In Dutch art he notes that distinct single values (distinkten Einzelwerte) are eliminated in favour of amorphous unitary values (amorphen Einheitswerte).233

2) While the first sphere of the visual, as we have just seen, only concerns the qualitative forming,234 the second, the sphere of the 'appearing thing',235 goes beyond. The decision regarding all the problems of the first sphere determines the decision regarding a new problem: the 'representation of things'236 - which I would also call the visual sensuous exhibition of objects. Here, Wind focusses on the relation of representation (Darstellungsbeziehung), which 'eröffnet uns, parallel zu der qualitativen Sinneserscheinung, die Welt des »erscheinenden Dings«'.237

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228Edgar Wind, 'Theory of Art versus Aesthetics', 357.
229Edgar Wind, 'Zur Systematik', 454.
230teils indem sie die einander zugewandten Gestalten »parallel« gliederte, so daß sich eine Konfiguration ergab, der jede bindende Kraft fehlte, - teils indem sie die zusammen gehörigen Figuren von vornherein als ein in sich geschlossenes, »massenkontinuierliches Gebilde« auffaßte, derart, daß gar kein verbindendes Medium in Anspruch genommen wurde', Edgar Wind, 'Zur Systematik', 454.
233Edgar Wind, 'Zur Systematik', 455.
234The level of the purely sensuous forming (die Schicht der rein sinnlichen Gestaltung.
235Die Sphäre des »erscheinenden Dings«, i.e. the sphere of the appearing object: the sphere concerning the representation, the exhibition, of the object.
236Edgar Wind, 'Theory of Art versus Aesthetics', 357.
237'Eröffnet uns, parallel zu der qualitativen Sinneserscheinung, die Welt des »erscheinenden Dings«', Edgar Wind, 'Zur Systematik', 454.
a) The first region of the second sphere of the visual regards the antithesis between scheme (Schema) and individual quality (singuläre Qualität). Wind places emphasis on the individuality of the appearing thing, on the fact that the ‘thing’ is visible only if it has ‘visual features, which are necessarily individual’.238 He asserts that these features (Eigenschaften) must be connected through a scheme of the thing in order to demonstrate their belonging to the thing.239 So, while in the previous sphere, at the first level of the purely sensuous organization, Wind locates an antithesis between haptical and optical values, now, in correspondence with it, at the first layer of the second sphere, he locates an antithesis between two various aspects of thing-appearance (zwei verschiedene Seiten der Dingerscheinung):240 between the schematic concept of form (die schematische Formvorstellung) and its individual fulfillment (ihre singuläre Erfüllung).241 Only their combination constitutes the concept of the ‘thing’ (den Begriff des »Dinges«).242 A schematic construction lacking in singular qualities would be equivalent in fact to the concept of a mere sign, while singular qualities lacking in schematic bond would constitute only a simple aggregate, where every ‘real’ meaning (‘dingliche’ Bedeutung) would be missing.

‘Thus’, - according to Wind - ‘as every style takes its decision between haptic and optical, surface and depth, between distinct individual values and amorphous unitary values, so it also catches a particular balance between schematic and individual components of the ‘thing’’.243 Also on this level, then, a comparison between styles is made possible. Egyptian art, for instance, ‘eliminates the singular differences in favour of a separated homogeneity’244 since it creates fixed schemes (feste Schemata) for the objects it means to represent (für die darzustellenden Gegenstände).245 The Impressionist, on the other hand, focusses precisely on individuality (gerade das Singuläre).246 According to Wind, he tries to get rid of all the formulaic bonds, since they would conceptually (begrifflich) dim ‘the pure ‘seeing’, on which, exclusively, he grounds his own conception of the thing’.247 In this case also, classic art represents an intermediate
combination between the two poles of the antithesis.  

b) The second region of the second sphere of the visual regards the antithesis between ideality (Idealität) and reality (Realität). While within the sensuous-elementary values the question of the place - i.e. the attempt to define the dimensions to which the optical principle and the haptic principle belong - referred to the determination of the spatial position, in this case, i.e. in relation to the factors of the ‘appearing thing’ (des »erscheinenden Dings«), this question must be regarded in an ontological sense. According to Wind, in fact, a different way-of-being (Seins-Art) - and not a dimension - corresponds to the individual feature and to the general scheme, as the first one is a real given fact, and the second one an ideal construction. Thus, the ‘thing’ (das »Ding«), which ‘results from a union between scheme and individual way of appearing’, is located in a middle zone between the world of the individual (das Einzelne) and the world of the general (das Allgemeine), i.e. between reality and ideality. In this sense, the thing ‘unites [...] ideal status with real existence’.  

