History and the Historian of Classical Art

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The study of classical art offers an interesting example of exclusions in the practice of art history. While the focus of this essay is the art of ancient Greece and Rome, those who deal with ancient Egyptian and Near Eastern art face many of the same institutional and disciplinary exclusions. Although the subjects are represented in a range of departments and programs and in professional organizations and journals with broad audiences, that representation is often marginal.

Historians of classical art occupy a no-man’s-land that exists uneasily among the fields of art history, classics, and archaeology. The borders are established both by disciplinary definitions and by institutional structures. Classical art is frequently excluded from departments of art history on the grounds that, by virtue of chronology or cultural specificity, it is better handled by classics or archaeology. Many departments of classics exclude the study of art on the grounds that the proper focus of classics is texts, that is to say, language, and that classical art belongs instead in the realm of art history or archaeology. A not uncommon assumption, for example, is that students in classics deal with texts and can therefore not be expected to take courses in ancient art or archaeology. In turn, many departments and practitioners of archaeology exclude the study of classical art and, with it, even the general field of ‘classical archaeology’ because the scientific analysis of human behaviour based on the contextual analysis of excavated remains has no place for a field that remains focussed on monuments and art and relies on texts for its interpretations – in other words, for a subject that belongs either to art history or to classics. Where do these circular exclusions leave historians of classical art? The archaeologists have an answer ready to hand: the study of ancient art is, in reality, no more than antiquarianism, that is to say, a pre-scientific and dilettantish interest in objects from the past, an ancestral and decidedly outmoded stage in the

1This essay is a slightly revised version of a keynote talk, ‘History and the Historian of Ancient Art’, given at the colloquium ‘Negotiating Boundaries – The Plural Fields of Art History’, Barber Institute of Fine Art, University of Birmingham, 2 July 2013. I am grateful to the organizers, Richard Woodfield and Matthew Rampley, for the chance to present this material from my forthcoming ‘Historiographic Structures in the Study of Classical Art’, and to the participants for valuable discussions.
development of thought and practice in modern, professional archaeology.  

This assessment of the current state of the discipline is accepted even for ‘classical archaeology’, which, as Ingo Herklotz observed, has ‘found its way back from the history of style to the analysis of ancient material culture’.  

But should students of ancient art not accept the label of antiquarian and wear it proudly? For recent years have seen a rehabilitation of antiquarianism that would place its practices at the very forefront of current approaches to the study of culture. Such an evaluation is the premise, for example, of the volume of essays published in 2007 with the title of *Momigliano and Antiquarianism. Foundations of the Modern Cultural Sciences*.  

For it is, of course, to the great historian Arnaldo Momigliano (1908-87) that is owed this positive evaluation of the methods of antiquarianism and its contributions to history. What greater vindication could be desired by the historian of classical art? It is possible to offer an ungrateful answer to that question. Momigliano’s classic analysis of historical method, in which he traces the relationship between antiquarianism and history, has the surprising effect of excluding the study of classical art from the realm of history. His characterization of antiquarianism and history – terms that in his formulation exist in a comfortable polarity that breaks down in the face of demands for precise definitions – and his conception of the relationship between them are more deeply flawed than any of his critics has yet recognized. Examination of his argumentation calls into question the authority of his formulation as the justification for some of the disciplinary exclusions that follow from it. It must be emphasized that disagreement with this part of his work in no way signals any lack of respect for his immense contributions to scholarship. The criticism reflects, rather, a particular set of questions and evidence.  

Momigliano presented his influential analysis of antiquarianism in two places. The first is his article ‘Ancient History and the Antiquarian’, which was published in 1950 and remains a daunting monument of erudition. He returned to the subject in the series of Sather Classical Lectures he delivered at the University of California at Berkeley in 1961-62, which he titled ‘The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography’. While many of the topics he discussed in these lectures...
were represented in his subsequent projects and publications, he did not complete his preparations for publishing the lectures themselves, but reworked them constantly, never bringing them to a state he considered satisfactory. They were still unfinished when he died in 1987. What is called ‘the latest stage of the work’ he left was published in 1990, with limited documentation.\(^5\) The problems surrounding the unfinished Sather Lectures lie, for the most part, beyond the scope of this essay; suffice it to say that the earlier article remains the clearest presentation of his ideas on the subject and continues to serve as the go-to reference for current scholarship.

