

Reality as the cause of Art: Riegl and neo-kantian realism

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*'In art form "strives" towards matter.'*¹

Alois Riehl

This paper² proposes that it is possible to find strong affinities between Alois Riegl's conception of art-history and the essential premises of the philosophical school of neo-kantian realism, as it is represented by the work of the Austrian philosopher Alois Riehl.³ This proposition synthesizes between a re-examination of the philosophical orientation of Riegl's art-historiography, and a consideration of the spatial elements of Riegl's *Kunstwollen*.

I propose that the philosophical character of Alois Riegl's art-history should be considered anew, taking into account the presuppositions of neo-kantian realism. Riegl's art-history is pregnant with epistemological observations which are too singular to be reduced to any single philosophical bias, whether it would be G. W. F.

¹ 'In der Kunst 'begehrt' die Form nach dem Stoffe.', Alois Riehl, 'Bemerkungen zu dem Probleme der Form in der Dichtkunst', in Alois Riehl, *Philosophische Studien aus Vier Jahrzehnten*, Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1925, 283. When an English translation is available, I use it and quote the source. If otherwise, English translations are mine.

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³ Riehl taught in the University of Graz from 1873. In 1882 he moved to the University of Freiburg and was accepted by the neo-kantian school there. In 1905 he inherited Wilhelm Dilthey's chair at the University of Berlin. On Austrian neo-kantian realism and especially on Riehl, see Carl Siegel, *Alois Riehl- Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Neukantismus*, Graz: Verlag der Universitäts-Buchhandlung, Lerschner und Lubensky, 1932; Wolfgang Röd, 'Alois Riehl, Kritischer Realismus zwischen Transzendentalismus und Empirizismus', in Thomas Binder, Reinhard Fabian, Uld Höfer and Jutta Valert, eds, *Bausteine zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Graz, Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie* 32, Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopoi, 2001, 117-134; Heiner Rutte, 'Ergänzende Bemerkungen zu A. Riehl, H. Spitzer, C. Siegel und zur Grazer Schultradition', in *Bausteine zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Graz*, 135-148; Michael Heidelberger, 'Kantianism and Realism: Alois Riehl (And Moritz Schlick)', in Michael Heidelberger and Alfred Nordman, eds, *The Kantian Legacy in Nineteenth-Century Science*, Cambridge Mass. and London: MIT Press, 2006, 227-247.

Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Franz Clemens Brentano, Lebensphilosophie, or neo-kantian realism. Instead, I maintain that Riegl's formulation of the *Kunstwollen* entailed complex suggestions that should be reconstrued as a mixture of competing philosophical standing points, available and active in Riegl's time and place. Indeed, turn-of-the-century Vienna was such a vibrant locus of intellectual and cultural turmoil, that the presence of emerging and competing philosophical schools in Riegl's immediate environment must be taken into account when trying to pinpoint his intellectual premises.⁴ Martin Seiler examined the empiricist issues that were part and parcel of the formation of the Viennese school of art-history.⁵ Already Julius von Schlosser, in his 1934 presentation of Riegl's art-history pointed to the positivist and realist character of the latter's historiography.⁶ Diana Reynolds discussed the positivist tendency of the institutions to which Riegl was affiliated, especially the institute for Austrian historical research (Institut für österreichische Geschichtsforschung).⁷ Riegl himself avowed an orientation which is positivist 'in the widest sense' of the term.⁸ Indeed the influence of the positivist philosopher Ernst Mach in turn-of-the-century Vienna cannot be over-estimated. But I think that the machian positivist characterization is still not sufficiently precise to pinpoint Riegl's philosophical position. The status of perceptions (*Empfindungen*) in Riegl's art-history is different from the one Mach gave them, because Mach considered subjective-impressions as an ontological

⁴ Regarding Austrian philosophy see Rudolf Haller, 'Österreichische Philosophie', in Rudolf Haller *Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie- Variationen über ein Thema*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1979, 5-22; Peter Kampits, 'Versuch über "österreichische Philosophie" oder "Offenlassen statt Abschließen"', in Peter Kampits, *Zwischen Schein und Wirklichkeit- Eine kleine Geschichte der österreichischen Philosophie*, Wien: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1984, 11-23.

⁵ Martin Seiler, 'Empiristische Motive im Denken und Forschen der Wiener Schule der Kunstgeschichte', in Martin Seiler and Friedrich Stadler, eds, *Kunst, Kunsttheorie und Kunstforschung in wissenschaftlichen Diskurs. In memoriam Kurt Blaukopf*, Vienna: Öbv and Hpt Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000, 49-88.

⁶ Schlosser mentions Johann Friedrich Herbart as an important influence for Riegl, as well as Robert Zimmermann and Christian von Ehrenfels. See Julius von Schlosser, 'Alois Riegl', trans. Matthew Rampley, in Richard Woodfield, ed., *Framing Formalism: Riegl's Work*, Australia: G+B Arts International, 2001, 42, 45; Julius von Schlosser, 'Die Wiener Schule der Kunstgeschichte', in *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Institut für Geschichtsforschung*, Ergänzung Band XIII, Heft 2 (Innsbruck, 1934), 181-193.

⁷ Diana Graham Reynolds, *Alois Riegl and the Politics of Art History. Intellectual Traditions and Austrian Identity in Fin de Siècle Vienna*, San Diego: University of California, 1997, 48-71.

⁸ Riegl refers to positivism in his theoretical writings. See Alois Riegl, 'Naturwerk und Kunstwerk I', in Alois Riegl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, Augsburg-Wien: Benno Filser Verlag, 1928, 64; Alois Riegl, 'Naturwerk und Kunstwerk II', 67, 70. See also Riegl, 'Naturwerk und Kunstwerk I', 59- 'Es gibt heute eine weitverbreitete philosophische Richtung, die unter grundsätzlicher Ablehnung aller Metaphysik sich lediglich an das Gegebene zu halten entschlossen ist: man nennt sie die positivistische (im weitesten Sinne). Überträgt man die Prinzipien dieser Denkrichtung auf die Kunstgeschichte, so wird man sagen müssen, dass das Kunstschaffen sich lediglich als ein ästhetischer Drang äußert: bei den einen (den Künstlern), die Naturdinge in einer bestimmten Art und Weise, unter einseitiger Steigerung der einen, Unterdrückung der anderen Merkmale wiederzugeben, bei den anderen (dem Publikum), die Naturdinge in ebendieser Art und Weise, wie es von den gleichzeitigen Künstlern geschieht, wiedergeben zu schauen. Dasjenige, wodurch dieser Drang determiniert sein könnte- ob nun Rohstoff, Technik oder Gebrauchszweck, oder Erinnerungsbild- ist für uns mindestens ein Ignoramus, vielleicht für immer ein Ignorabimus: es bleibt nur das *Kunstwollen* als das einzig sicher Gegeben übrig.'

foundation, in as much as for Riegl apart from sensations, there are also things of nature. Furthermore, for Riegl, perception, as well as plastic production, is not only dependent on changing, idiosyncratic occasional formations, but also on several a priori, constant, unifying factors. How shall we supply an adequate account for this objective, regulating pole of the *Kunstwollen*? It is here that I find neo-kantian realism helpful. Alois Riehl's philosophy, which was no doubt influenced by the empiricist thinkers, also shared affinities with positivism.⁹ Though rather than to Mach, Riehl referred much more to psycho-physical post-kantian experimentalists such as Johann Friedrich Herbart and Hermann von Helmholtz.¹⁰

Andrea Reichenberger¹¹ and Michael Gubser¹² offered accounts of Riegl's philosophical orientation by examining Riegl's milieu of turn-of-the-century Austria. They both constructed a continuous field of intellectual coordinates that surrounded Riegl, and they both pointed to the realist and positivist character of his work. Nevertheless, the directions of reconstruction to which they pointed are different from the one I propose here. In as much as Reichenberger suggested a sociological orientation as the foundation for an understanding of the *Kunstwollen*, I am concerned more with the epistemological and metaphysical components of his stands. And if Gubser related Riegl's projects to the tradition issuing from Brentano, my argument is that in fact we can view Riegl's projects as posing an alternative to the mentalist realism of Brentano and his followers, an alternative which goes-back to the basic questions posed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant, and developed by the neo-kantian school and the post-kantian philosophers in Germany. This entailed a return to a synthetic conception of reality, which tries to find the middle-ground between subjectivity and objectivity, as well as between a priorism and empiricism. That same endeavour can be found in Riehl's neo-Kantian realist philosophy.¹³ While adhering to the kantian revolution (In opposition to Brentano who was an anti-kantian), Riehl criticized the kantian dichotomy between "things-in-the-themselves" and apprehended objects, a dichotomy that he viewed as dualist. Instead, Riehl proclaimed a monist metaphysics in which reality unites realities and their representations.¹⁴

⁹ Carl Siegel, Riehl's student, underlined the positivist element in Riehl's philosophy, Siegel, *Alois Riehl*, 57, 67.

¹⁰ Siegel, *Alois Riehl*, 10, 23-24, 33-34; Alois Riehl, *Zur Einführung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart*, Leipzig: Verlag von B. G. Teubner, 1903, 137-179, 256-265.

¹¹ Andrea Reichenberger, 'Riegl's "Kunstwollen"- Versuch eine Neubetrachtung', *Conceptus-Studien* 15, Academia, 2003.

¹² Michael Gubser, *Time's visible surface- Alois Riegl and the discourse on history and temporality in fin-de-siècle Vienna*, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2006.

