Towards an ‘exakte Kunstwissenschaft’(?)

Part II: The new German art history in the nineteenth century: a summary of some problems

The rhetoric of scientificness

‘Dem Kunsthistoriker kann niemand vorarbeiten’.¹ Anton Springer was not only an eminent academic art historian but also the master of a concise German prose. ‘The art historian does not need anybody else to prepare the ground for him’ would be an English equivalent. Springer’s statement of 1881 marks the principal desire of the scholars of his time, from the 1820s to the 1880s, namely to establish art history as a distinct field, as a new subject in its own right, equal to all the other major academic disciplines. At the very beginning of this report it was stated that the principal aim of all the very recent research appeared to be to provide a detailed account of how art history’s independence had emerged. Yet it turned out that all three major books discussed here predominantly emphasise art history’s togetherness with the adjacent disciplines and its involvement with the philosophies and the major cultural issues of the time. What has undoubtedly been demonstrated in this way is the new subject’s overall intellectual rank.

The second part of this report tries to summarise these issues and to shed a little more light on them by putting renewed stress on the initial purpose, to characterise the subject’s distinctiveness. Hence the argument is somewhat reversed: intellectual rank and academic probity follow from the aspirations of methodological self-definition.

Two strong voices have been added to the discussions – which have already briefly been mentioned in the section on Locher’s book - the tracts by the principal actors of the 1870s and 80s, Anton Springer and his colleague in Vienna, Moritz Thausing.

Connoisseurship

Apart from the as yet very small number of those who considered themselves ‘proper’ art historians, there were many other groups who also claimed the right and the distinction to speak authoritatively about art. Thausing begins with those preoccupied with aesthetics. ‘In its methods and problems it is totally different ... aesthetics is a ‘philosophic discipline’.’² In Thausing’s understanding aesthetics appears to have amounted principally to the propensity of making ‘aesthetic

² ‘In Methode und Problem völlig verschieden’, Moritz Thausing, ‘Die Stellung der Kunstgeschichte als Wissenschaft’ ... Antrittsvorlesung (inaugural lecture) ... ’ 1873, also in Mortiz Thausing, Wiener Kunstbriefe, Leipzig; Seemann 1884, 1-20 (article newly published in Wiener Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte, XXXVI, 1983, 140-150, henceforth abbreviated as ‘Thausing’, here p. 5.
judgements (aesthetische Urteile), and he follows his argument about the unsuitability of this procedure with the already quoted remark about not needing the word beauty in art history.³

To operate with absolute judgements in art history would be equivalent ‘to conducting political history with the help of moral philosophy’.⁴ Hence acts of veneration, as in the case of the Italian Renaissance, have no place in art history.⁵ Springer, in particular, rejected facile judgements, such as ‘elegant’, ‘forceful’, and ‘tender’, which to him are detrimental to historical research.⁶ For Springer the issues can also be more complex. He goes into some detail in his assessment of major writers of his era, such as the Berlin architectural theoretician Karl Boetticher on Greek architecture, Viollet le Duc on Gothic and Semper on the principles of the applied arts and Renaissance architecture. However insightful these works are for the art historian, a notion of ‘general laws in the world of art’ cannot be considered within art history proper. Not that art history would want to dispute the laws in themselves, but historical consideration always reflects on contingencies: what is needed is the ‘verification of the various external and internal conditions for the development’ of an art form.⁷

By far the most important groups, however, from whom Springer and Thausing strove to distance themselves, were the ‘Kunstkenner’. ‘Kunstkenner und Kunsthistoriker’ is the actual title of Springer’s tract. He comprehensively refers to all groups of collectors, antiquarians, critics, as well as all dealers and collectors. To him, and this is Springer’s opening argument, the principal motive of many groups of the connoisseurs of his day appeared to ascertain monetary value and he records his disgust for the ‘Kunstmakler’, the art-realtor.⁸ Both Thausing and Springer also forcefully distanced themselves from any contemporary artist who attempted a judgement of a work of art of the past.⁹