The core of Momigliano’s conception of antiquarianism is by now so familiar that it may rightly be called, as Alain Schnapp did in an essay published in 2012, ‘his canonical definition’.\(^6\) This definition is the basis for the account of what Momigliano saw as a series of crucial developments in historical method. He argued that in the late fifth century B.C., in Greece, there opened a split between writers, like Thucydides, who concentrated on political history, and others whose researches on the past instead concerned everything else – customs and traditions, for example, and a great range of other matters that fall generally into the category of institutions.\(^7\) They are subjects that were studied, he said, not chronologically, but systematically, and therefore, as he states, ‘must be linked with modern antiquarian studies’.\(^8\) This distinction was carried through in Western historiography until the point at which, in the seventeenth century, the recognition that history had too often become political or religious propaganda began to breed scepticism. The extreme scepticism of historical Pyrrhonism discredited the hitherto authoritative narratives of political history, but at the same time it cast doubt on the possibility of achieving historical truth.\(^9\) Momigliano argues that the stalemate was broken in the eighteenth century by what he calls a ‘reform’ or, indeed, ‘a revolution in historical method’ that kept alive ‘the possibility of sound historical knowledge’.\(^10\) It was then, he says, that antiquarian research, with its characteristic subjects and methods, and especially its focus on facts, was incorporated into historical practice, and ‘the

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\(^8\)Momigliano, ‘Ancient History’, 287. On the sophists and ‘a science called “archaeology”’: ‘In so far, however, as some of their researches were presented in the form of systematic treatises, they must be linked with modern antiquarian studies.’


antiquary', he argues, ‘rescued history from the sceptics, even though he did not write it’.11 If history had been susceptible to abuses, antiquarianism was not, and could place history on a sound footing. In the course of the nineteenth century, he asserts, it came to be recognized that ‘there was no longer any justification for making a distinction between antiquarian and historical studies’.12

On the surface, Momigliano’s scheme presents antiquarianism in a positive, if not positively heroic light. To rescue history! Think of it! But why, then, does he so often speak of it in negative terms? In 1950, he called ‘[t]he combination of philosophic history with the antiquarian’s method of research . . . the aim [of] many of the best historians of the nineteenth century’ and remarks that it is ‘still the aim that many of us [historians] propose to ourselves’; it requires, however, ‘the avoidance of the antiquarian mentality with its fondness for classification and for irrelevant detail’.13 And he cautioned that ‘[o]ccasional relapses into the antiquarian state of mind must be expected even in the future’.14 These comments, in his own voice, echo late nineteenth-century criticism of antiquarianism as pointless erudition. For example, the Chichele Professor of Modern History at Oxford, Montagu Burrows, in a lecture in 1884 on ‘Antiquarianism and History’ addressing ‘the question of historical method’, remarked that he saw the historian and the antiquarian as ‘two different classes of minds’. Burrows expressed hope that the two could be brought together in harmonious co-operation that might to some extent cancel out the flaws he found in both, but his description of the antiquarian is not promising.

Amongst those, I say, who are engaged in the study of the past there will always be, as there have always been, the men of simple research, delighting in the multiplication of facts, in the chain of positive sequence, not only undeterred by the dryness of mere facts as facts, but positively revelling in them, or if sometimes wearied, reckoning the very weariness as a witness to the goodness of the deed, devotees of literature as willing and as self-denying as the veriest ascetics of the desert and the pillar.15

In the Sather Lectures, Momigliano went even farther than he did in the article of 1950, personalizing a ‘mentality’ into ‘a type of man’ in remarks that Robert Gaston has rightly called ‘triumphantly derisive’. The contradiction between Momigliano’s praise of the antiquarian’s achievement and his denigration of his character and work is odd. So, too, is his lax conflation of a purported methodology with something so slippery as ‘mentality’, another indication signalling that his canonical distinction between antiquarianism and history requires scrutiny. The materials, subjects, and methods he gives to each may be briefly considered.

With respect to materials, historians of art should be especially clear that the simple division between texts and objects, so dear to disciplinary purists in classics and archaeology, is inaccurate in this context. Momigliano’s antiquarians dealt with both – with ‘charters, inscriptions, coins, and statues’, for example. The crucial distinction he draws concerns instead the realm of the ‘literary’ – the contrast is between non-literary material as opposed to ‘literary sources’. Non-literary evidence lay outside the structure of authority and authorities that governed the practice of political history and was therefore not subject to its errors and abuses. The many problems surrounding the definition and nature of ‘documentary’ sources cannot be addressed here; suffice it to say that for Momigliano, the kind of evidence studied by antiquarians differentiated them from historians just as much as did their subjects and methods.

Momigliano, however, for all that he identifies specifically antiquarian subjects, leaves the actual scope of antiquarian research to be inferred from his selection of authors and works. In discussing the split that arose in antiquity, he separates political history from ‘learned research on the past’ that includes works on genealogies, foundations of cities, lists of officials, customs, names of peoples, religious customs, and political institutions – ‘subjects which to-day we would call of antiquarian interest’. In post-antique times, until the advent of ‘the philosophic historian’, ‘the province of the antiquary’ was ‘[m]atters such as art, religion, custom and trade’. This definition, ostensibly circumstantial but vague in its effect, appears at least straightforward; in fact, however, it rests on a circular proposition.