¹³ There is no evidence of personal or institutional contact neither between Riegl and Riehl, nor between Riegl and Riehl's follower, Carl Siegel, that Riegl quoted (See below). Riehl left Austria when Riegl was still at his university studies stage.

¹⁴ This search for a neo-monism Riehl shared both with Riegl and with many turn-of-the-century thinkers who were aware both of psycho-physical and evolutionary theories, such as Henri Bergson and Ernst Haeckel. See Hans Schwarz, 'Darwinism between Kant and Haeckel', *The Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 48/4 (1980), 581-602; Robert J. Richards, *Darwin and the emergence of evolutionary theories of mind and Behavior*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987, 398.

Though many times neglected in canonical histories of nineteenth-century European or even Austrian philosophy, Riehl founded one of the most intriguing tropes of the neo-kantian movement. His stand, differently from the canonical neo-kantian one, was that it is possible, and indeed, necessary, to be a kantian (i.e. a critical thinker of the transcendental structure of our apprehension) and a realist at the same time. His approach was based on a positivist viewpoint, which however did not reduce all of reality to sensation.¹⁵ Instead, for Riehl, reality, qua nature, exists, and its essential structures are approachable to human consciousness. This is possible due to the fact that there exists a parallelism between the “thing in itself” (Ding an sich) and the “I in itself” (Ich an sich), the latter characterized by the unity of consciousness, as the sole a priori condition for experience.¹⁶ The unity of consciousness, though, for Riehl, is necessarily ordered by space and time.

The linkage I suggest between Riegl and Riehl neither leans on evidence of personal or institutional acquaintance, nor on direct influence. It rather points to a shared problem;¹⁷ The one regarding the endeavour to find the middle-ground between subjectivity and objectivity, as well as between an a-posteriori and an a-priori approach in the sciences (Art-history in the case of Riegl, Philosophy in the case of Riehl). This search for a definition of the positive reality of artistic-production as lying at the middle ground between empiricism and idealism appears in Riegl's works from 1899 onwards.¹⁸ Furthermore, this affinity enables giving an account for essential traits of Riegl's art-history: The synthesis of space and time which the *Kunstwollen* entails, the indispensability of the things of nature to the workings of the *Kunstwollen*, and the organizational volition of human productions. These three axes of comparison are treated by the several sections of this essay as following: (1) Space and time as standing at the heart of what I find as the common concerns of Riegl and Riehl. (2) The realist character of both Riegl's and Riehl's oeuvres, and the status of things-of-nature. (3) The relation between formalism and realism (4) Distance as the structure of both art and perception. (5) The origin of space-representation and the suggested solution to the 'empiricist-nativist' debate, and finally (6) The *Kunstwollen* as an auto-regulative agent of subjectivity.

¹⁵ Alois Riehl, *Zur Einführung in die Philosophie*, 245-255.

¹⁶ Röd, 'Alois Riehl: Kritischer Realismus', 122.

¹⁷ In this respect it is plausible to view my methodical point of view as pertaining to the way Panofsky phrased his understanding of the relation between art, history and philosophy, through his re-articulation of the notion of the medieval 'Habitudo', as mental habit. See Erwin Panofsky, *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism. An Inquiry into the Analogy of the Arts, Philosophy and Religion in the Middle Ages* (1951), New York: Meridian, 1976.

¹⁸ I detect the appearance of this orientation in Riegl's art-history around the period of his posthumous published lectures, given at the University of Vienna in 1897 and in 1899, named *Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts*. See Alois Riegl, *Historische Grammatik der bildenden Künste*, Graz: H. Bohlau, 1966, 209 ff.; Alois Riegl, *Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts*, trans. J. E. Jung, New York: Zone Books, 2004, 287 ff.

Synthesis of space and time in the *Kunstwollen*¹⁹

One of the fundamental elements of the rieglarian understanding of form within the confines of the *Kunstwollen* is the synthesis of space and time. For Riegl "form" is a spatial entity. No form is fully emancipated from spatial existence.²⁰ Most of the cases Riegl examines in his writings include a substantial spatial factor. On the other hand, any one of Riegl's projects explicitly engages problems of temporal succession and the possibility of change. Art's Historical existence, then, according to the rieglarian *Kunstwollen* would be accurately described as a spatio-temporal synthesis between spatial and temporal vectors. Indeed, Riegl even posed his concept of the *Kunstwollen* as a possible solution to the inability of the functionalist art-history of Gottfried Semper to give an account for change and development of styles in the plastic arts.²¹ Thus, it is essential to try and formulate correctly what is the state of affairs between these two vectors in Riegl's art-history.

Gubser's book supplied tenable brentanoian contextualization of the temporal component of Riegl's work.²² My questioning is directed rather to the spatial aspect of the *Kunstwollen* and especially to the synthesis of space and time, and here I find neo-kantian realism most efficient. My suggestion does not exclude Gubser's propositions, but rather tries to contribute yet another piece to this ongoing process of reconstructing Riegl's thought.

Austrian neo-kantian realism, active in Riegl's intellectual and cultural milieu, was unquestionably familiar to him, as in his *Spätromische Kunstindustrie*,²³ in the pages devoted to the deployment of the issue of the development of space-

¹⁹ Though the centrality of the concept of the *Kunstwollen* in Riegl's art-history stands somewhat in debate, I choose to retain this concept as the core atom of his historiography. This is justified by the fact the tradition of art-historiography after Riegl referred and criticized this same notion. Also, Riegl himself, in his last published essay, used the notion of the *Kunstwollen* in several places. See Alois Riegl, 'Der moderne Denkmalkultus sein Wesen und seine Entstehung' (1903), in Riegl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 147, 161, 178, 188, 190. On the concept of the *Kunstwollen* see Erwin Panofsky, 'Der Begriff des Kunstwollens', in Erwin Panofsky, *Aufsätze zu Grundfragen der Kunstwissenschaft*, Hariolf Oberer and Egon Verheyen, eds, Berlin: Verlag Bruno Hessling, 1964, 33-48, translated as Erwin Panofsky, 'The concept of artistic volition', trans. K. J. Northcott and J. Snyder, *Critical Inquiry* 8/1 (Autumn, 1981), 17-33. See also Michael Benedikt, 'Alois Riegl's Kunstanalyse und das Kunstwollen', in Michael Benedikt, *Kunst und Würde*, Wien: Turia and Kant, 1994, 53-66.

²⁰ 'Alle Dinge in der Natur sind geformt, d.h. sie erstrecken sich nach den drei Dimensionen der Höhe, Breite und Tiefe'. Riegl, *Historische Grammatik*, 129; Alois Riegl, *Historical Grammar*, 187: 'All things in nature possess form; that is, they extend themselves in three dimensions of height, width and depth'.

²¹ Alois Riegl, 'Naturwerk und Kunstwerk, I', 60: 'Es fragt sich nun, wie innerhalb dieses Kunstwollens eine Entwicklung möglich ist. Wie das Studium der Denkmäler in ihrer uns wohlbekannten zeitlichen Aufeinanderfolge lehrt, knüpft die Entwicklung nicht etwa an die Naturdinge als solche, die sich vielmehr immer gleichgeblieben sind, sondern an die Art und Weise an, in welcher der Mensch die Naturdinge jeweilig reproduziert schauen wollte. An dieser Stelle vermag ich von dem Entwicklungsgange des Kunstwollens, wie er sich in den bisher bekannt gewordenen und unterschiedenen Stilperioden darstellt, im nachfolgenden nur eine allgemeine Skizze der treibenden Momente zu geben(...)'.

²² Gubser, *Time's visible surface*.

²³ Alois Riegl, *Spätromische Kunstindustrie* (1901), Wien: Druck und Verlag der Österr. Staatsdruckerei in Wien, 1927, 30; Alois Riegl, *Late Roman Art Industry* (1901), trans. R. Winkes, Rome: Giorgio Bretschneider Editore, 1981, 23.

representations, he referred to an essay written by one of the most central representatives of this school, Carl Siegel, a follower of Alois Riehl. This 1899 essay, titled *Entwicklung der Raumvorstellung des Menschlichen Bewußtseins*,²⁴ Siegel draws on Riehl's understanding of space and time and poses a realist understanding of space-representation.

For Riehl and Siegel, space and time are radically intermingled, equally important platforms of apprehension. Indeed, Riehl's realist reading of Kant entailed the emphasis on the forms of intuition (*Anschauung*), i.e. space and time, while reducing the importance of the categories in the apprehension of reality. Only that for Riehl space and time are not considered as two separate forms of intuition but as inherently intermingled platforms of reality. Space and time are the objective unities of relations between realities (These realities can also be called 'essences' - the German word is 'Wesen').²⁵ In as much as spatiality is the coexistence of realities,²⁶ temporality supplies the platform of their succession and variation. Space and Time together form the platform for the unity of consciousness, as well as of reality. The relations of realities co-exist and change upon the platform of unity and parallelism which is supplied by space and time, on the basis of the law of causality. Spatio-temporal dynamics lean on the most fundamental form of our conception of nature: The law of causality (*Kausalgesetz*),²⁷ which determines that every thing has a cause. But this law of causality according to Riehl leans on an even more fundamental principle, which is the unity (*Einheit*) encompassing, according to Riehl, both subject and realities.²⁸ This encompassing unity is reality itself. Below I will specify in what manner this conception of reality fits well also with Riegl's formulations.