Yet the attempted juxtaposition of connoisseurs and art historians was far from clear. The basic problem, Springer claimed, was that ‘the connoisseur and the art historian are one and the same person in the eyes of most’.¹⁰ In fact, it had to be admitted that ‘for the art historian the activities of the connoisseur form an undoubted pre-condition.’¹¹ The question arises, what is, or, what was Kennerschaft? Clearly it was not enough to simply disdain it, as Hegel did early on, who held that it was concerned merely with external appearance.¹² Prange’s brief outline in her section on the eighteenth century characterises the connoisseur as somebody who has a strong interest in art but is not normally an artist. He or she no longer concentrates on preaching the elevated values of art in general but takes each

³ See note 14 in part I.
⁴ ‘politisiche Geschichte ...Moralphilosophie’, Thausing 5.
⁵ Thausing, 4.
⁶ ‘historische Urteile ... elegant, energisch, zart’, Springer, 15.
⁸ Springer, 1.
⁹ Springer, 13.
¹² Cf. Prange, 80.
work ‘as it is’, ascertaining authenticity, assessing dates and names of authorship. In fact, all art history before the new German art history of the nineteenth century could come under the Kunstkenner heading. One must turn here to Gabriele Bickendorf’s comprehensive book of 1998 on Italian (and some French) writers on art, entitled Die Historisierung der italienischen Kunstbetrachtung im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (The historisation of Italian [and some French] writings on art in the 17th and 18th centuries). Concepts of the historicising of art were gaining strength all the time. This entailed the combination of ‘direct visual observation’, such as the meticulous examination of ‘lineaments and brushstrokes’, with an ever greater precision and sophistication of the examination and use of documentary sources (‘Quellenkritik’). The ‘material’ was ordered into periods and schools, using the guiding terms of ‘style’ and ‘character’. Studies extended back into the Middle Ages, often in order to serve local historical pride. It all meant a decisive departure from the Vasarian mode of the vita as a ‘historia magistra’, as well as supplementing his central historical narrative in many directions. The term ‘storia dell’arte’ came into firm use by the later eighteenth century, albeit after Winckelmann. The high point and end point of this development, published belatedly in 1823, was the work of Seroux d’Agincourt, his monumental, copiously illustrated volumes on Medieval art, l’histoire de l’art par les monuments, depuis sa décadence au quatrième siècle jusqu’à son renouvellement au seizième. Claudia Schrapel has detailed the role and writings of another major contemporary author in the very early nineteenth century, Johann Dominicus Fiorillo. He was Central Europe’s first university teacher of art history (in Göttingen), who, being an artist himself, was also one of the last serious writers who held that such proficiency was necessary in all pursuits of art history.

Both the deepening of ‘source-criticism’ and the desire for ‘the perfection of sight’ continued to be dominating issues. To the art historians it appeared that connoisseurs, like archaeologists, were frequently engaged in arguments about authenticity. However, art historians also took part in major controversies. A celebrated case, already mentioned, was the Holbein Streit in the 1870s. The winners were held to be the art historians in this case, whose eyes acted free from aesthetic prejudices. As regards Morelli, did his new nomenclature of marking smallish details in paintings as significant, belong to connoisseurship or modern art history? Thausing was completely in favour of Morelli, while Springer’s answer was that

13 Prange, 28-31.
16 Bickendorf, 312.
17 Bickendorf, 179.
while Morelli’s method has aided the study of works of art, it is not at all sufficient when trying to comprehend a work of art in its totality.22

So what exactly was added to connoisseurship by the new German art history from the 1820s? Firstly, as Bickendorf states in the afterword of her Italian book, it was the new professionalisation, meaning the new institutionalisation which gradually replaced individual, independent and ‘private’ scholarship. Secondly, it was the new ‘German discussions of the philosophical-aesthetic and the theory-of-history concepts of idealism and romanticism’.23 Hence in this way Bickendorf neatly prepared the ground for Prange’s comprehensive philosophical analysis, while Prange implicitly agrees with Bickendorf in discussing art-connoisseurial empiricism in her section on the eighteenth century. There is only the small proviso, namely that among art historians in museums there were always those who stressed the importance of what they saw as the more connoisseurial kind of procedures, as distinct from the more academic kind of work. Arguments between the two groups continued in Germany well into the twentieth century.