Among the infinite possible combinations between these two poles, Wind analyses the solution represented by classic art and indicates it as an intermediate balance (mittlere Ausgleich) between the poles represented by ‘idealism’ (»Idealismus«) and ‘realism’ (»Realismus«), which are obviously never totally achievable, either by Egyptian art or by Impressionism.

c) The third region of the second sphere of the visual is the place of the opposition between the continuous flow (unausgesetztes Verfließen) and the rigid separation (strenge Sonderung), between the way in which ‘the individual moments unfold their existence’ and the way in which, ‘contrasting with them, the schematic constructions affirm their status’. It is the region of the opposition between ‘separation’ (»Trennung«) and ‘connection’ (»Verbindung«). While the first class, the individual
contents,258 constantly follow one another,259 the second, the schemes (die Schemata),
‘connect and separate the given qualities according to their belonging to the thing’.260
For instance, when the artistic decision is for individuality and reality - as happens in
the highest degree in Impressionism - the uniform-qualitative relation (gleichmäßig-
qualitative Zusammenhang) prevails and overcomes the diversities of the forms of the
thing (die Verschiedenheiten der Dingformen).261 On the other hand, the opposite occurs
when the decision is inclined to the schematic-ideal (zum Schematisch-Ideellen) relation -
for instance the extreme case of Egyptian art, i.e. when the things appear sharply
separated from each other.262 Classical art represents the intermediary solution
between the two terms of the antithesis. The equivalence (Gleichwertigkeit) reached by
classical art in the correlation of whole and part constitutes ‘a decisive mark of the so-
called ‘organic’ forming’.263 This mark, however, only pertains to the external aspect of
the ‘organic’ forming, since the essence of the organic (das Wesen des Organischen) goes
beyond the determinations of the ‘appearing thing’264 and, above all, has its fulfillment
‘in the form of the ‘self-expressing life’’.265

3) As we have seen, the first sphere of the visual - that of the purely sensuous
forming (rein sinnliche Gestaltung) - is linked with the second sphere - that of the
‘appearing thing’ (des »erscheinenden Dings«) - by means of the ‘relation of
representation’ (»Darstellungsbeziehung«).266 So, the ‘appearing thing’ for its part can
refer to the world of ‘feeling’ or of ‘life’267 by means of the ‘relation of expression’
(»Ausdrucksbeziehung«).268 While the first connection concerns the relationship between
the visual appearance and what is visually appearing,269 - i.e. the use of the purely sensuous
form as a medium for the comprehension of the self-presenting things, now, the access
to the third sphere of the visual requires us to pass ‘from the outside, which presents to
us the thing as an appearance, to its inside [to the inside of the thing], as long as it [the
thing] expresses itself in it [in its inside].’270

260’binden und trennen die gegebenen Qualitäten je nach ihrer dinglichen Zugehörigkeit’, Edgar Wind,
‘Zur Systematik’, 466.
Systematik’, 467.
266Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. As I have noted above, the word »Darstellungsbeziehung« could also
be translated as ‘relation of exhibition’.
270von der Außenseite, welche uns das Ding als Erscheinung darbietet, auf dessen Inneres, sofern es sich
darin ausdrückt’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 467. For Wind: ‘We go in this way a second step away
from the purely visual, as it was offered to us by the previous layer. While the ‘appearing thing’ still
represents itself in a visible way, although (as thing) it does not realize itself in the visible, so the ‘feeling’
does not have any more a direct relationship to the visible; since it let itself indirectly be perceived only as
far as, on its part, the ‘thing’, in which it expresses itself, ‘appears’. Exactly in this mediate manner,
however, it necessarily belongs to the phenomenological status of the visual’ (‘Wir entfernen uns damit
um eine weitere Stufe von dem rein Visuellen, wie es uns die vorderste Schicht bot. Während das
»erscheinende Ding« sich noch sichtbarlich darstelle, wenn es auch selbst (als Ding) nicht im Sichtbaren
aufging, so hat das »Gefühl« gar keine direkte Beziehung zum Sichtbaren mehr; denn es läßt sich nur

37
a) Wind stresses the similarity between the first antithesis enclosed in the concept of the ‘appearing thing’ (i.e. the first antithesis of the second sphere), and the first antithesis enclosed in the concept of the ‘self-expressing feeling’ (i.e. the first antithesis of the third sphere). In the first case, the thing required individual visual features in order to be able to exhibit itself in a visible way. Now, in the second case, the feeling must become firmly established as a formula in order to be mimically expressible. So, once again, Wind takes the line of reasoning to the necessary connection between the two opposite elements of the antithesis, i.e., here - in the first layer of the third sphere of the visual -, to the necessity of interrogating the artworks as if they were balances between animation (Belebung) and fixation (Statuierung), between feeling (Gefühl) and stillness (Status). As we read in Theory of Art versus Aesthetics: ‘There is no expression of life without a formula. But the formula, in order to be expressive, must be animated’.