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17Momigliano, ‘Ancient History’, 296. That antiquarians dealt with such a range of ‘non-literary evidence’ is appreciated by Herklotz, ‘Momigliano’s “Ancient History”’, 136-41, although his discussion tends to equate such evidence with ‘material objects’.


In commenting on the conventional view of antiquarians, which he sees as ‘incomplete’ but not wrong, he states that ‘subject-matter contributes to the distinction between historians and antiquaries only in so far as certain subjects (such as political institutions, religion, private life) have traditionally been considered more suitable for systematic description than for a chronological account.’ He also explains the survival of antiquarianism by asserting that ‘the antiquarian mentality, naturally enough, was not unsuited to the nature of the institutions with which it was mainly dealing. It is easier to describe law, religion, customs, and military technique than it is to explain them genetically.’ In other words, subjects are antiquarian because they correspond to antiquarian mentality – and methods. The circularity of the argument is clear.

Next, the question of methods. Methodology is the primary and explicit concern of Momigliano’s essay, and at its core is the distinction between the antiquarian’s systematic treatment and the historian’s chronological one. This analysis has proved hugely influential. Its effect has been reinforced by the popularity of the terms ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’.

It is useful here to look at the sets of contrasting qualities that follow from Momigliano’s formulation. They commonly appear in discussions of the development of academic disciplines. The historian writes chronologically; the antiquarian, systematically. History concerns itself with change, and is dynamic; antiquarianism, with systems, and so is static. The historian’s work is focussed; the antiquary simply gathers information, even ‘irrelevant detail’, about his subjects.


22Cornell, ‘Ancient History Revisited’, 6: ‘the contrast, which all historians have to face and must resolve in one way or another, between chronological narrative and systematic or descriptive analysis – what it is fashionable nowadays to call “diachronic” and “synchronic” history’. For the paired terms: Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale (1916), published by Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye, and Albert Riedlinger, Paris: Payot et Cie., 1922, 116: ‘nous préférons parler de linguistique synchronique et de linguistique diachronique.’


24Momigliano, ‘Ancient History’, 286; he here rehearses common assumptions about antiquarianism, which he largely accepts; his points are quoted and summarized by Schnapp, Discovery, 61-2.

Momigliano, ‘Ancient History’, 311: ‘the antiquarian mentality with its fondness for classification and for irrelevant detail’.

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The historian analyzes and explains; the antiquarian merely collects, describes, and classifies.\textsuperscript{25} These are not neutral polarities, but establish a hierarchy that continues to be invoked in the struggles for disciplinary prestige that go on today. For, despite the assertions of harmony and cooperation among the cultural sciences that are seen as proceeding from the synthesis posited by Momigliano, disciplinary rivalry remains strong, and with the competition for territory and prestige comes the imperative for strong distinctions and stronger exclusions. But the hierarchical nature of Momigliano’s formulation is not its most serious flaw. The difference between antiquarianism and history is a methodological absolute – in his words, ‘Classification can dispense with chronology’\textsuperscript{26} – but, as has been seen, method is also what defines subjects: antiquarians deal with subjects that are suitable for antiquarian methods. It is a circular Catch-22, and one that has consequences. It is a formulation that makes history of art a generic impossibility, at best a conceit that only masks its fundamental nature as a stubborn relapse into antiquarianism and its inescapable mentality. There is no clearer example of disciplinary exclusion than the line between history and not-history. This is not a cheerful prospect for the would-be historian of ancient art. But is Momigliano’s formulation correct?

The circularity of Momigliano’s fundamental generic premise and the vagueness of its statement have already been noted.\textsuperscript{27} Vagueness also mars his presentation of the historical development he posits. For example, in the course of his article, he places the crucial change in historical method in both the eighteenth century and the late – or ‘second part’ – of the seventeenth, and the posited development is interrupted by frequent exceptions of authors and works that he acknowledges precede or lag behind their proper developmental niche.\textsuperscript{28} And vagueness is not the only flaw in his argumentation that critics have found; his formulation does not seem to be supported by evidence, both what he does not include and what he does cite. It has been observed more than once that Momigliano’s view of antiquarianism and history can be questioned.\textsuperscript{29} For example,

\textsuperscript{25}Momigliano, ‘Ancient History’, 286: ‘historians produce those facts which serve to illustrate or explain a certain situation; antiquaries collect all the items that are connected with a certain subject, whether they help to solve a problem or not’.

\textsuperscript{26}Momigliano, ‘Ancient History’, 311.

\textsuperscript{27}He also offers remarks that seem to contradict the strict generic distinction; for example, Momigliano, ‘Ancient History’, 293: ‘In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries there were both antiquarians and historians (often indistinguishable from each other) for the non-classical and post classical world’; 286: ‘the so-called antiquaries . . . made people reflect on the difference between collecting facts and interpreting facts’.