Riehl called this unity of time and space- duration ('*Dauer*'). Differently from the notion of the '*Durée*' of Henri Bergson²⁹ and from Franz Brentano's '*continuum*',³⁰ which were both directed to the explanation of temporality, Riehl's duration is inherently spatial as much as it is temporal. Indeed, for Riehl duration is the very identity of space and time.³¹ Moreover, in as much as both Brentano and Bergson were interested in the complex flow of the processes by which objects

²⁴ Apart from the fact the Riegl quoted Siegel, there is no evidence of personal or institutional contact between the two men. Carl Siegel indeed studied, as well as taught for awhile, at the university of Vienna (In the institute of philosophy), but his time there did not overlap with Riegl's. Carl Siegel, *Entwicklung der Raumvorstellung des Menschlichen Bewußtseins- Eine psychologische Analyse*, Leipzig und Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1899.

²⁵ Alois Riehl, 'Realistische Grundzüge (1870)', in Alois Riehl, *Philosophische Studien aus Vier Jahrzehnten*, Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1925, 19-37; Siegel, *Alois Riehl*, 144-146, 160.

²⁶ Riehl, 'Realistische Grundzüge', 30- 'Der Raum der absoluten Wesen ist nichts anders, als ihre Koexistenz.'

²⁷ Alois Riehl, 'Kausalität und Identität (1877)', in Riehl, *Philosophische Studien*, 202-218; Mathias Jung, *Der Neukantianische Realismus von Alois Riehl*, Inaugural Dissertation, Bonn: Mathias Jung, 1973, 179-191- 'Das Kausalgesetz als „allgemeine Form der Naturgesetze“ und als „Leitfaden der Identität“'.

²⁸ Riehl, 'Realistische Grundzüge', 7-18.

²⁹ See Henri Bergson, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (1896), Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1927, 56-104.

³⁰ Franz Brentano, *Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum*, Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1976. See also Gubser, *Time's Visible Surface*, 61- 75- 'Franz Brentano and the In-existence of Time'.

³¹ Riehl, 'Realistische Grundzüge', 35-37.

appear in our consciousness, Riehl's duration refers to what endures and subsists throughout these processes.

Indeed, we can see similar dynamics active in Riegl's *Kunstwollen*; the *Kunstwollen* is the identity of temporality and spatiality in man's plastic productions. It is the constant human striving to retain unity and cohesiveness in face of the changing and complex reality of things of nature. This constant 'duty' (*Aufgabe*), which is the outcome of the basic 'intention' (*Absicht*)³² of the plastic arts, consists of the constant transfiguration of spatial presentations, i.e. it consists of an intimate synthesis between spatial co-existence and temporal succession. In other words, The *Kunstwollen* is the durational identity of temporality and spatiality in man's fabrication of objective relations between realities. Thus, both in Riegl and in Riehl we find a function of duration, in which time and space function as the constant unifying platforms of human perception.

The requisiteness of natural things to the *Kunstwollen*

Things of nature are a necessary requisite for activation of the dynamics of the *Kunstwollen*.³³ Even prior to the spatio-temporal synthesis, the most important trait neo-kantian realism supplies for an adequate understanding Riegl's method, is the dominancy of nature and its objective position.³⁴ Indeed, for both Riegl and Riehl, the object of art (as well as of any other human activity) is nature.³⁵ The synthesis of space and time in Riehl's philosophy is a result of a causal form which unites subject and nature, and which demands us to regard objects as a result of our perception of them as well as ourselves as a result of our contact with objects. This causality is enabled by the identity and unity of nature and our apprehension of it.³⁶ Causal relations, in Riehl's philosophy, are the primary embodiment of the unity of reality. Note, that differently from the regular kantian view, in which the world of experience is constituted by the transcendental capacities of the subject, in neo-kantian realism causality between apprehension and reality is considered as bi-lateral: it is not only that the subject pre-arranges reality (or nature), as in the kantian

³² See Riegl, *Spätromische Kunstindustrie*, 25; Riegl, *Late Roman Art Industry*, 20.

³³ 'Naturwerk und Kunstwerk, I', 60- 'Die Naturdinge offenbaren sich dem Gesichtssinn des Menschen als isolierte Figuren, aber zugleich verbunden mit dem Universum (d.h. mit einem so gut wie unbegrenzten Ausschnitt desselben), zu einem unendlichen Ganzen.'

³⁴ See Reichenberger, 'Riegls *Kunstwollen*', 84- 'Alois Riegl versteht hier unter "Natur" keineswegs nur die "äußere Welt" also die unabhängig vom Menschlichen Bewusstsein existierende Welt von Objekten, die der Mensch (...) als Außen stehender, die nicht in diesen Prozess eingebunden wäre, beobachten und erforschen könnte, sondern die Welt als Ganzes, in der die Natur als ein Teil und der Mensch als Teil der Natur begriffen wird. Dieser Begriff von "Welt" umfasst das Physische wie das Psychische, materielles wie Geistigen bzw. Ideelles, Außen- wie Innenwelt. Es ist eine Welt, in der der Mensch als Subjekt zugleich ein Objekt ist und umgekehrt als Objekt doch stets nur subjektabhängig betrachtet werden kann.'

³⁵ Siegel, *Alois Riehl*, 146; Hans Jürgen Sproß, *Die Naturauffassung bei Alois Riegl und Josef Strzygowski* (PhD. Dissertation), Saarbrücken: Universität des Saarlandes, 1989.

³⁶ Riehl, *Einführung in die Philosophie*, 167- 'Es ist dieselbe Wirklichkeit, aus der unsere Sinne stammen und die Dinge, die auf unsere Sinne wirken. Die nämentliche Schaffende Macht, die schon in den einfachsten Dingen am Werke ist, setzt ihr Werk in uns, durch uns fort. Sie ist die gemeinsame Quelle von Natur und Verstand.'

view; instead, nature itself causes and constructs the ever-changing united-structures of subjective apprehension. This bi-laterality exists also in Riegl's conception of the *Kunstwollen*. It is only in the face of things of nature that the organizing and designing processes of the *Kunstwollen* are activated. No *Kunstwollen* can be activated without there being things of nature to cope with. That is why Riegl states that art is essentially and was always naturalistic.³⁷ Therefore, any act of perception holds objective, positive and realist character. On the other hand, subjective transcendental schemes and apparatuses make also a necessary part of experience. And this is what makes of Riehl's realism a neo-kantian one.

Indeed, the 20th century Austrian philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend, in his essay 'Wissenschaft als Kunst',³⁸ applied Riegl's concept of the *Kunstwollen* to the philosophy of science. For Feyerabend, the riegelian understanding of the artwork makes the latter parallel to the workings of science; both occupations refer to reality, by the arrangement of experience, experiments, trials and errors, and both strive to sustain the inner-unity of the apprehension of that reality.³⁹ Thus, Feyerabend argues in a radical manner, the relation between art and reality is identical to the relation between science and reality. The way Riegl presents the artwork, for Feyerabend, parallels the workings of pure mathematics- both are indispensable instruments for the exploration of reality, and both fabricate organizing structures for that purpose.⁴⁰ This description can be described as both positivist and neo-kantian in character.⁴¹ Feyerabend, though, writing already in the 20th century, claims that Riegl's concept of reality is essentially an open one. Riehl's point of view was that the openness of the concept of reality rests on the pre-established unity and continuity between subject and realities, a continuity upon which change and variation are possible. Indeed, for Riehl the function of temporality is exactly to enable the infinite subjective schema for non-limited transformability.⁴²

Such a bringing-near of science and art works in contrast to the development of the differentiation between the natural sciences and the humanities in the German neo-kantian tradition, apparent in the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey, Wilhelm

³⁷ '(...) those who argued that human artistic creation has never been anything but naturalist are correct'. Riegl, *Historical Grammar*, 298; 'menschliche Kunstschaffen wäre überhaupt niemals ein anderes gewesen als ein naturalistisches'. Riegl, *Historische Grammatik*, 215.

³⁸ Paul Feyerabend, 'Wissenschaft als Kunst- Eine Diskussion der Rieglschen Kunsttheorie verbunden mit dem Versuch, sie auf die Wissenschaften anzuwenden', in Paul Feyerabend, *Wissenschaft als Kunst*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984, 15-84.

³⁹ Feyerabend, *Wissenschaft als Kunst*, 39- 'Die Künstler auch die Wirklichkeit darstellen will- innere Vollkommenheit und Darstellung der Wirklichkeit, das sind die zwei Randbedingungen die sein schaffen leiten'.

⁴⁰ Feyerabend, *Wissenschaft als Kunst*, 38- 'Die reine Mathematik und die Rieglsche Kunst (...) sind also wichtige Hilfsmittel einer vorgeschrittenen Wirklichkeitsforschung.'

⁴¹ For another reading of Riegl's *Kunstwollen* which emphasizes its positive-objective character and mentions also Feyerabend's article, see Benedikt, 'Alois Riegls Kunstanalyse'.

⁴² Riehl, 'Realistische Grundzüge', 33- 'Die Zeit ist Unendlich, aber nicht als gegebene Größe, sondern als subjektives Schema von unbeschränkter Anwendbarkeit.'