Wind refers only to some of the possible examples, since in this case too ‘the [...] sought connection can still vary in the most different ways. So, for instance, in Egyptian art there is such a limitation of the vital aspect of the represented figures, that their action is reduced to a simple pose. Impressionism, on the other hand, limits the presence of the formula to the point where ‘every formula, and therefore every possibility of a language of gestures’, and ‘the feeling expressed in its landscapes’ are dissolved ‘into a mere mood’.

b) The pair constituted by the concepts of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’, which - as I have illustrated - has been demonstrated by Wind as unsuitable for the role of the original categorical antithesis, has its right place ‘within the material (and therefore special) region of the ‘self-expressing life’’. So, if we see the subject (Subjekt) as ‘the...
source of the expression of life (and not [as] the ‘I’ of the theory of knowledge), and the object (Objekt) as ‘the product of the expression of life (and not [as] the ‘object’ (»Gegenstand«) of the theory of knowledge), then subject and object constitute the two opposite ‘places’ (gegensätzliche »Orte«) to which feeling and stillness - the two poles of the forming of the expression (Ausdrucksgestaltung) - respectively belong. In this sense, to every connection between fixation (Statuierung) and animation (Belebung) there therefore corresponds ‘a balance between the finished world of the objects and the eternally flowing world of the subject’.

c) While the subjective world of the feelings (Gefühle) ‘unfolds itself in a constant flow and requires the fixation in formulas, i.e. the objectifying separation’, the objective world of the formulas (Formeln) ‘is based on the rigid isolation of its constructions and therefore requires animation through feeling, which ‘flows’ into it bringing unity’. So, it is not difficult to guess that, for Wind, the last region of the third sphere of the visual is the region of conflict between these two last ‘orders’ (»Ordnungen«): vital flowing (lebendiges Verfließen) and rigid isolation (starre Isolierung).

In this case too, Wind cites examples: Egyptian art is ruled by rigid isolation and the principle of vital flowing has become a rule of disposition (Regel der Anordnung) ‘connecting the positions of the single parts with the position of the entire figure’. ‘The position’ of an Egyptian figure, which has to be grasped in isolation, is built from the ‘positions’ of its limbs, which also have to be grasped in isolation. The intermediate balance between the two poles of the antithesis is reached again by classic art, which determines a vital correlation of the action, so that in the artwork there are ‘relatively independent partial actions, which combine and complement each other within the entire action’. The transition to the impressionistic pure mood is represented - for Wind - by Rembrandt’s ‘aura’ (»Fluidum«), i.e. the atmosphere which connects all the forms together in the Dutch artist’s late works. Actually, the ‘aura’ operates among the people acting in the represented scene, who are still somehow separated, although this separation is only meant to be absorbed again in a coherent particularization of the categorical antithesis.
action (zusammenhängende Handlung),\textsuperscript{292} in the flowing unity. On the other hand, the pure ‘mood’ (»Stimmung«) of Impressionism does not allow any separation at all in vital flowing.\textsuperscript{293}

The role of the scheme and the importance of the really special problems

The entire science of art (kunstwissenschaftliche Denken) conceived by Wind, his whole reflection on artistic problems (künstlerische Probleme), is grounded, as I have tried to show in this section, on a double methodological procedure: on the search for a fundamental antithetical conflict (grundlegende Antithetik) - ‘a tension from which the artistic appearances can be interpreted as ‘performances’’,\textsuperscript{294} and on the search for a regional scheme - ‘which makes possible the application of the antithetical conflict to the appearances’.\textsuperscript{295} The investigation of the artistic rules of coherence, of the rule of art, conducted by Wind can never be understood, however, as an attempt at localizing a norm - at least strictly speaking, but only as the analysis of a system of conditions, of transcendental tools for art interrogation.\textsuperscript{296} In this sense I believe it can be said that Wind introduced to art history a new way of thinking, a new way of looking at artworks. And this is because he went back to art interrogation as such, reflecting on it in a transcendental way and managing, as I have intensively and extensively illustrated in this section, to carry out what I would call a ‘Copernican revolution’ within the field of art interrogation. It is precisely this study of the rules of articulation of the artistic language which is, as we have seen, the main goal of Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft. And these rules - which are in no way psychologically established - reveal themselves only by means of a transcendental reflection on our way of approaching art.