\textsuperscript{28}Momigliano, ‘Ancient History’, 286, 293, 311.

in the field of British historiography, Mark Salber Phillips has demonstrated that in the eighteenth century there existed more genres, more experimentation within them, and more interaction among them than acknowledged by Momigliano, whose dichotomous view of modern-era history and antiquarianism was rooted in his evaluation of the Greek situation in the fifth century.\textsuperscript{30} The art historian Ingo Herklotz has likewise shown the inaccuracy of Momigliano’s analysis of post-antique antiquarianism in terms of its nature and affiliations.\textsuperscript{31} Antiquarian studies often displayed ‘historical interests’ and were, as he demonstrates, closely linked to philological research, particularly in their use of non-literary materials to explicate literary sources.\textsuperscript{32}

But it is surprising that Momigliano’s treatment of modern-era antiquarianism has not been challenged more often. Even a cursory examination of some of the works he cites shows that his generic dichotomy fundamentally misinterprets them. Keeping in mind his dictum that ‘classification can dispense with chronology’, one need only consider a few of the examples he gives to see that the premise is not true. Three cases will suffice. All are well-known landmarks in the study of ancient art, and their treatment of that subject makes clear the flaws in Momigliano’s contention.

The Benedictine Bernard de Montfaucon\textsuperscript{33} began his career as an editor of patristic texts. When he became convinced that it was not possible to understand the work of the Church Fathers without sound knowledge of the ancient world, he extended his research to the monumental record. The first, French edition of \textit{Antiquity Explained, and Represented in Sculptures} appeared in 1719; it was followed by a second edition, a \textit{Supplement}, and translations.\textsuperscript{34} The preface to the first volume sets out the plan and methods of the work. The several volumes treat a wide range of topics in an order that proceeds from religious to secular: Greek and Roman religion, daily life, war, roads, and many others, and they contain abundant illustrations of the objects he cites. So far, so systematic.

The scope of the work, however, is explicitly defined by a developmental

\footnotesize{(I thank Eric Garberson for this reference).}

\textsuperscript{30}Phillips, ‘Reconsiderations’ for Momigliano’s overstatement of the division between antiquarianism and history; 300 (‘in broad terms a clear demarcation between the two groups can be made’), 303.

\textsuperscript{31}Herklotz, ‘Momigliano’s “Ancient History”’ 128-31.

\textsuperscript{32}Herklotz, ‘Momigliano’s “Ancient History”’, esp. 131, 131-6, 136-40.

\textsuperscript{33}Bernard de Montfaucon (1655-1741) is mentioned by Momigliano, ‘Ancient History’, 298 n. 1, 303, 304, 306, 310 (\textit{Antiquité expliquée}).

theme and a specific chronological frame. In the contemporary translation: ‘This Work comprehends all the polite and flourishing Antiquity, which fell very low in the third Century, but ended entirely in the time of Theodosius the Younger [A.D. 401-50]. . . All the Arts sunk, and especially Painting, Sculpture and Architecture’.  

The decline of the arts in the Late Roman Empire is a formulation already established in earlier post-antique writing on art, for example, in Vasari’s well-known summary of the course of ancient art that prefaces the Lives. Montfaucon’s account is likewise not only qualitative, but also developmental and chronological in relative and absolute terms as well. For example, his account of the iconography of the Graces traces the origin of and successive changes in their representations. His work is deeply historical in conception, structure, and content.

Another antiquarian mentioned by Momigliano is Joseph Spence, Professor of Poetry and Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, perhaps best known for his notes and anecdotes about his friend Alexander Pope and his circle. He is also a significant figure in the study of classical art. In 1747 he published Polymetis, an illustrated work in the form of twenty-one dialogues on the ‘agreement’ between Roman poetry and art. Spence’s work echoes Montfaucon’s in its merging of literary and non-literary sources, but it focuses on the theme of the ‘sister arts’ of painting and poetry, a formulation that goes back to antiquity and has generated an immense literature. Because Spence chose deliberately to focus on Roman art and poetry, his historical scope likewise necessarily differs from that of Montfaucon’s more expansive project, but the explicitly historical scheme is the same: the rise and fall of the arts. Through the dialogues, this course of development in poetry and the ‘other arts’ in its relative and absolute chronology is charted on the basis of quotations from Roman writers and examples drawn from material culture. In his summary:

You may see by these two accounts I have given you of the Roman poetry, and of the other arts, that the great periods of their rise, their flourishing, and their decline agree very well, . . . Their style was prepared . . . under the

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35Montfaucon, Antiquity Explained, I, ‘Author’s Preface’, unpaged [6].
38Joseph Spence (1699-1768) is mentioned by Momigliano, ‘Ancient History’, 304 (Polymetis).
first period, or in the times of the republic. In the second, or the Augustan age, their writers and artists were both in their highest perfection: and in the third, from Tiberius to the Antonines, they both began to languish, and then revived a little, and, at last, sunk totally together.41

The course of rise, peak, and decline is at once a universal pattern of development and contingent on particular historical circumstances. In no way is his antiquarianism deficient in chronology or explanation.