Empiricism

Judging from some of the writings, the 1870s and 1880s marked a high point in the drive to instil the general values of science. One may begin with the exhortations to observe ‘precision’24 and the ‘utmost completeness’.25 In a tribute to Springer, his colleague Hubert Janitschek moralises by using the strongest words: Springer’s work stood ‘under a strict methodological discipline / under the rod’, he excelled with the ‘cleanliness of his technique of working’ and more specifically with the way he ‘conducted the processes of verification’.26 Thausing demanded ‘inductive research’; observation must then ‘lead to continuous comparisons, similar to those which the most real of our sciences, the natural sciences are used to practice’.27 For subsequent pronouncements of this kind of empirical art history one may continue with Kathryn Brush’s book on some members of the next generation of art historians, such as Wilhelm Vöge and Adolph Goldschmidt, both of them Springer’s pupils.28

22 Springer, 6-7.
27 ‘induktive Forschung’, Thausing, 5; ‘ein Weg ... fortwährender Vergleichung, ähnlich denjenigen, den die realsten unserer Wissenschaften, die Naturwissenschaften einzuschlagen pflegen’, Thausing, 11.
All those weighty words are easily voiced by art historians and historians of art history alike. Yet, for the philosopher, ‘induction’ or ‘truth’ are the subjects of complex debates of a kind that art historians are hardly capable of understanding. Hence there is a gap here which nobody seems able to fill. In any case, problems with empiricism were voiced among the art historians, too. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly even the tracts by Springer and Thausing contain statements of doubt. Springer’s words, ‘raw empiricism’ have already been cited.\(^{29}\)

Thausing at some point appears to belittle the work on the ground: ‘to arrive at an exact observation of monuments no special divination is needed.’\(^{30}\) As regards the comparisons with the natural sciences, Karge has pointed to the way in which Kugler’s procedure is reminiscent of a more mechanical kind of eighteenth century taxonomy rather than the newer kinds of systematic thinking in biology.\(^{31}\) All this fits in with a debate that was being conducted widely, regarding the relative positions of the natural and the human sciences, to use today’s most frequent wording; earlier terms used were Geisteswissenschaften or Kulturwissenschaften. Where should the borderlines between the two groups be drawn? To what extent should the methods or the ethos of the natural - the ‘exact’ - sciences be used for the human sciences as well? Evaluations in the natural sciences seemed to be ruled by the sense of progress; would one apply this to the human sciences as well?\(^{32}\) The more reflective recent histories of art history take care to avoid any kind of valorisation. Heinrich Dilly warns of applying a simple linear development from dilettante art history to professional, scientific art history.\(^{33}\) Rößler cautions regarding a ‘normative understanding of scientific procedure, whereby history of idea components might be lost,\(^{34}\) in other words, an optimal history of ideas (with stress on the plural) cannot proceed when judgements or norms taken from one of the fields are applied throughout. This also includes philosophy.

A more radical philosophical line is taken by Prange. For her, the question of scientific progress hardly arises. At several points in her book, her philosophical scepticism takes her quite far. Already quoted was her remark on the foundations of Burckhardt’s insistence on looking in Schelling’s philosophy of art. Categorically, for Prange ‘the object which is described by the art historian is merely being produced by the art historian himself’.\(^{35}\) In an extremely laudatory review of Prange’s book by a philosopher we read that ‘the methods of analysing objects and the critique of sources which are aimed at given facts constitute mostly only a moment within the double-track pursuit of a scientific praxis.’\(^{36}\) To characterise in

\(^{29}\) Quoted in Rößler, 94.

\(^{30}\) ‘Genaue Anschauung der Denkmäler ...um zu dieser Kenntnis zu gelangen, bedarf es jedoch keiner besonderen Eingebung oder Divination’, Thausing 11.

\(^{31}\) Karge in Klein / Boerner, Stilfragen, 2006, 50.


\(^{34}\) ‘Normativen Wissenschaftsbegriff ... ideengeschichtlichen Komponenten verloren gehen könnten’, Rößler, review of Hellwig, Biographie, in Sehepunkte [electronic resource], Ausgabe 6, no. 9 2006.

\(^{35}\) ‘Der Gegenstand, den der Kunsthistoriker beschreibt, wird durch ihn erst produziert’, Prange 121.

\(^{36}\) ‘Die auf gegebene Fakten gerichteten Methoden der Werkanalyse und der Quellenkritik bleiben vielfach nur ein Moment einer zweigleisig verfahrenden Wissenschaftspraxis’, review of ‘Prange by
this way the immense effort in empirical work, undertaken by generations of art historians, seems to mark an extreme position, one which, one might say, goes rather beyond the limits of the usefulness that a philosophical viewpoint can provide.