The style\textsuperscript{297} in art - like the causal relationship in the knowledge of nature for Kant - is not something empirically attainable, it is not the sum of manifold surveys,\textsuperscript{298}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{292}Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 471.
  \item \textsuperscript{293}Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 470-471.
  \item \textsuperscript{294}‘Spannung von der aus die künstlerischen Erscheinungen sich als »Leistung« deuten lassen’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 474.
  \item \textsuperscript{295}‘die Anwendung der Antithetik auf Erscheinungen möglich macht’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 474.
  \item \textsuperscript{296}A scheme which makes possible the comparison between styles, although independently of the presupposition of psychological constants, historical powers, historical empirical elements to be considered. Wind presents his Kunstwissenschaft as a response to Wölfflin’s purely formal approach, intending that the particularity of the artistic activity cannot be judged and respected by means of a merely formal description.
  \item \textsuperscript{297}See Edgar Wind, ‘Theory of Art versus Aesthetics’, 357-358.
  \item \textsuperscript{298}And hence also the meaning (Sinn), the Kunstwollen.
  \item \textsuperscript{299}The style of a work of art is not to be determined through a heap or a small piece of details we have empirically to pick up. Neither must it be intended as a purely historical or psychological product. Rather, we could say, the style, for Wind, is nothing but a sort of logical coherence that the artist and the interpreters of the artist’s work are supposed to respect and which each time has to be measured by means of the artistic problems. In this sense, it is interesting to read what Wind writes in 1922 about the weakness of Morelli’s method: ‘Ja, man muß sogar die Forderung stellen: Wo man im Dienste der Gruppenbildung spezielle Übereinstimmungen aufzuweisen sucht, wo man also auf einen engen Gruppenzusammenschluß hinauswill, da müssen die Übereinstimmungen zugleich vielseitig aufgewiesen werden! Bleibt die ’spezielle’ Gleichartigkeit vereinzelt, so kann sie eine Zusammengehörigkeit niemals verbürgen. Hier liegt die Schwäche der Morelli’schen Methode. Wer sein Augenmerk nur auf einzelne entlegene Details der Kunstwerke lenkt (auf Ohrformen, Fingernägel) und deren formale Übereinstimmung für ausschlaggebend erklärt, der ist vor willkürlichen Gruppierungen niemals sicher. Allerdings wurde Morelli zu dieser Beschränkung durch eine psychologische Theorie bestimmt, nach welcher die
\end{itemize}
rather, it is immanent in our way of seeing the artistic object, of seeing an object as artistic. I would say that for Wind we approach art stylistically. As we have seen, through the mediation of the scheme we can make the fullness-form category applicable to the artistic objects: we can trace a sort of Cartesian plane - of the phenomenological conditions - on which we can ideally place and organize works of art. Beginning from this premise, I would say that, for Wind, we do not interrogate art either on the basis of psychological default models or looking for deep structures. Rather, Wind wants to show that it is possible to make the work of art answer to our questions only if we interrogate it by means of some transcendental ‘linguistic’ tools, i.e. - putting it in a Kantian way - bearing in mind that we do not know the works of art in themselves, but only in accordance with our way of approaching art. But, unlike Kant and his theory of knowledge, as I have noted several times, Wind is not trying to show how we can give sense to the world of nature constituting the objects of our knowledge by means of the encounter between our categories and the data of experience. Rather, Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft respects the particularity of art - its being a pre-formed material - and has therefore only a regulative intent: it is aimed at showing how it is possible to re-constitute the meaning of the already existing artistic objects, by seeing them as concretely given solutions - balances - to the ideal fullness-form antithesis. In this sense, then, the artistic problems I have illustrated above are still interpretative ideal tools, specializations of the Urproblem, orienting the art historian in his interrogation of art.