The same is true of another work cited by Momigliano, the immense Recueil d’antiquités of the comte de Caylus.42 The contributions of this great scholar have only recently begun to receive the attention they deserve. His ‘collection [in the sense of compendium] of Egyptian, Etruscan, Greek, Roman, and Gaulish antiquities’ appeared in seven volumes from 1752 through 1767.43 While the presentation of the antiquities region by region seems at first sight to suggest a systematic conception of the kind proposed by Momigliano, the order in which the regions are treated in fact has explicit chronological significance. Caylus believes that the practice of the arts was passed from place to place – from Egypt to Etruria to Greece, and so on.44 The regional organization of the material embodies both a particular historical sequence and a general historical process; he speaks specifically of the history of the arts.45 Within each regional section, the presentation follows the order in which the arts were born and developed. The course of development is repeated within and beyond individual cultural spheres. The arts are formed in Egypt and pass to Etruria and then to Greece, ‘where knowledge, joined with the most noble elegance, led them to their greatest perfection’, they were transported to Rome, where, ultimately, ‘they interred themselves in the debris of the Empire’.46 He

41Spence, Polymetis, 44.
44Aghion, Caylus, 25, summarizes his ‘theory of the progress and migration of the arts among the Ancients’ (‘sa théorie du progrès et de la migration des arts chez les Anciens’) but does not note the historical nature of his theory, emphasizing instead his methodical treatment of the antiquities he studied. Schnapp, Discovery, 238-42, treats Caylus in terms of ‘[t]he foundation of a science of objects and monuments’ (238), remarking on his ‘experimental method’ (240) and his proposal ‘to turn the antiquary into a kind of physicist of the past’ (238). He does not distinguish the kind of literary history from which Caylus sought to distance himself from other kinds of historical thought; he stresses ‘evolutionary typology’ without acknowledging the essentially historical nature of either ‘ordering similar objects in series’ or a ‘principle of evolution’ (241). He characterizes the Recueil unflatteringly, remarking on ‘its lack of order and disjoined composition’ (241).
46Caylus, Recueil, I, ix-x: ‘On les voit formés en Egypte . . . de-là passer en Etrurie . . . être ensuite
states his purpose explicitly: ‘Such is the path that the Arts seem to me to have taken among the nations that communication successively brought together; and such is the order that I have given to this work.’

The explicitly historical treatments of the arts offered by Montfaucon, Spence, and Caylus are also highly judgemental, as is obvious from the very pattern of rise, apex, and decline they share. This pattern allows the works also to serve a clearly stated prescriptive purpose of improving the practice of the arts in the present day. The developmental pattern and its prescriptive relevance and utility are, of course, features found in earlier works dealing with ancient art, such as those of Vasari in the sixteenth century and Franciscus Junius in the early seventeenth preceding, that is to say, the interplay between discrete genres of history and antiquarianism as proposed by Momigliano.

Both the developmental pattern and the didacticism are clear in the work of Johann Joachim Winckelmann, also cited by Momigliano and, if only by virtue of the title of his History of the Art of Antiquity of 1763/4, a key figure in the literature of antiquarianism and history. In Winckelmann’s early work, the ‘Reflections on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture’ of 1755, the prescription is explicit: he criticizes contemporary art and society in comparison to those of the ancient Greeks and asserts that following their models is the pathway to greatness. And the History itself is built on the simultaneously critical and developmental

transportés en Gréce [sic], où le sçavoir joint à la plus noble élégance, les a conduits à leur plus grande perfection; à Rome enfin, où . . . ils s’ensevelissent dans les débris de l’Empire’.  

47Caylus, Recueil, I, x: ‘Tel est le chemin que les Arts me paraissent avoir fait parmi les nations que le commerce a successivement réunies; et tel est l’ordre que j’ai donné à cet ouvrage’.  

48Montfaucon, Supplement, I, Preface, unpaged [2, 3]; Spence, Polymetis, 292; Caylus, Recueil, I, ii.  