Windelband and Heinrich Rickert,⁴³ as well as in Aby Warburg's and Erwin Panofsky's iconological inquiries, in which art-history was related to 'eruditio' and not to 'scientia'.⁴⁴ The German neo-kantian school, generally speaking, wished to keep for the humanities a terrain closer to art than to science. The humanities, the "idiographic" sciences in the terms of Windelband, are not responsible for the formation of general laws of nature but for the description of cultural phenomena.⁴⁵ Thus the humanities should be occupied with systems of values and with world-views, in as much as the natural sciences are the only ones eligible to be occupied with the general rules of reality. In a contrasted manner, Riegl expressed an unquestionable urge to forge general rules for the history of art, as is manifested in the title of the two lecture-courses given by him at the University of Vienna at 1897 and 1899- 'Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts'.⁴⁶ The one who produces the work of art, said Riegl, does not have to know these laws of grammar; but the one who wants to understand the productions of man, is obliged to explore and analyze them.⁴⁷ Riegl did not comply with the neo-kantian dichotomy between the idiographic and the nomothetic sciences. It is not only that behind every work of art we can find a thing of nature, but that art is based on the laws of nature, and therefore there are general laws which can account for its historical development. Because nature 'motivates' the work of art, it also serves as the organizing factor of plastic decisions. It is only on the basis of the exploration of the naturalistic causes of the history of art and the structural laws of plastic grammar, that Riegl's projects require the description of worldviews. These worldviews, embodying a relation to nature, serve as the "what" (Was?) of plastic production.⁴⁸ And so in Riegl's method the description of worldviews is subordinated to the search for general laws of the history of plastic production. This Riegl's art-history does not comply with Windelband's definition of the idiographic sciences.⁴⁹

Again on that point, Riegl's views are close to the ones of Riehl. Riehl wrote explicitly that he does not think the "idiographic sciences" exist in the sense that

⁴³ See Heinrich Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*, Freiburg, Leipzig und Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1899; Wilhelm Windelband, 'Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft (1894)', in Wilhelm Windelband, *Präliminarien- Aufsätze und Reden zur Einleitung in die Philosophie*, B. II, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1915, 136-160. An English translation of this lecture is to be found as Wilhelm Windelband, 'History and Natural Science', trans. Guy Oaks, *History and Theory* 19/2 (Feb. 1980), 165-185. See also Wilhelm Dilthey, *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften* (c.1910), Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970.

⁴⁴ Erwin Panofsky, 'The History of Art as a humanistic discipline', in Erwin Panofsky, *Meaning in the Visual Arts*, Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday Publishing, 1955, 25.

⁴⁵ Windelband, 'Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft', 145 ff.; Windelband, 'History and Natural Science', 175ff.

⁴⁶ Riegl, *Historische Grammatik*; Riegl, *Historical Grammar*.

⁴⁷ Riegl, *Historische Grammatik*, 211; Riegl, *Historical Grammar*, 293.

⁴⁸ Riegl, *Historische Grammatik*, 22, 247 ff.; Riegl, *Historical Grammar*, 53, 293ff.

⁴⁹ On that point Riegl is closest to Karl Menger, who also insisted on the necessity of the investigation of fundamental rules and structures in the science of national economy. This insistence brought Menger to his famous 'Methodenstreit' with Gustav von Schmoller and the German historical school of economics. See Annette Wittkau, *Historismus. Zur Geschichte des Begriffs und des Problems*, Göttingen: Hubert und Co., 1992, 61ff.

Windelband defined them.⁵⁰ If an inquiry is idiographic, then it is not a science. That is only one point out of several in which Riehl departed from both the Marburgian and the Bädische schools of neo-kantianism.⁵¹ Any science, says Riehl, should be occupied with analysis as much as it is occupied with description and synthesis.⁵² Without forming general laws and operating with them, it is impossible, according to Riehl, to carry-out any historical endeavour whatsoever. The real distinction between the natural sciences and the historical sciences, for Riehl, actually lies not in the one between the idiographic and the nomothetic sciences, but in the one between the scientific orientation, to which philosophy and history belong, and the pedagogic, educational orientation, which is occupied with values and worldviews.⁵³ Riehl finds that the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche pertain to that educational and creative orientation.⁵⁴ Indeed, though himself being committed to a rationalist viewpoint, Riehl was very much intrigued by the philosophy of Nietzsche, to which he referred several times in his writings.⁵⁵

Realist-Formalism

Realism indeed was a 'mental habit' of 19th century Austrian philosophy, which was highly interested to define its own place against German speculative idealism; both the Brentanoian and the Riehlian schools held realist views.⁵⁶ Although realist

⁵⁰ Riehl, *Einführung in die Philosophie*, 171- 'Es gibt keine "ideographische" das Einzelne als solches nur beschreibende Wissenschaft.' This anti-Windelbandian assertion is notable, due to the fact that Riehl inherited Windelband's position in Freiburg at 1882. See Röd, 'Alois Riehl- Kritischer Realismus', 117-118.

⁵¹ Siegel, *Alois Riehl*, 10; Röd, 'Alois Riehl. Kritischer Realismus', 118-121.

⁵² Riehl, *Einführung in die Philosophie*, 171- 'Eine Geschichte, die sich auf die bloße Wiedergabe der Ereignisse beschränkte, wäre nicht Wissenschaft, sondern Geschichtskunde.'

⁵³ Riehl, *Einführung in die Philosophie*, 169-199- 'Probleme der Lebensanschauung'; Alois Riehl, 'Über wissenschaftliche und nichtwissenschaftliche Philosophie (Freiburger Antrittsrede 1883)', in Riehl, *Philosophische Studien*, 227-253.

⁵⁴ Riehl, *Einführung in die Philosophie*, 200-235.

⁵⁵ Alois Riehl, *Friedrich Nietzsche: der Künstler und der Denker*, Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann Verlag, 1897. See also, *Einführung in die Philosophie*, 213-250, 266-270. Though I am not aware to an explicit reference to Nietzsche in Riegl's writings, the affinity of his work with Nietzschean notions was noted by Reynolds. Reynolds, *Alois Riegl and the Politics of Art History*, 24-47.

⁵⁶ For the anti-speculative character of Austrian philosophy, see Alois Riehl, 'Realistische Grundzüge', 7- 'Die realistische Philosophie überwindet also den vagen Traumidealismus und seinen Verbündeten, den schlaffen Quietismus, zugleich'.; Kevin Mulligan, 'De la philosophie autrichienne et de sa place', in *La philosophie autrichienne de Bolzano à Musil, Histoire et actualité* in Jean-Pierre Cometti and Kevin Mulligan, eds, Paris: Vrin, 2001, 8-11; Brentano was also very much opposed to the idealist school. He went as far as stating: 'Hegel's system and its pretensions have been exposed. A system that was only some decades ago still generally praised as the highest achievement of human inquiry, is today generally damned as the most extreme degeneration of human thought. This is a good sign'. Franz Clemens Brentano, 'The Four Phases of Philosophy and its Current State (1895)', in Franz Clemens Brentano, Balazs M. Mezei and Barry Smith, eds, *The Four Phases of Philosophy*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988, 102; 'Nun wohl! Dieses Hegelsche System und seine Prätensionen sind gerichtet. Vor wenigen Dezennien noch allgemein als die höchste Leistung menschlicher Forschungskraft gepriesen, wird es heute ebenso allgemein als die äußerste Entartung menschlichen Denkens verdammt. Das ist ein gutes Zeichen.' Franz Clemens Brentano, 'Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblickliche Stand

tendencies appeared also in German post-kantian thought, as in that of Herbart or of Helmholtz, the idealist and the neo-kantian premise regarding the ability of the subject to create her world was prominent in German intellectual discourse. Austrian philosophy of the 19th century was, on the other hand, much more interested in the exploration of that which resists subjective construction. This realist habitude is noticeable in a wide range of manifestations, from the positivism of sensation of Mach,⁵⁷ to the psychological empiricism of Brentano.⁵⁸ The Brentanoian school, lead by Brentano's student Alexius Meinong,⁵⁹ arrived at a mentalist realism, in which the reality of "non-existent objects" was declared and explored.⁶⁰ The Riehlian orientation, in its turn, held a realist view neither regarding mental objects, nor regarding sensation itself, but regarding both things of nature and our ability to know their structures. This argument stood of course in opposition to the canonical kantian dictum, which ordered to push 'things-in-themselves' out of the explorations of philosophy. The 'real' (Das Wirkliche⁶¹) in neo-kantian realism is construed as a border-line (i.e. a transcendental) concept (Grenzenbegriff) which man necessarily (and inherently successfully!) strives to approach. And the perceived world is conceived not as a lacking and deficient image of a transcendent world, nor merely as an extension of the structures of subjectivity, but as a continuation of the order of real things.⁶² This is quite concomitant with Riegl's insistence in his *Historische Grammatik*, that every human production is actually a competition with nature, in the sense that it strives to produce things according to the laws of nature.⁶³ Structures of nature are transferred from the physical world to the poietic world, and they serve as the motif (Dem Motive) of the work of art, thus being the 'δύναμη' of artistic-volution.

Though we tend to regard Riegl's art-history as first and foremost a formalist one,⁶⁴ I suggest regarding Riegl's art-history as having a substantive realist

(1895)', in Franz Clemens Brentano, *Die vier Phasen der Philosophie*, Oskar Kraus, ed., Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968.

⁵⁷ Ernst Mach, *Die Analyse der Empfindungen und der Verhältnis der Physischen zum Psychischen* (1885), Jena: Gustave Fischer Verlag, 1922.

⁵⁸ Franz Clemens Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874), Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1973.