299 I think it would be advisable to compare Wind’s ideas with what Guido Kaschnitz-Weinberg says in his Guido Kaschnitz-Weinberg, ‘Alois Riegl: Spätrömische Kunstindustrie’, Gnomon, 5, 1929, 195-213. There, emphasizing the importance of the new edition (1929) of Riegls Spätrömische Kunstindustrie (Late Roman Art Industry), Kaschnitz refers several times to Edgar Wind and to his ‘Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme’, presenting Wind’s proposal as a really important and original rereading of Riegls own thought (despite - as Kaschnitz explicitly notes - the claim of Otto Pächt that there were no available significative approaches to Riegls thought). But I think it should not escape the reader that Kaschnitz, while presenting Riegls thought and underlining the importance of Wind’s approach, omits to stress the fact that Wind’s approach is transcendental. Although one could try to use the word ‘structures’ in order to define the role and the function of Wind’s artistic problems, one should never forget to specify that these ‘structures’ are a priori and transcendentally deduced and, therefore, absolutely different from Kaschnitz’ own structures based on a psychological interpretation of Riegls Kunstwollen. By omitting this ‘detail’ Kaschnitz evidently interpreted Wind’s transcendental Kunstwissenschaft as if it were similar to his own approach to art.

300 Nevertheless, as Wind himself admits, the scheme has a double limitation: it is arbitrarily limited to the visual sphere of the appearance (visuelle Erscheinungssphäre), and it necessarily avoids any specific distinction between architecture, painting and sculpture. The first limitation is only aimed at narrowing the research field, while the fact remains that the other phenomenological spheres also - to which other arts may belong - can be investigated in parallel. The second limitation is justified because the differences between the arts of the visual field have nothing to do with artistic problems (in the narrow sense of the term). The nine pairs of concepts Wind localized within his scheme are entirely grounded on the formal
As emerges from *Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme*, a ‘table of the artistic problems’ (‘Tafel der künstlerischen Probleme’) entails the advantage of making possible the location of general laws which are also important on a methodological level. It can therefore be used ‘as a test for systematic judgments on art’. Moreover, for Wind, besides the nine places (Orte) constituting the table of the fundamental artistic problems, it is also possible to locate a further position (Stelle) in which the original problem (Urproblem) reveals itself: the layer of the antithesis between thing-appearance (Dingerscheinung) and the expressive content (Ausdrucksgehalt). In fact, as the relation of representation connects the sphere of the ‘sensuous appearance’ (der >sinnlichen Erscheinungs<) with the sphere of the ‘appearing thing’ (des >erscheinenden Dings<), and the relation of expression connects the sphere of the ‘appearing thing’ (des >erscheinenden Dings<) with the sphere of the ‘self-expressing life’ (des >sich äußernden Lebens<), so also the comprehension of the figure of the thing (Erfassung der Dinggestalt) and the comprehension of the expressive content (Ausdrucksgehalt) are after the same determined aim and proceed in a one-sided direction. The first tends to move from individual qualities to the general scheme, the second from formal stasis to vital feeling. Thus, if the two directions are analysed in the light of the original categorical antithesis between fullness and form, the result is that the aim of the relationship of representation (Darstellungsbeziehung) is on the side of ‘form’ (>Form<), while, by

principle which makes the artistic performance in general possible (the fullness-form categorical antithesis) and on the phenomenological conditions (phänomenologischen Bedingungen) - corresponding to the conditions of objectivity in general - according to which this performance appears, but not grounded on the empirical conditions according to which the appearance is realized (see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 471). The question about the difference between architecture, painting and sculpture is tied up with the observation of these law-governed relations allows us to start from a single determination and to reach in advance a decision relating to all the others. If the result of this conclusion does not agree with facts, then, the first determination - the analysis of the sensuous-elementary - proves insufficient (see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 471).

<sup>301</sup> ‘zur Erprobung kunstwissenschaftlicher Urteile’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 472. Thanks to the observation of these lawlikenesses (Gesetzmäßigkeiten) for the meaning of this term see supra and the Cambridge edition of the works of Kant), in fact, the determination of the way of forming (Gestaltungsweise) of a work of art, at least in relation to the sensuous-elementary values (sinnlich-elementar), involves necessary consequences on the level of the spatial configuration (Raumbildung), of the composition (Gliederung), of the understanding of the thing (Dingauffassung), of the shaping of the expression (Ausdrucksgestaltung). The knowledge of these law-governed relations allows us to start from a single determination and to reach in advance a decision relating to all the others. If the result of this conclusion does not agree with facts, then, the first determination - the analysis of the sensuous-elementary - proves insufficient (see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473). Knowledge of the a priori lawlikenesses (apriorischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten) therefore gains the role the meaning of a methodical regulative (eines methodischen Regulativs) which Wind - as Buschendorf notes - ‘wants to give to the art historian […]’ (‘will dem Kunsthistoriker […] geben’), see Bernhard Buschendorf, ‘War ein sehr tüchtiges gegenseitiges Fördern’: Edgar Wind und Aby Warburg’, Idee. Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunsthalle, IV, 1985, 169.