Kaufmann’s critique is well founded in terms of the early modern tradition, but although he correctly observes that Sandrart relates and compares ‘theses about history, inherited from earlier literature, to empirical observation of objects’,\footnote{Kaufmann, ‘Antiquarianism’, 529.} he does not sufficiently recognize some significant features about these theses. One such feature is the source of similar formulations in post-antique treatments of ancient art. For the key to the early modern practices in the study of art lies not in their own methods so much as in the content of the ancient sources they use. Many of the texts used by the post-antique scholars do not present raw information about works of art that requires external interpretation. The information is instead often pre-digested, as it were, and packaged within specific developmental analyses. A clear example is Winckelmann’s account of the origin and early developmental stages of Greek sculpture, which on the surface looks like a brilliant reconstruction reached through acute analysis of surviving works of art and of indications scattered through the corpus of ancient texts. In fact, however, Winckelmann simply followed and repeated what ancient writers said in their discussions of the evolution of cultural forms – including sculpture – from primitive beginnings through increasingly accomplished steps.\footnote{For Winckelmann’s adoption of ancient formulations of the aniconic origins of sculpture: Donohue, Xoana, 183-9, 219-30; ‘The Greek Images of the Gods. Considerations on Terminology and Methodology’, Hephaistos 15, 1997, 41.} The same is true of his outline of the stylistic development of classical sculpture toward increasing naturalism, which has likewise passed as the product of his own empirical analysis. But it, too, simply adopts the scheme set forth in ancient texts – such as Cicero’s Brutus, which Ernst Gombrich long ago identified as the source for the very similar outline presented by
Vasari.\textsuperscript{56} The patterns of origin and development, and of rise, fall, and decline; the chronological framework,\textsuperscript{57} and even the critical judgements, are all explicitly articulated within the ancient texts, often with considerable agreement in detail and cited evidence as well. The ancient texts themselves, in other words, furnish the historical impulse, and this is the reason the same formulations appear so consistently in post-antique writers from Vasari to Winckelmann – and even into the present day. It cannot be too greatly stressed that the post-antique literature on classical art does not offer original syntheses, but instead follows, very closely, both the factual groundwork and the conclusions presented by the ancient writers. The path to understanding Momigliano’s conception of antiquarianism and history thus leads inexorably back to the point at which he begins his analysis: to the ancient writers.

In arguing that Momigliano overstated the difference between historians and antiquarians, Ingo Herklotz correctly indicates the importance for his argument of the distinction between chronological and systematic treatments that he insisted existed in the antiquity. In critiquing Momigliano’s treatment of the ancient writers, he finds significant oversimplification.\textsuperscript{58} Herklotz points to the Roman writer Varro as a prime example of an ostensibly antiquarian writer in the fragments of whose work are clear suggestions of interest in ‘historical change’, and he offers examples of what he calls ‘the fusion of subject taxonomy with chronology’ in the works of Aristotle, Cato, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Livy, and Plutarch, as well as post-antique writers.\textsuperscript{59} He is right to say that these examples could be multiplied. But we may go even farther and point to a flaw in Momigliano’s use of the earliest material, the fifth-century works that serve as the basis of his contention that a division opened then between political history and essentially antiquarian work. He ignores the obviously chronological focus of works he cites, such as the genealogies, the lists of Olympic victors assembled by Hippias, and the accounts of Hellanicus of the


\textsuperscript{57}For decline in Late Roman times, for example, see Rutilius Claudius Namatianus, \textit{De reditu suo}, an account in verse of his journey from Rome to Gaul in the early fifth century A.D., shortly after the sack of Rome in A.D. 410.

\textsuperscript{58}Herklotz, ‘Momigliano’s “Ancient History”’, 127, 128-31. Similarly noted by Phillips, ‘Reconsiderations’, passim.

\textsuperscript{59}Herklotz, ‘Momigliano’s “Ancient History”’, 128-30. Another point with which he takes issue is Momigliano’s assertion that the ‘antiquary accumulated knowledge for its own sake or for his personal pleasure’ (130); cf. Momigliano, ‘Ancient History’, 288: ‘Hippias, Hellanicus, Damastes, Charon collected traditions of the past and took pleasure in erudition as such.’ Herklotz argues convincingly for programmatic intentions in the works he cites that are comparable to those attributed by Momigliano to ‘political history.’
‘foundations of peoples and cities’. It is difficult to construe these works as anything but chronological. And we know of the existence throughout antiquity of many such explicitly chronological works on ‘antiquarian’ subjects: priestesses, winners of dramatic festivals, discoveries and inventions. Surviving ancient treatments of the various technai, what might be called the ‘arts’ of civilization such as music, rhetoric, and the visual arts, clearly demonstrate interest not only in overall patterns of origins and development, but also in chronology. An example is the Augustan writer Vitruvius’s ten books on architecture, which freely mixes technical information with discussions of the origin and development of architecture. It is easier to recognize the converse, the elements of ‘antiquarian’ research within writers of ‘political history’, and perhaps to view them as exotic interlopers; but in the case of Thucydides, Momigliano’s key figure for the late fifth century, not only does his own historical thinking bear unmistakable marks of the kind of approach to the past represented by antiquarian research, but he also attests to the existence of such conceptions in the world of his contemporaries. There is in fact an interplay between the ‘political’ and the ‘institutional’ realms throughout ancient approaches to the past. Momigliano certainly knew all this material. Why, then, did he argue for a generic distinction that is belied by his own evidence?