Another two philosophers who must be mentioned regarding Austrian realism are Robert Zimmermann and Richard Wahle. Wahle's work exhibits remarkably close affinities with Riegl well as with Riehl. This link should be studied further. See Richard Wahle, *Gehirn und Bewußtsein. Physiologisch-Psychologische Studie*, Wien: Alfred Hödler, 1884. See also Heinrich Gomperz, *Die Welt als geordnete Ereignis. Bemerkungen zu Richard Wahles „definitiver Philosophie“*, Leipzig: Barth, 1901.

⁵⁹ Riegl heard courses of both Brentano and Meinong and the University of Vienna. A good introduction to the thought of Meinong could be found in Barry Smith, 'Alexius Meinong and Stephan Witasek: On Art and its Objects', in Barry Smith, *Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano*, Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1994, 64-84.

⁶⁰ See William J. Rapaport, 'Non-Existent Objects and Epistemological Ontology', *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 25/26 (1985-1986), 61-96.

⁶¹ See Rotte, 'Ergänzende Bemerkungen', 143.

⁶² Siegel, *Alois Riehl*, 29.

⁶³ Riegl, *Historische Grammatik*, 22; Riegl, *Historical Grammar*, 51-52.

⁶⁴ For the most seminal treatment of formalistic aspects in Riegl's art-history, see Woodfield, *Framing Formalism*.

foundation.⁶⁵ Of course this is not a 'photographic realism' in the sense of a simulation of nature, but exactly in a neo-kantian sense: a realism concerning the persistence of things of nature and concerning the laws of nature. Realism and formalism are inter-connected in Riegl's *Kunstwollen*, and we can tag his approach to art realist-formalism.⁶⁶ Riehl's artistic theory⁶⁷ reconciled realism and formalism just as well. In this realist formalism, form, as spatio-temporal, i.e. as durational creature is the constituent foundation of art, due to the former's realist capacity to transmit laws of nature.⁶⁸ Furthermore, formal operations produce positive realities that resist and subsist in equivalence to nature, or better, as part of nature itself.

Differently from the German iconologist tradition, led by the Warburg and Panofsky,⁶⁹ but also differently from the "Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte" of Riegl's follower at the University of Vienna, Max Dvorak,⁷⁰ Riegl's art-history does not reduce the history of art to the history of the spirit (*Geistesgeschichte*). Instead, Riegl retains the specificity and the concrete nature of artistic production. Thus, art is not an expression of an idea, nor is it a solely aesthetic manoeuvre of sensation; it is a middle ground between the two. Riegl conceived of artistic reality as existing at the neutral point of contact between subject and object, between world-views and nature, and between idealism and radical scepticism.⁷¹ What Riehl's neo-kantian realism could add to this formulation is that this neutral-territory could be conceived as reality itself, the border-surface between experience and nature. And it is a formal reality.

I have to emphasize that the *Kunstwollen* is not entirely an autonomous territory; rather it embodies the inter-relations of a public of viewers, users and producers, circulating products, values, worldviews and aesthetic judgments, always in specific and particular circumstances. As Georg Vasold has showed, Riegl's work is endowed with economical aspects.⁷² The *Kunstwollen* itself is described by Riegl

⁶⁵ Margaret Olin emphasized the centrality of issues of realism and realist art throughout Riegl's work. See Margaret Olin, *Forms of Representation in Alois Riegl's theory of art*, University Park, Penn.: Penn State University Press, 1992, 91-169.

⁶⁶ In as much as Riehl's approach to art could be tagged 'formalist realism'.

⁶⁷ Siegel, *Alois Riehl*, 148- '(...) seine ästhetische Auffassung ist vielmehr der Versuch kennzeichnend, den Forderungen des Formalismus und Realismus in der Kunst zugleich gerecht zu werden, indem er als deren wahre Aufgabe die Umformung der Wirklichkeit vom Gesichtspunkt der Herausarbeitung der Form anspricht.'

⁶⁸ Riegl's realist-formalism can be compared to the evolutionary formalism of Ernst Haeckel's in his *Kunstformen der Natur* (1899), which embedded 'original forms' (*Urformen*) in nature itself. Nevertheless, for Riegl, it is space which is the condition for any form; and forms in the realm of the plastic arts are not considered as an organic continuation or copy of the forms of nature, but rather as the outcome of a struggle with it, of a competition with it. Regarding Haeckel's theory of forms See Christoph Kockerbeck, *Ernst Haeckels "Kunstformen der Natur" und ihr Einfluß auf die deutsche bildende Kunst der Jahrhundertwende*, Frankfurt am Main-Bern- New York, 1986.

⁶⁹ On the Iconological tradition see Ekkehard Kaemmerling, ed., *Ikongraphie und Ikonologie: Theorien, Entwicklung, Probleme*, Koln: Dumont Buchverlag, 1979.

⁷⁰ Max Dvorak, *Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte*, Munchen :R. Piper, 1928.

⁷¹ Alois Riegl, 'Kunstgeschichte und Universalgeschichte', in Riegl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 9- 'Zwischen Wellenberg und Wellental liegt ein toter Punkt, in welchem die Extreme sich berühren.'

⁷² Georg Vasold, *Alois Riegl und die Kunstgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte*, Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach Verlag, 2004. An interesting comparison could be found between Riegl's realism and the known Austrian economists, Carl Menger. See Iskali Mäki, 'Mengerian economics in realist perspective', in

as related to other 'Cultural-practices,' which are all factual doings of man. The same emphasis on man's doings and productions is to be found in Riehl's philosophy. At the end of his essay 'Realistische Grundzüge', Riehl writes: 'Morality is shown not in the sinking into the self, like the Indians imagine, but in practice.'⁷³ In a similar manner, art is neither a game nor a phantasy, and its values originate in the uses and handlings of man.⁷⁴ In Riegl as in Riehl, factuality and corporeality man's doings in the face of nature is an indispensable requisite for any theoretical or productive human activity.

The special relation which exists between the subject and things of nature in Riehl's philosophy, as well as in Riegl's art-history, entails the strive of the subject to preserve and regulate unity. The formation and regulation of unity or cohesiveness (Einheit, Zusammenhang) is also a consistent and an evident trait of the Riegl's Kunstwollen.⁷⁵ But what is the source of this strive for cohesiveness? Riehl's philosophy can supply the answer. The strive for unity is energized by the identity of things and mind. This identity between things and mind establishes the primacy of causal relations between things as well as between the world and the mind.⁷⁶

For Riegl, throughout the history of art, the Kunstwollen aspires to create and regulate cohesive organizations of perceived reality, serving as a platform of continuity and cohesiveness between mind and world. This cohesive process does not fit with orthodox Kantian constructions. As in Riegl's as well as in Riehl's accounts, spatial-representations are regulated by things of nature, and they are not based-upon the sheer a-priori subjective capacities.⁷⁷ Furthermore, within this framework, art cannot be characterized as a Brentanoian mental presentation, nor as the content of intentional act; its reference is not the psyche but things of nature (Naturdinge),⁷⁸ and its activity is a physical operation which produces material figures. In Riegl as well as in Riehl's accounts, neither art nor spatial representations

Bruce J. Caldwell, ed., *Carl Menger and his legacy in economics*, annual supplement to *History of political economy* 22, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990, 289-312.

⁷³ Riehl, 'Realistische Grundzüge', 59- 'Nicht in Selbstversunkenheit, wie die Indianer wähnen, sondern in Handlungen erscheint das Sittliche.'

⁷⁴ Riehl, *Einführung in die Philosophie*, 173-174. See also Siegel, *Alois Riehl*, 128-130, and Alois Riehl, 'Über wissenschaftliche und nichtwissenschaftliche Philosophie. Eine akademische Antrittsrede (Freiburg 1883),' in Riehl, *Philosophische Studien*, 227-253. Also, Riehl quoted Adolf Hildebrand, who argued: 'Die Kunst ist produktive Tätigkeit, kein Spiel; auch nicht ein Spielen mit sich selbst in Genuß "bewußter Selbsttäuschung".' Riehl, *Einführung in die Philosophie*, 174

⁷⁵ Michael Podro, *The Critical Historians of Art*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, 75-89 (Podro refers to Riegl's 'Einheit' and 'Zusammenhang' as 'Coherence'); Margaret Iversen, *Alois Riegl: Art History and Theory*, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993, 101-105. For spaces Riegl uses the notion of unity, see Alois Riegl, *Das holländische Gruppenporträt* (1902), Wien: WUV Universitätsverlag, 1997, 239-244, 236, 256; Alois Riegl, *Group portraiture of Holland*, trans. Evelyn M. Kain and David Britt. Los Angeles, CA: Getty Research Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1999, 217-221, 267, 270.

⁷⁶ Alois Riehl, 'Kausalität und Identität', 214-218; See also Heidelberger, 'Kantianism and Realism', 9-10.

⁷⁷ Riehl, 'Realistische Grundzüge', 22-26.

⁷⁸ It is actually in the realist philosophy of later Brentano, which is much closer to the neo-kantian realism of Riehl, that closer affinities with Riegl's Kunstwollen could be found. See Arkadiusz Chrudzimski and Barry Smith, 'Brentano's Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism', in Dale Jacquette, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 2004, 197-219.

exist as mental presentations; instead, they are constantly changing realities of procedures, processes and things. So again art is a contest with nature,⁷⁹ but not in the sense of a simulation (Ertäuschung) of natural things but rather in the sense that production of art is carried-out vis-à-vis nature, while trying to correct human perception by human products.⁸⁰ I would say that the Kunstwollen for Riegl holds therapeutic capacities, and its function is like a prosthesis, a substitute for regular perception. It acts as a 'corrector' of perception. Indeed, we may even say that the Kunstwollen is in itself a viewing-instrument, though it itself does not see. Art furnishes human perception with objects that will help it become cohesive, where nature fails. Human artistic production competes with nature on the position of being a regulator of subjectivity. That is also why, as Feyerabend argued, art and science are compatible and parallel venues for experimenting with reality.