<sup>303</sup>Darstellungsbeziehung, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473.
<sup>305</sup>See Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473.
contrast, the aim of the expressive relation (Ausdrucksbeziehung) is on the side of ‘fullness’ (»Fülle«).\textsuperscript{307} I believe this statement of Wind is important, precisely because it definitely illustrates the semantic framework within which the Windian concept of fullness (Fülle) is to be understood. Fullness therefore refers, ideally, to the content-related element of a work of art at every level, from the merely material to the expressive content, and, consequently, it is opposed to and articulated with the form, which ideally represents the forms of intuition, the formal delimitation and, at this point, also composure and rigidity of expression.

Despite this last observation, and despite the fact that the other nine antitheses localized by Wind explicitly represent only the fundamental problems (Grundprobleme) from which, in an endless variety, the single problems (Einzelprobleme) spring, there is still a feeling - of which Wind himself is also partially aware\textsuperscript{308} - that the table of the fundamental problems is poor and insufficient in comparison with the vastness of the artistic phenomena to which it is supposed to do justice.\textsuperscript{309} In spite of his various attempts, I believe this feeling remains very strong, particularly in relation to the difficulty Wind tried several times to confront: the need to take into consideration the particular cases, the single problems, the need to mediate among the original categorical antithesis (Uranantihese) and single artworks, which made Wind formulate his scheme of the fundamental problems. In Kantian terms, Wind resorts to the scheme although, in my opinion, this does not resolve the problematic relation between empirics and theory which Wind meant to overcome through the foundation of a Kunstwissenschaft and from which we began our considerations: the scheme reveals itself as a linking tool between the original antithesis and single artworks, it certainly has at least a methodical-regulative value, but it does not seem entirely able to represent the infinite number of single cases or a sufficient alternative to the contemplative moment related to the aesthetic enjoyment of a work of art.

However, there is a passage from Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme which I believe is crucial to Wind’s Kunstwissenschaft, since it can be used for testing the validity of his transcendental proposition and because from it we can really see to what extent Wind himself acknowledges how difficult it is to uphold a strong

\textsuperscript{307}A special rivalry, between both the regions of the thing-appearance and of the expressive content as such, still joins the different polarities which result in their tension within the individual regions’ (‘gesellt sich zu den verschiedenen Polaritäten, die ihre Spannung innerhalb der einzelnen Regionen auswirken, noch eine besondere Rivalität zwischen den Regionen der Dingerscheinung und des Ausdrucksgehaltes als solchen’) - see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473. Where the artistic decision (künstlerische Entscheidung) favours the ‘form’ (»Form«) - as in the case of the first Italian Renaissance, Greek art of the archaic period, Egyptian art, where it favours the haptic and the surface, the schematic and the ideal, the fixation and the objective (‘zugunsten des Haptischen und der Fläche, des Schematischen und des Ideellen, der Statuierung und des Objektiven’) - ‘in that case the thingness [the fact or character of being a thing] as a whole becomes predominant over the expression’ (‘dort hat auch die Dinglichkeit als Ganze notwendig das Übergewicht über den Ausdruck’) - see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473. By contrast, where the choice favours the ‘fullness’ (»Fülle«) - as in the case of Impressionism, where it favours ‘the optical and the depth, the individual and the real, the feeling and the subjectivising’ (zugunsten des Optischen und der Tiefe, des Singulären und des Reellen, des Gefühls und der Subjektivierung) - in that case ‘the expressive content also directs the actual attention to itself and reduces the meaning of the thingness’ (lenkt auch der Ausdrucksgehalt die eigentliche Aufmerksamkeit auf sich und vermindert die Bedeutung der Dinglichkeit), Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 473-474. Classical art, then, represents in this case too a point of intermediary balance between the two elements of the antithesis (see Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 474).