One part of the answer lies in the immense emphasis on such generic distinctions in the study of classical historiography in the later nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. To some extent, the focus on genre reflected various programmatic statements in the work of some ancient writers, but these are usually shaped by a particular task at hand – evaluating a specific author, for example, or establishing the superiority of one’s own work to that of predecessors or rivals. But just as significant a part of the context of the nineteenth-century scholarship was the practical need to organize the surviving information about ancient writers and texts and make it available. The five-volume corpus of Fragments of the Greek Historians edited by Carl Müller, published between 1841 and 1872, was long the most comprehensive and authoritative source available for that material. Even now, it remains the best if not the only edition of some works. The volumes are arranged chronologically, from the fragments of the earliest writers through Byzantine times.

62See, for example, Kenneth Sacks, Polybius on the Writing of History, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1981, 98-100 for the evaluation of Thucydides by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Thucydides 5-6), and the ‘self-serving arguments’ of Polybius in asserting the superiority of his own works to those of predecessors.
64Karl Wilhelm Ludwig Müller (1813-94); C. Müller, ed., Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum, Paris: A. Firmin Didot, 1841-72. He is not to be confused with Karl Otfried Müller (1797-1840).
This undifferentiated inclusiveness did not, however, go unchallenged.

In 1908, the great classical scholar Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff delivered a lecture at Oxford ‘On Greek Historical Writing’ and published it the same year. Wilamowitz recognized the great scope of ancient Greek historical writing: in his view, it ‘had a much wider range than that to which Thucydides the Athenian statesman wished to confine it.’ But from that insight he drew a surprising conclusion: he argues that Greek historical writing was not truly history. Throughout the lecture, he emphasizes two fundamental deficiencies in the ancient practices he deems not historical: the absence of a critical approach, and the absence of synthesis. ‘Is it not obvious that no real historical research existed either in theory or practice?’ These two failures – the uncritical attitude toward the materials of history, and the inability or lack of desire ‘to reach the truth’ through evaluation and synthesis – are characteristic of the figure on whom Wilamowitz pours scorn: the compiler, who is entirely different from the true historian. ‘I have difficulty in resisting the temptation to draw conclusions for our own guidance in pursuing historical research. Is it not obvious that nothing at all depends on the compilers? What they add is nothing but a confusion of the original tradition.’

Here is one source for the polarities found in the work of Momigliano, who retained the characterization of the compiler-antiquarian even as he simultaneously attempted to rehabilitate him. The difficulty, of course, is that good intentions could not coexist with, much less overcome, that negative characterization.

Wilamowitz’s ideas about the nature of history and the task of the historian are reflected in the work of the great ancient historian Felix Jacoby, whose volumes of The Fragments of the Greek Historians, which began to appear in 1923 but remained unfinished at his death in 1959, replaced Müller’s collection as the authoritative source for most of these materials. Fundamental aspects of Jacoby’s work are in turn reflected in Momigliano’s essay, where he thanks Jacoby for helpful discussion. In 1909, Jacoby published his views in an essay ‘On the Development of Greek Historiography and the Plan of a New Collection of Fragments of the Greek Historians’. He begins by criticizing Müller’s edition on the grounds of its lack of independence, its uncritical nature, gaps, and arbitrary arrangement. It needs

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68Felix Jacoby, ‘Ueber die Entwicklung der griechischen Historiographie und den Plan einer neuen Sammlung der griechischen Historikerfragmente’, Klio 9, 1909, 80-123; 80 n. 1 for his presentation of his ideas at a historical congress in August 1908.
to be replaced. After rejecting alphabetical and chronological order and an arrangement based on location, he proposes the developmental-historical principle as the only satisfactory organizational scheme for his own efforts. He recognizes that this arrangement ‘according to literary genres’ (nach literarischen Gattungen) raises the question of the development of Greek historiography, and he discusses his view of this development.69 His ordering of the fragments was thus intended to embody what he believed to be the development of Greek historical writing: genealogy, ethnography, contemporary history, chronography, and local history. And it is of course genealogical typology (or typological genealogy) that underlies Momigliano’s treatment of antiquarianism and history.

In practice, the generic-developmental principle conflicted with the principle of keeping together the materials attributed to each author. In the case of authors who had inconsiderately produced works in several genres, the solution was a system of cross-references. But the chief problem was apparent even in scanty remains: Jacoby’s conceptual structure was at odds with ancient practice. Neither the authors nor their works could be satisfactorily classified according to his categories. That Jacoby was aware of these fundamental problems and not able to resolve them is made clear by his notes for the part of the corpus – planned but never executed – that would deal with ‘antiquarian literature’.70 As Guido Schepens, the continuator of Jacoby’s corpus, remarks, ‘It is as if we were looking over Jacoby’s shoulders [sic]’ while he is ‘at a loss to settle the many problems he gets involved in’.71

In the introductory section of these notes, Jacoby remarks on authors whose status as historians is doubtful. He excludes certain genres on the grounds that their ‘nature’ or ‘character’ is insufficiently or simply not historical. Schepens finds major inconsistencies in Jacoby’s application of this criterion, condemning as ‘specious’ his rejection of some works with significant historical content while accepting others with less.72 And he is correct to point to the inconsistency. As has been seen, inconsistency was inevitable, given that the criterion itself was at odds with the actual practices of antiquity.