As I've mentioned, in Riehl's epistemology, causal relations are the foundation of spatio-temporal reality. And because man and nature are causally united, any spatial representation necessarily holds at least to some extent an objective content.⁸¹ Sensations (Empfindungen), so central to machian Austrian positivism as well as to Riegl's art-history, are not considered as totally subjective, but as at least partly objective, because they are caused by things. We cannot know something about our sensations without knowing at least something objective about the things we perceive. Actually, subjects exist at causal proximity to things. The two are tangent to each other; they both pertain to the same reality. And it is only from the point of view of the subject, that his apparatuses of space-representation separate and distanciate between her and things of nature.⁸² Thus space-representation is inherently objective and deformative. As long as spatial representation relates to things (And according to Riegl and Riehl space must forever relate to things), it cannot be entirely subjective. This argument is the foundation of the causal relation which can also account for the inter-relation between haptic and optic perceptions in

⁷⁹ Riegl, *Historische Grammatik*, 21; Riegl, *Historical Grammar*, 51.

⁸⁰ Of course, the parallel between artistic production and natural creation, as well as the opinion that artistic work should not be a simulation of the work of nature, are genuine kantian observations. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), *Werkausgabe*, Band X, Wilhelm Weischedel, ed., Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1957, 240-241- 'An einem Produkte der Schönen Kunst muß man sich bewußt werden, das en Kunst sei, und nicht Natur. Aber doch muß die Zweckmäßigkeit in der Form desselben von allem Zwange willkürlicher Regeln so frei scheinen als ob es ein Produkt der bloßen Natur sein.'

⁸¹ Alois Riehl, *Der philosophische Kritizismus, zweiter Band- Die Sinnlichen und Logischen Grundlagen der Erkenntnis* (c.1879, 1883), Leipzig: Alfred Kroener Verlag, 1925, 214- 'Unsere ganze Untersuchung führte der Beweis, daß Zeit und Raum nicht rein subjektive Vorstellungsformen sind, die von der Wirklichkeit selbst gar nichts bedeuten würden und in einem anderen Bewußtsein als dem menschlichen wesentlich andere sein könnten. Die Motive zur Ausbildung dieser Vorstellungen gehen überwiegend von der äußeren, d.e. von unserem Bewußtsein unabhängiger Wirklichkeit aus. Zwar sind es immer nur die durch äußere Vorgänge in uns erregten Empfindungen, die wir nach dem Grundgesetze der Einheit des Bewusstseins zeitlich und räumlich ordnen. Aber die bestimmten Verhältnisse der Empfindungen sind uns dabei von außen gegeben. Sie bilden den rein objektiven, obgleich nur formalen Bestandteil der besonderen Raum und Zeit Vorstellungen. Dass wir diese Vorstellungen nur als Teile eines "einigen" Raumes und einer "einigen" Zeit begreifen, beweist nicht das Vorhandensein einer apriorischen Raum und Zeitform, sondern ist einfach die Folge davon, dass alle Vorstellungen als solche Teile eines Bewusstseins sind.'

⁸² Alois Riehl, *Der Philosophische Kritizismus*, 215.

Riegl's *Kunstwollen* (On which I will elaborate below). The only space-representations which are entirely subjective are the images of empty space, i.e. a space which contains no object, or the image of infinite open space.

Causality, Distance and Ambience⁸³ at the core of the *Kunstwollen*

Both in Riegl's and Riehl's writings, the bi-lateral causality between nature and man is manifested as a relation of distance. Distance thus is a manipulative instrument for achieving a separation where actually unity prevails. Two types of apprehension of distancing causality exist, for both Riegl and Riehl: they are 'Nahsicht' and 'Fernsicht': close-seeing and far-seeing; and space-representation is always the outcome of the synthesis between the two. Both Riegl and Riehl borrowed this differentiation from the writings of the art-theoretician Adolf von Hildebrand.⁸⁴ Close-seeing, which is tactile (*Tastsinn*), and which Riegl calls 'Haptic', is the immediate, physical contact of man and nature; it relates to minute details of surfaces, but it lacks unity and coherence. It is strongly related to the temporal vector, as it demands a successive synthesis of numerous separated points. Because leaning on immediate contact, haptic sensation is actually more objective than optic perception. On the other hand far-seeing (*Fernsicht*), which is the subjective mode of apprehension, uses experience and intellectual synthesis to make out of the series of tactile points a continuous whole. Far-seeing is also responsible for the appearance of form (or *Gestalt*), and of course for the articulation of distance. Against the haptic objective spatial-representation, which is unable to present the spatial location and extension of things, western *Kunstwollen*, Riegl argues, constantly aspires to achieve greater subjective opticality in the plastic art, an aspiration which is most apparent in the formation of perspective constructions. Subjectivity is constituted as distanced perspectival view of the world, which supply her with a wider-view of relations between things and their encompassing environment. This strengthening of the subjective in art is manifested for Riegl for example in Dutch painting of the 17th century and in modern painting as a whole.

Riehl and Riegl conceived of spatiality as the outcome of the synthesis between *Nahsicht* and *Fernsicht*, of sensation by touch (*Tastsinn*) and perception by seeing (*Gesicht*).⁸⁵ And art, for Riehl as well as for Riegl, is essentially the deployment of the transition from tactile perception to optical perception and back.

⁸³ The German word "Stimmung" can be translated in many ways. As Riegl's references to *Stimmung* combined the characters of atmosphere, environment, Attention, mood" and sentiment, I find 'ambience' to be fitting.

⁸⁴ Adolf von Hildebrand was held a close connection with the art-theoretician Konrad Fiedler. See Hubert Faensen, *Die bildnerische Form. Die Kunstauffassung Konrad Fiedler, Adolf von Hildebrand und Hans von Marées*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1965. Fiedler's art-theory was kantian in many ways. Riehl knew Fiedler's theory, as he is inscribed, together with Heinrich Wölfflin, as referees in a doctoral dissertation which was submitted to the university of Berlin in 1908, and which discussed the art-theory of Fiedler. See Hermann Konnerth, *Die Gesetzlichkeit der bildenden Kunst. Eine Darstellung der Kunsttheorie Konrad Fiedlers*, Berlin: Friedrich Wilhelm Universität, 1908. See also Michael Podro, *The Manifold of Perception. Theories of Art from Kant to Hildebrand*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, 61-90.

⁸⁵ Alois Riehl, 'Der Raum des Tastsinns und des Gesichts', in Riehl, *Der Philosophische Kritizismus*, 164-169.

As mentioned, Riegl's opinion was that though haptic perception will always remain a basic component of plastic presentation, modern man achieves also the ability to view reality as a totality, by emphasizing the *Fernsicht*, not only in the arts but also in his other dealings.

The relations between causality, distancing and spatiality are the subject of Riegl's essay of 1899, 'Die Stimmung als Inhalt der modernen Kunst' ('Ambience as the content of modern art').⁸⁶ In human perception, Riegl argues, ambience supplies the ability to view something from a distance. The representation of ambience is the embodiment of the relation between the attention given to causal relations among things at the nearer environment and the attention directed towards larger causal chains: It thus embodies the synchronism of the near-view and the wider, distanced view. In as much as the near-view, according to Riegl, causes anxiety and annoyance, the far-view of a cosmological totality in which everything is inter-related, supplies calmness and harmony. Ambience is created when order and rules overcome chaos; harmony overcomes dissonance, and tranquillity overcomes movement.⁸⁷ Modern art, more than any other phase of the western *Kunstwollen*, says Riegl, exhibits the tendency to design and produce situations of ambience, which express distance between world and subject, and the wide-ranging relations existing between things. But returning to the importance of causality as the platform of reality according to neo-kantian realism, Riegl states explicitly that the modern interest in ambience embodies plastically the order of causality:⁸⁸ It is a causality created not between a man and close-by, fragmentary things and details, but between the subject and 'creation' at large as its object. And Riegl adds: 'The impression erupts out of our knowing, the ripe fruit from the trees of consciousness. We know yet, that a law of causality traverses the whole of creation'.⁸⁹ The things we conceive are the products of what we know, and at the basis of what we know, is first of all the law of causality. So causality, according to Riegl, actually stands at the basis of our impressions. For Riehl also, the *Kausalitätsgesetz* stand at the bottom ground of any perception and thought, and of course of any human production.⁹⁰ So Riegl and Riehl share this line of continuity between causality, spatiality and distance.

So for Riegl and Riehl Space-representation embodies the mimesis not of the world itself, but of the causal relation between the world and the subject. Riehl stated that distancing (*Entfernung*) is not limited to spatial reality but actually exists as spatio-temporal entity,⁹¹ i.e. it is duration. The durational "impact" which is caused

⁸⁶ Alois Riegl, 'Die Stimmung als Inhalt der modernen Kunst (1899)', in *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 28-42.

⁸⁷ Riegl, 'Stimmung als Inhalt', 29- 'Diese Ahnung aber der Ordnung und Gesetzlichkeit über dem Chaos, der Harmonie über den Dissonanzen, der Ruhe über den Bewegungen nennen wir die Stimmung. Ihre Elemente sind Ruhe und Fernsicht.'