\textsuperscript{308}Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 472.

transcendental position, to uphold the usage of ideal tools for the investigation of the manifoldness of experience. This passage is crucial for evaluation of the validity of the category and of the scheme and also because it opens a path towards the developments of Wind’s own approach to art. I am referring in particular to the passage where Wind’s investigation is explicitly focussed on the relationship between the scheme of the fundamental antitheses and the ‘multitude of the different problems which take turns in the course of historical development’:310 the question of the special problems (die speziellen Probleme).311 These occur when ‘instead of the intuitive values, which compete with each other on principle, one introduces particular representatives of value’.312 For instance, it is possible to speak about the ‘contrast between figure and space’313 only because ‘figure and space are considered as bearers of determined values (the figure, for instance, as a bearer of haptical values, the space as a bearer of optical values)’.314 To maintain that the space ‘devours’ the figures (der Raum ‘verschlänge’ die Figuren) is, for Wind, the same as saying that ‘the optical values dissolve the haptical ones, [that] the unitary values dominate the individual ones’.315 The only difference is that ‘the general antithesis shows itself in a quite special formulation’.316 Therefore, the introduction of the ‘bearer’ (»Träger«) limits the field of the artistic problems because it ties the values to determined empirical objects causing, in this way, the loss of the comprehensive applicability of the antitheses, since such ‘bearers’ are common only ‘to a limited choice of artworks (einer beschränkten Auswahl von Kunstein).’317

Even more evident is the specification (Spezifizierung) of the artistic problem when it ‘is associated with a representational condition, as, for instance, when this condition is given through a determined theme’.318 The case considered by Wind is one in which a ‘pre-artistic assignment’ (»vorkünstlerische Aufgabe«) becomes the foundation of the artistic problem, to be precise in such a way that the ‘assignment’ sets out the antithetical conflict of the problem’.319 Wind refers to the text in which Riegl derives ‘the problems of the opinion and of the composition from the particularities of the commission’.320 The Riegelian problem to which Wind cross-refers here is that of the representation of the patrons within the picture, the problem arising when ‘many people are to be represented in full inactivity’321 and ‘yet, at the same time, the outer...
portrait similarity is demanded’. In this case, Wind affirms, ‘a rivalry must emerge between the ‘independent’ opinion and the ‘fixed image’: this means a conflict between ‘attention’ and ‘will-expression’ for the psychological characterization of the figures, a conflict between loose vertical ranging (i.e. affirmation of the plane-relations) and bond through a normal scheme (i.e. affirmation of the plane) for the composition’. This rivalry, however, is nothing but ‘the particular shaping of a fundamental antithesis’, and this is enough to show that the non-artistic foundation of the problems limits only their applicability, but certainly not their meaning, and that, therefore, one cannot talk about ‘special’ problems but only problems ‘applied in a special way’. And this is because - as we have already seen - ‘the antitheses as such are employed in their basic meaning [...]. But then,’ - as Wind asks - ‘where are the really special problems to be found?’

For this reason, it often happens that, ‘instead of a representational or thematic condition, a concrete morphological figure is chosen as the ‘representative of value’’, as for instance in Frankl’s statement: ‘Column and wall are opposites’. Although for the art historian such a statement is absolutely normal, it still reveals a paradoxicality on the logical level, related to the possibility of ‘putting two concrete constructions against one another’. In order to explain how this might be possible, Wind uses the verb verkörpern (to embody) and affirms that ‘it is the values embodied in the constructions which are put against one another - not the constructions themselves’. From this, a complication derives: a concrete figure (konkrete Gestalt) - a concrete morphological figure (konkrete morphologische Gestalt) as, for instance, a column - is not so much a pure representative of the single value (Wert), as it contains in itself a determined balance of an antithetical conflict. So, for instance, if a concrete figure is set up against another concrete figure (einer anderen konkreten Gestalt) - as against the mass of a wall with a determined conformation (Ausformung) - we relate two opposite solutions and obtain therefore a new problem that requires reconciliation and ‘solution’. This problem, i.e. this antithetical opposition, however is no longer a fundamental one, but