Jacoby never solved his dilemma. He was aware of the fundamental problem

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72 Schepens, ‘Jacoby’s FGrHist’, 151-4 (problems of selection and categorization), 160-1, 162: ‘writings that are historical (or sufficiently historical) in character’; ‘nicht historischer natur’; ‘Jacoby’s specious use of the notion of “historikerqualität”’. 
of his conception, but he did not change his approach. Nor did Momigliano, who adopted a similar generic-developmental scheme that was not supported by his evidence, and who likewise remained troubled by the problems it posed that could not be resolved. Why did he persist? Why, indeed, did he put it forward at all?

Momigliano himself provides the answers to these questions. His discussion of historical method in the past is aimed at contemporary practice. In this, as has been seen, he is following in the steps of Burrows and Wilamowitz. Some would even argue that in giving credit to the antiquarians, he created ‘a flattering mirror-image of the profile of the twentieth-century historian’.73 But it is condescending and simplistic to dismiss Momigliano’s treatment as self-congratulatory. The link he sought to forge between past and present practice is a more serious business.

That Momigliano’s interest in antiquarianism reflected a particular set of personal concerns has long been recognized, not least because he expressed them openly. Antiquarianism, with its emphasis on erudition and factual research, represented for him a defence against specific trends in historiography, particularly relativism, Crocean idealism, and the emphasis on the rhetorical aspects of historiography that since the 1970s has come to be associated with Hayden White.74 It is reasonably believed that Momigliano’s distrust of what seemed to him dangerous forms of scepticism about the possibility of reaching historical truth was linked to his experiences under fascism and the wholesale murder of his family by the Nazis, who have not yet ceased to represent for Western culture the ultimate consequences of tolerating historical untruth.75 This view, linked to his post-war stature as a moral exemplar, has been complicated by the controversy that arose after his death over the public acknowledgement that before he left Italy to take refuge in England, this model of ethical behaviour, driven from his position in Turin in 1938, deprived forever of much of his family, and ever after vigorously articulate in denouncing the lies of ideology, had earlier taken the Fascist oath required to take up a position at the University previously held by a scholar who had refused to swear it.76

74For example, Momigliano, ‘Historicism Revisited’, 1-10 (= 63-70); repr. Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography, 365-73.
Whether one condemns or forgives Momigliano or declines to pass judgement, this information makes more understandable the urgency that underlies his treatment of antiquarianism and history, which he first presented as a lecture in 1949. There are just a few places in his essay in which the real significance of the discussion of historical method becomes clear. At one point, he defines history as ‘a re-interpretation of the past which leads to conclusions about the present’. In other words, not the dead hand of the past, but a living hand with the capacity to act for good or ill. And he concludes the essay by remarking that the antiquary made real ‘contributions to the “ethics” of the historian’. So, despite his denigration of the antiquary, it was, in short, a redemptive scheme that he set forth, in which antiquarianism rescued history, and more than history, by preserving the possibility of establishing historical truth. Not methods, but morals. This moral concern is the nearly invisible scaffolding of his treatment. But the scheme posed a problem: it pitted historical morality against the fundamental generic principles that guided the study of ancient history. To make antiquarians the saviours of truth simultaneously required the sacrifice of the intellectual dignity of antiquarianism by denying it any interpretive capacity, because it was interpretation that had opened the door to the abuses that weakened history. To judge from his temporizings, his vagueness, and his contradictions, his capitulation to the scheme of Wilamowitz and Jacoby troubled his scholarly conscience and lay at the root of his perpetual dissatisfaction with his attempts to rework the Sather Lectures. But no resolution was possible. His attempt to create a system of history that was immune to abuse had failed.

To sum up: Some of the most striking disciplinary exclusions that surround the historian of ancient art find their justification in the ideas of Arnaldo Momigliano on the nature and relationship of history and antiquarianism. Many of his ideas can be traced to nineteenth-century scholarship on ancient historiography and prescriptions for historical practice. Momigliano, for reasons as much personal as intellectual, adapted these schemes to his own purpose and attempted to devise a system of historical practice that would be proof against methodological and moral
failure alike. His formulation has the consequence – perhaps unforeseen; it is hoped unintended – of making the study of ancient art untenable as a historical discipline; it is, if anything, fundamentally not-history. The scheme, however, is unsound: in the Western tradition, the visual arts, like all the arts of civilization, were treated historically even in antiquity. While many questions remain open – even ones so basic as the status of the visual arts in ancient Greece and Rome – at least historians of art may rest secure that they, too, are truly historians.

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