⁸⁸ Riegl, 'Stimmung als Inhalt', 35- 'Die strikte Beobachtung des Kausalitätsgesetzes bildet den Kernpunkt der modernen Ästhetik der bildenden Künste und insbesondere der Malerei.'

⁸⁹ 'Das Drückende entspringt aus unserem Wissen, der reifen Frucht vom Baume der Erkenntnis. Wir wissen jetzt, daß ein Kausalitätsgesetz die ganze Schöpfung durchzieht.' Riegl, 'Stimmung als Inhalt', 29.

⁹⁰ Alois Riehl, 'Kausalität und Identität', in Alois Riehl, *Philosophische Studien*, 203-218.

⁹¹ Riehl, *Der philosophische Kritizismus*, 174.

by the tangent state between the subject and nature is reality, which receives its organization through expressions of distance and ambience. Bear in mind that in as much as spatiality is the co-existence in unity of things, temporality is the embodiment the succession of perceptions of things;⁹² and therefore because the perception of distant objects requires, on the part of the subject, the ability to move her attention through a sequence of points, and then to combine them into a vision of co-existence, temporality is woven into our spatial construction by haptic perception. The representation of distance, then, is the primary embodiment of duration,⁹³ i.e. of the synthesis of space and time.

As I mentioned above, the division between *Fernsicht* and *Nahsicht* appeared as such in a very influential book of Adolf Hildebrand, *Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst*,⁹⁴ to which both Riegl and Riehl dedicated special articles.⁹⁵ Hildebrand's artistic theory itself was formed through his connection with the art-theoretician Konrad Fiedler,⁹⁶ and it is considered as related to the herbartian conception of perception.⁹⁷ They both took from Hildebrand the conviction that the embodiment of distance is the eternal aspiration of art, and that this embodiment is construed out of the regulation of spatio-temporal reality, as causal series between nature and man. For Riegl, Hildebrand's essay was important for its focus on the spatial, architectural element in art, and for the understanding that the presentation of spatiality is indeed the highest aim of the plastic arts. For Riehl, Hildebrand's book was important for designating the problem of form, as a double-headed creature of *Fernsicht* and *Nahsicht*, and as the foundation of any art whatsoever, including literature and theatre. Thus, form, which is inherently durational (i.e. spatio-temporal), became for Riehl the foundation for understanding all works of art, including the ones which are temporal in character. From a riehlian point of view, all art is inherently durational. In the essay which departed from Hildebrand's book in order to develop a theory of art, literature and theatre, Riehl posed a view which is utterly identical to the propositions of Riegl, i.e. that the embodiment of distance is the eternal aspiration of art, and that this embodiment is always construed out of the regulation of spatio-temporal reality, as a causal series between reality and man. In the terms of Hildebrand, it is only by the "distanciated-image" (*Fernbild*) that formal values (*Formwerte*) are observable.⁹⁸ Hildebrand's art theory traces back to the herbartian interpretations of Kant's transcendental aesthetic and theory of taste. In that manner, we are lead yet again to a realist neo-kantianism, though to a German version of it. And we have the solidarity in emphasizing elements of distance, far-seeing and causality in the production, as well in the understanding, of artworks.

⁹² Riehl, *Der philosophische Kritizismus*, 184.

⁹³ Riehl, 'Bemerkungen zu dem Probleme der Form', 269-271.

⁹⁴ Adolf von Hildebrand, *Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst* (1893), Strasbourg: J. H. Ed. Heitz, 1910.

⁹⁵ Alois Riegl, 'Naturwerk und Kunstwerk II (1901)', 65-70; Alois Riehl, 'Bemerkungen zu dem Probleme der Form', 266-303.

⁹⁶ See Faensen, *Die bildnerische Form*, 138-156.

⁹⁷ Podro, *Manifold of Perception*, 80-91.

⁹⁸ Riehl, 'Bemerkungen zu dem Probleme der Form', 281.

The origin and nature of space-representation ('Raumvorstellung')

Riegl's, as well as Riehl's definitions of space-representation involve a questioning of the origin of our space perception. The basic issue which is being addressed is: Is space-perception an innate form of sensation (as in the kantian understanding- and that attitude is called 'nativist'), or is it wholly transformable and a-posteriori (An approach which is called-'empiricist')?⁹⁹ This debate between empiricist and nativist theories of space perception accompanied 19th century psycho-physiological discourse, and was first brought-up around 1867 as a debate between Ewald Hering and Helmholtz.¹⁰⁰ Implicitly, this controversy actually regarded a debate between a kantian and a non-kantian approach to the sciences of perception. Alois Riegl, Alois Riehl and Carl Siegel all referred to this controversy. All three, though appreciating the achievements of Helmholtz and his followers the psychophysiological scholars in giving a causal account of perception, nevertheless insisted that some component of a priori conditions and structures must be included in the formation of our space-representations. To the dilemma between nativism and empiricism, the realist neo-kantian answer is as follows: space-representation is neither one nor the other, as the two mentioned positions assume that spatiality is a schema imposed on reality from the side of the subject. Instead, the realist neo-kantian proposition is: Space representation embodies the distance between the subject and the object,¹⁰¹ and therefore it is the unified bi-lateral dynamics of subjectivity and objectivity. Space-representation is a-posteriori in the sense that it is constituted and habilitated constantly; but it is innate in the sense that it embodies perceptually the a-priori continuity and identity between subject and things. Space representation, according to Riehl, is enabled when seeing is intermingled with touching, i.e. when there is a distance between man and nature.

This neo-kantian realist approach to space-representation can be used to clarify the transition from the world of things to the world of subjective organization which exists in Riegl's exposition of the *Kunstwollen*. It explains in what sense the *Kunstwollen* aspires to "correct" the initial perception of things, and indeed why Riegl is supposing that human perception is in a constant need of construction and regulation through plastic production. On the other hand, it explains why art, according to Riegl, constantly aspires to present objects (And thus it can never be entirely abstract and will remain always to some extent figurative), and why spatiality is an eternal and elemental component of visual representation. Therefore, Riegl's *Kunstwollen* should be understood as a regulation of the distance between man and things, a distance in which causality regulates sense-perception.

Space, according to neo-kantian realism, is the unitary, isomorphic platform upon which every sensual data could be inscribed in our mind by seeing. In a short

⁹⁹ Riegl, *Spätromische Kunstindustrie*, 30; Riegl, *Late Roman Art Industry*, 28.

¹⁰⁰ See Hermann Kalkofen, 'Anmerkungen zur Empirismus-Nativismus-Kontroverse', *Psychologie und Geschichte* 3/4 (February 1992), 24-45; Steven Turner, 'Consensus and Controversy: Helmholtz on the visual perception of space', in *Helmholtz and the Foundations of nineteenth-century Science*, David Cahan, ed., Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993, 155.

¹⁰¹ See especially Riegl, 'Naturwerk und Kunstwerk I', 51-64.

paper dated from 1877, titled- 'Der Raum als Gesichtsvorstellung',¹⁰² Riehl stated that spatiality is intimately and necessarily connected with seeing, and vice versa: 'To say that things exist in space and fill it, means no more than they are perceived as parts of the visual field'.¹⁰³ Thus, Riegl's identification of the emancipation of plastic space with the increasing opticality and with the empowerment of subjectivity, is carried out in the Riehl neo-kantian realist direction of thought.

Riegl writes in *Das holländische Gruppenporträt*:

Art History distinguishes between two types of three-dimensional space: first, there is cubic space, a property of solid bodies, and then the free space between the figures. Art, like that of antiquity, that assumes the shapes of individual objects are objectively determined could never manage to depict free space.¹⁰⁴

So, according to Riegl, it is only through the gradual development of subjective perception, which is able to deal with the space that exists between objects, that western man has achieved the depiction of free space. Objective, primitive perception produces expressions of the horror vacui, and thus tends to fill-up plastic space with as many bodies and things as possible. In an opposite manner subjective, optical perception is capable of endorsing in its plastic products the depiction of free, empty space.¹⁰⁵ Horror vacui characterizes the productions of the ancient mind, in as much as in modern mentality, in which reigns 'subjectivized objectivism' concentrates on the space between things, and it views objects as first and foremost a part of the perception of subjects.¹⁰⁶

We can conclude this section then by saying that both in Riegl and in Riehl, space, which is inherently a representation (*Vorstellung*) is essentially the synthesis and synchronicity of *Fernsicht* and *Nahsicht* and between subjectivity and objectivity.

¹⁰² Alois Riehl, 'Der Raum als Gesichtsvorstellung (1877)', in Riehl, *Philosophische Studien*, 217-226.

¹⁰³ 'Dinge existieren im Raum und erfüllen ihn, heißt, sie werden als Teile des Gesichtsfeldes empfunden, und weiter nicht.' Riehl, 'Raum als Gesichtsvorstellung', 226.

¹⁰⁴ Riegl, *Group portraiture of Holland*, 82; Riegl, *Hollandische Gruppenporträt*, 27- 'Die Kunstgeschichte unterscheidet zwei Erscheinungsformen des dreidimensionalen Raums: dem kubischen der an den Körpern haftet, und den Freiraum, der zwischen den Figuren ist. Eine Kunst, die, wie die antike, die geformten Einzeldinge als des objektiver Gegebene ansah, konnte nie dazu gelangen, den Freiraum darzustellen.'