Reference needs to be made again to Andrea Schütte’s book on Jacob Burckhardt and its philosophical approach. In an overall sense it comes close Prange’s, but without the metaphysics. Schutte cannot find any essentialisms at all in Burckhardt’s generally ‘jerky’ approach.37 Schutte firstly refers to the older epistemological sceptics, namely that no writer on history can bypass his or her own subjectivity.38 Burckhardt, Schütte claims, had ‘no problems’ with the issue of objectivity, and for him the ‘subjective approach’ was, in fact, ‘an objective one’.39 Using elements of a post-modern Textkritik she defines history writing further as a mixture of ‘claims for truth, productions of representations, and considerations of texts [thoughts about how to write]’, which continually oscillate between noesis and poiesis.40 As Burckhardt himself wrote, ‘history is, and will be for me to a large extent poetry’.41

With this postulate of a historiographic-fictional continuum, Schütte, as already indicated, prefigured Rössler’s approach. As a result they both feel to be in a position to sideline the problems of empirical observation and objectivity. However, Schütte’s book remains very largely within the theoretical sphere, in the sphere of epistemology and literary theory. If one expects from the history of art history a certain comprehensiveness, revealing not only the more abstract kinds of theories and the literary parameters, but also a sense of the the lifeworld of the protagonists, as well as an insight into how the actual works of art were dealt with, then Rosler’s inclusive approach is to be preferred, even if the result is lengthy and intricate.

**History Writing**

Once again the basic question: What is the Wissenschaft component in the new art history? It is precisely: ‘history’. And: ‘the knowledge of the past remains exclusively the task of Wissenschhaft’, wrote Thausing.42 Springer stresses many times that the Kunstkenner, the dilettante is simply not capable to understand things historically. All areas of history have to be examined by the art historian, especially ‘the cultural background’.43 ‘Indispensable’ is also the ‘the most thorough knowledge of the history of literature’.44 Springer advocates a special kind of

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37 Schütte, 106.
38 Schütte, 103.
empathy with the past: ‘One needs to place it all into the real world in which the artist stands and moves around.’\textsuperscript{45} This included the culture of the middle and lower classes, the ‘popular’, the ‘volkstümliche’ world.\textsuperscript{46} Does all this not lead one back to the issue of the separateness of the fields? Springer goes into further detail about the use of the historical frame or background for the art historian, or rather he tells us how not to proceed. When trying to characterise the art of a period, the art historian should be cautious in using sweeping judgements, such as the characterisation of the Renaissance as a period of rough and egoistic manners. Springer was no doubt having a dig at Schnaase when he warned of broad concepts, ‘contained in abstract introductions’.\textsuperscript{47} As already cited: ‘one must not generalise, but individualise’.\textsuperscript{48}

Much is made of the term \textit{Historismus}, or historicism, of the nineteenth century. It first of all refers to a new and unshakable belief in the relevance of history writing. It was felt that it was the researching and writing of the history of a subject, of a sphere of life or knowledge which provided an excellent – if not the best – understanding of that subject. Before or alongside the new art history, new ‘historical schools’ of law, of economics and of language emerged, predominantly of course conducted in academe. And with those, the epistemological problems outlined above did not seem to apply. A completely dispassionate, objective view of the past is possible because, as Thausing explains, nobody would ask a diplomat to try and explain old documents, or a contemporary painter to enlighten us about an older painting, because ‘the present and the past have been completely separated’, once again the insight into the latter remains exclusively the province of Wissenschaft.\textsuperscript{49} Most importantly, proceeding dispassionately means that all periods of human history were judged similarly, according to the principle of ‘historical neutrality’ (Prange), and of the ‘equal evaluation of all cultures’ (Karge)\textsuperscript{50} – with the possible exception of one’s own period, referring once again to Locher’s contention regarding the new art historians’ widespread reluctance to judge the art of their contemporaries.