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323’muß sich eine Rivalität ergeben zwischen der «ungebundenen» Auffassung und dem «gestellten Bild»:
Für die psychologische Charakteristik der Figuren bedeutet das einen Konflikt zwischen
325’die äußerkünstlerische Fundierung der Probleme nur deren Anwendbarkeit eingrenzt, aber nicht recht
328’die Antithesen als solche werden in ihrer grundlegenden Bedeutung herangezogen [...]. Wo sind aber
329statt einer gegenständlichen oder thematischen Vorbedingung eine konkrete morphologische Gestalt
332The first time Wind used this term was in his doctoral dissertation, almost always in the same sense as
here. See Edgar Wind, Ästhetischer und kunstwissenschaftlicher Gegenstand, 23, 25, 26, 31, 32 and, in
particular, 197 where Wind proposes the same thesis as here.
333es sind die in den Gebilden verkörperten Werte, die man gegeneinander kontrastiert, - nicht die Gebilde
absolutely special’;\textsuperscript{335} ‘it can only be considered as a \textit{particular} condition of a \textit{determined} representation and not as a \textit{universal} condition of the ‘forming \textit{in general}’\textsuperscript{336}. Nevertheless, the fact remains that this \textit{problem} too, this \textit{really special}\textsuperscript{337} problem, can be reduced to general antitheses, since each one of the poles which compose it can still be resolved in turn by an elementary antithesis:

‘column’ and ‘wall’ - which we put in a mutual antithesis - already contain, respectively, a determined balance between optical and haptical values. In exactly the same way even the composition-scheme of the triangle, which in certain phases of northern painting ‘competes’ with the tonal spatial values, derives from a contrast between surface and depth. It is established, in this way, that the really special problems carry a complex character and are to be resolved into elementary components. In this sense, every \textit{historically conditioned} problem can be reduced to a \textit{supra-historical} one, every \textit{evolutionary} polarity can be reduced to a \textit{systematic} one. So, we reach the conclusion that it is precisely on the particular problems that the basic antitheses prove themselves as ‘final authorities’. The ‘concrete problems’ by in themselves point back to a ‘systematic ready network of questions’\textsuperscript{338}.

It is precisely these Windian considerations which fully recover the sense of Wind’s \textit{kunstwissenschaftlich} approach and substantiate the sense and the importance of the transcendental reflection he introduced with his \textit{Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme}. At the same time, if one looks at the developments in Wind’s thought after 1925, it is precisely these last considerations\textsuperscript{339} that seem to be somehow connected to the new Windian thesis which will arrive only one year later, in 1926, on the occasion of a lecture Wind gave in the USA, at Harvard.\textsuperscript{340} Here, in \textit{Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme}, as I have shown, a reflection on both the specification (\textit{Spezifizierung}) of the artistic problems and the difficulty in dealing with the manifold artworks justifies for Wind a resort to the \textit{ideal instruments} for the investigation of the \textit{artistic reality}. Later, it is precisely this problematic relationship between the \textit{concreteness of the reality to be investigated} and the \textit{ideality of the investigative tools} which appears under a different light and becomes for Wind a new question: the need to determine the sense of the relationship between \textit{empirics} and \textit{theory} starting from a

\textsuperscript{335}’ist kein grundlegendes mehr, sondern ein durchaus spezielles’, Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457.
\textsuperscript{337}Since it is not based on a non-artistic foundation, unlike the \textit{special} problems already examined above. See \textit{supra} and Edgar Wind, ‘Zur Systematik’, 457.
\textsuperscript{339}Which are also present in Wind’s doctoral dissertation - see \textit{supra}.
\textsuperscript{340}Edgar Wind, ‘Experiment and Metaphysics’, 217-224.
redefinition of the meaning of investigative tools and experiment. So, if compared with the theory of the embodiment (or Verkörperung) formulated by Wind shortly afterwards in Experiment and Metaphysics,\textsuperscript{341} his particular use of the verb verkörpern (to embody) in Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, and his interest in both determining the final authorities (letzte Instanzen) and investigating the problematic role of the concrete individual element in comparison with the theoretical element, seem to anticipate the direction of his following meditation. In this sense, I believe that, although the theories and the solutions which Wind developed from 1926 onwards are unlikely to be found in Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme, it is certainly reasonable to maintain that in Zur Systematik der künstlerischen Probleme Wind still localized at least a specific underlying question: the relationship between ideal a priori structures and the data of experience. It is precisely to this problem, perhaps implicitly acknowledging the limits of his own earlier solution, that he tries to find a different answer by means of the new philosophical theories he got to know during his stay in the U.S.A, where he became acquainted with the thought of Peirce and Lewis and with the experimental method of contemporary physics.

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\textsuperscript{341} And, then, in Das Experiment und die Metaphysik. As I shall show in the following section, the very foundation of Wind’s theory of the Verkörperung must certainly be detected in his conference paper of 1926: Edgar Wind, ‘Experiment and Metaphysics’, 217-224. See also Edgar Wind, Das Experiment und die Metaphysik, 1934 and 2001, English transl.: Edgar Wind, Experiment and Metaphysics, 2001.