¹⁰⁵ Riegl, 'Über Antike und Moderne Kunstfreunde', 203-204. Riegl emphasized that already in late Roman art we can see the beginnings of the development of modern, optical mode of apprehending the world.

¹⁰⁶ Riegl, *Group Portraiture of Holland*, 366- 'Subjective objectivism (...) Life is a constant struggle between the individual ego and the surrounding world, between subject and object.'; Riegl, *Hollandische Gruppenporträt*, 280- '(...) subjektivierten Objektivismus (...) Alles Leben ist eine unablässige Auseinandersetzung des einzelnen Ich mit der umgebenden Welt, des Subjekt mit dem Objekt.'

The Kunstwollen as a regulator of subjectivity

Riegl refers to the Kunstwollen as a regulative operator. In the last chapter of *Late Roman Art Industry*, Riegl states:

All (...) human Wollen is directed towards self-satisfaction in relation to the surrounding environments (In the widest sense of the word, as it relates to the human being externally and internally). Creative Kunstwollen regulates the relation between man and objects as we perceive them with our sense.¹⁰⁷

The subject, both in Riehl and in Riegl, acts via its will. But I believe a specification of this will is owed: This will is neither, as in Hegel, a will to self-knowledge, nor a free and creative will, as in the case of Schelling and Nietzsche, and it is also not the blind chaotic will of Schopenhauer. Instead, the will of neo-kantian realism that I suggest as adequate to describe the Kunstwollen is a will to cohesiveness; it is the will that endeavours to sustain order, it is essentially a conservative will, and it is no more subjective than it is objective. Will in this version is the auto-regulative capacity of subjectivity.

In his various writings, especially in *Spätromische Kunstindustrie* and in the *Hollandische Gruppenporträt*, Riegl emphasized the process of subjectivization of western art, a process which includes the emancipation of free-space.¹⁰⁸ For Riegl, in as much as western art was gradually able to contain in its plastic presentations images of free space, it became more 'subjective' in character, and therefore sceptical towards the transcendent existence of objective things. Indeed we could understand this rieglan historico-plastic narration of the loss of confidence in the existence of external things in western culture as an implicit critic of kantianism, which is in line with the riehlian criticism of Kant. Nevertheless, it is not that Riegl criticizes subjectivity on behalf of a purely objectivist conception: instead, he endeavours to find the point at which both subjectivity and objectivity belong to the one and the same reality. As Margaret Iversen rightfully noted,¹⁰⁹ for Riegl as long as art exists, there will always remain some objective element in it; an objective element that Riegl identifies explicitly with things.¹¹⁰ This objective aspect is vital and indispensable for

¹⁰⁷ Alois Riegl, *Late Roman Art Industry*, 231; Alois Riegl, *Spätromische Kunstindustrie*, 401- 'Alles Wollen des Menschen ist auf die befriedigende Gestaltung seines Verhältnis zu der Welt (im umfassendsten Sinne des Wortes, inner- und außerhalb des Menschen) gerichtet. Das bildende Kunstwollen regelt das Verhältnis des Menschen zur sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Erscheinung der Dinge.'

¹⁰⁸ Margaret Iversen, 'Late Roman Art and the Emancipation of Space', in Margaret Iversen, *Alois Riegl: Art History and Theory*, Cambridge, Mass. And London: The MIT Press, 1993, 92-123.

¹⁰⁹ Iversen, *Alois Riegl*, 10-11.

¹¹⁰ Riegl, *Das holländische Gruppenporträt*, 396 note 37 – 'Das moderne Problem ist vielmehr ein Raumproblem wie jedes frühere: eine Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem Subjekt einerseits und dem Dinge (d.i. Ausdehnung, Raum) andererseits und keineswegs ein völliges Aufgehen des Objekts im Subjekt, das überhaupt das Ende der bildenden Kunst bedeuten würde.'; Riegl, *Group Portraiture of Holland*, 373, note 41- 'To modern art, the major challenge revolves around problems concerned with space, as it always had: the interaction between the viewing subject, on one hand, and the object (that is extension, space), on the other, rather than a complete merging of the object in the subject- a situation that would signal the end of the visual arts in general.'

the existence of art, and without it art will cease to exist. Every thing of nature, says Riegl in his *Historische Grammatik*, holds, apart from his form, an objective surface and a subjective one.¹¹¹ Objective surface is the intrinsic component of the object's own form. Indeed, in as much as art cannot become wholly subjective, it will also never lose its objective, haptic, tactile character, in behalf of total opticality. The history of art is an endless process of forming situations of tension and distancing between subject and object, between spatiality and surface. Riegl locates his own research in the locus between hill and valley, between full subjectivity and full objectivity, in which a pacified, borderline tissue is to be found.¹¹² For Riehl as well, perception is located at the border-line between subjectivity and objectivity.¹¹³ This tissue is for the neo-kantian realist identical to what is real, and it will also be the locus of his inquiries.¹¹⁴

Instead of emphasizing the subjective tendency of the *Kunstwollen*, I suggest then a realist impulse to be found in Riegl's art historiography, an impulse which makes the *Kunstwollen* a regulator of subjectivity through space-representation. Again: The *Kunstwollen* is not just the agent through which the subject arranges representations of the world, but rather the modus in which she regulates herself with the aid of the impacts of things of nature. Furthermore through the *Kunstwollen* real produced things (i.e. artworks) are regulated by the very reality which is the ground for their own production (i.e. the subject), images of ambience and distance being the manifestations of that same causality. Representations of empty or infinite space stand at the un-reachable horizon of causation between things and man, in which the subject strives to triumph in her competition against nature.¹¹⁵ But as long as in the visual arts no space will be utterly empty or infinite (As plastic art happens always and forever within the boundaries of material reality), subjectivity, at least within its borders, will remain also limited and regulated.¹¹⁶

Let me then summarize my neo-kantian realist reading of the rieglian *Kunstwollen*. Plastic art regulates and limits subjective perception, while synchronically organizing physical reality itself; and also the other way around: plastic art is a regulation of realities of nature, achieved by a parallel re-regulation and a re-limitation of subjectivity.¹¹⁷ Art is a synchronic and a permanent re-organization of realities and of their perception, through produced things. Art, any art but specifically plastic art, is the embodiment of the reality of the tangent situation between mind and nature. Art regulates reality through its manipulations of

¹¹¹ Riegl, *Historische Grammatik*, 131; Riegl, *Historical Grammar*, 189.

¹¹² Alois Riegl, 'Kunstgeschichte und Universalgeschichte', in Riegl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 9.

¹¹³ Siegel, *Alois Riehl*, 29.

¹¹⁴ Siegel, *Alois Riehl*, 124; Röd, 'Alois Riehl- Kritischer Realismus', 122.

¹¹⁵ Neo-kantian realism shared the opinion that the only spatial image which is wholly subjective and has no objective status is the image of an empty, infinite space. See Siegel, *Entwicklung der Raumvorstellung*, 49-50; see also Siegel, *Alois Riehl*, 75.

¹¹⁶ See also Alois Riegl, 'Über Antike und Moderne Kunstfreunde (1904)', in Riegl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 202-205.

¹¹⁷ Paul Feyerabend suggested a similar correlation of the *Kunstwollen* with objectivity and reality, but not from a realist standpoint, see Feyerabend, *Wissenschaft als Kunst*.

distance. Its operative objects are the relations between things (i.e. space and time), and its referent is the apprehension of nature. Artistic organization relates not to the very natural realities, but to the relations between them. Modern art will make these relations its sole subject. Thus, space and time are not identified with these realities themselves but with the reality of their being apprehended, under the dictum of the rule of causality. Space and time, though standing for the subjective apprehension of relations, hold also an objective character, as they are caused by the relations between realities. Space-representations are objective, because they are caused by the relations between realities. The *Kunstwollen* neither imitates nature nor expresses free and autonomous will: instead, it shapes the simultaneous-identity of the subjective and the objective, while the production of plastic figures shapes physical reality and its perception. Thus the *Kunstwollen's* territory belongs neither to the terrain of subjectivity nor to the terrain of objectivity but to the distance between the two. Reality, in the framework of rieglian and riehlilian realism, is constantly being re-shaped, transfigured and re-formatted according to the platform of unity and its foundational rule: causality. On that platform, possibilities of change and variation are unlimited. Form itself is the product of the causal-continuity between thought and matter. And the constant mission of the subject, as well as of art and science, is to demonstrate that continuity and to regulate it effectively. The only a-priori platforms for experience are space, time and causality. Art competes with nature for the right to serve as the regulation of subjectivity. Art 'wills' to regulate perception in an equivalent manner to the way things of nature regulate perception. Art does not will to replace or to simulate nature, because when the signs of labour and human production disappear from the product, artistic purpose disappears just as well.¹¹⁸ And why is that? Because, we can say then in riehlilian terms, the distance from nature must be sustained and preserved in order for man to exist.

In terms of intellectual history, my suggestion is to link Riegl's art-history with realist neo-kantianism. This linkage is efficient, I believe, also for a reconstruction of the bigger picture of the state of art historiography around the turn of the century. Neo-kantianism was dominant in Heinrich Wölfflin's as well as in Erwin Panofsky's art-histories. Thus, on the basis of neo-kantian realism, we are better equipped to account both for Riegl's art-history's affinity with the positivist, realist tendencies formed inside the Austrian intellectual field, and for its linkage with the German tradition of the history of art. This last linkage must be developed further.

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¹¹⁸ Riegl, *Historische Grammatik*, 22; Riegl, *Historical Grammar*, 52.