Finally, the historicism of the nineteenth century has also come to mean something else, which entailed rather the opposite to ‘value-neutrality’. During the course of the century we witness changing preferences for historical periods, and in that sense the term \textit{Historismus} is often used to characterise the nineteenth century propensity to imitate many historical styles in its art. In Springer’s time a love for everything that belonged to the Italian High Renaissance surfaced again and again, ‘the magnificence and the pure ideal verve of Italian art’ as he wrote, devoting the

\textsuperscript{45} ‘Es gilt doch die Einfügung in die reale Welt in welcher die Künstler stehen und sich bewegen’, Springer, 17.
\textsuperscript{46} Springer, 18.
\textsuperscript{47} ‘In abstracten Einleitungen’, Springer, 17.
\textsuperscript{48} ‘Nicht generalisieren, sondern […] individualisieren muss man’, Springer, 17.
majority of his academic studies to it.\footnote{Die Herrlichkeit und den reinen idealen Schwung', Springer, 18.} Raphael still ruled supreme. However, from 1871 Germany witnessed a sudden love of a style that was now defined as ‘German Renaissance’, especially in architecture as well as a new appreciation of the art and life of the German fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.\footnote{Cf. Ralf Mennekes, \textit{Die Renaissance der Renaissance}, Petersberg: Imhof 2005.} It was associated with the prevailing new national-liberal outlook in the politics of the new Prussian German Empire, to which Springer also subscribed. Even though, by the 1880s the issue of a ‘German’ art was, on the whole, not a strong one, when one disregards the occasional attempts to declare early Netherlandish painting as ‘German’. There was no real parallel, in art history, to the Germanicity preached by the Brothers Grimm as linguists and literary historians. The early nineteenth romantic century idea of the German origin of Gothic had been expunged by architectural historians by the 1850s and substantial work on old German painting did not really get going before the 1870s or 1880s. The beginnings of a stronger and partly racially orientated cultural nationalism only came in the 1890s. Earlier on in this piece, reference was made to Gabriele Bickendorf’s argument that much of what Germans prided themselves to be ‘their’ new art history had in fact been prepared by Italian writers in the preceding centuries, and as the Germans took over those approaches from the Italian writers, they also continued to cherish Italy as the land of art, and thus, Bickendorf concludes, they failed to produce ‘a systematic history of German art’.\footnote{‘konsistente Geschichte der deutschen Kunst’, Gabriele Bickendorf, ‘Deutsche Kunst und deutsche Kunstgeschichte’, in Thomas Schilp and Barbara Welzel, eds., \textit{Dortmund und Conrad von Soest im spätmittelalterlichen Europa}, Bielefeld: Verlag für Regionalgeschichte, 2004, 29-41.}

A rather unusual recent study must be noted in this context, Marcus Müller’s \textit{Geschichte, Kunst, Nation …} which pieces together a comprehensive semantic field of a ‘“deutsche” Kunstgeschichte’ by lifting the word ‘German’ from a vast number of publications, mostly dating from the early twentieth century.\footnote{Marcus Müller, \textit{Die sprachliche Konstituierung einer,deutschen Kunstgeschichte’ aus diskursanalytischer Sicht}, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004.}

As regards Hegel, there is of course a continuing general agreement that without him there would hardly have been a historicism or the notion of the historical framing of all cultural manifestations. His kind of thinking can be traced into the details of some specific interpretations. For instance, according to Rößler, Springer closely follows Hegel in his analysis of the patronage of Julius II: bringing into the discussion the mixed reputation of this Pope, Rößler writes about quoting Springer:

\begin{quote}
As patron Julius thinks “devotedly of art” [Springer], because it freely pays homage “to the powers of the world, to the ideal concepts of life”. Springer hereby sets the history of art in analogy to the healing power of realpolitik. He places himself completely into the Hegelian tradition and he interprets art as the visualised expression of “the really and truthfully rational state” [Hegel] and the ideal reconciliation of opposites …\footnote{‘Als Mäzen denkt Julius “ehrerbietig von der Kunst, weil sie den Weltmächten, den idealen Ordnungen des Lebens frei huldigt. Damit schaltet Springer die Kunstgeschichte analog zur versöhnenden Kraft der Realpolitik. Ganz in Hegelscher Tradition stehend, wird die Kunst als}.
\end{quote}
Hegel’s follower as an art historian in Berlin was Heinrich Gustav Hotho to whom we largely owe the recording of Hegel’s *Aesthetics*, and who then attempted in his lectures to fill the philosopher’s abstract systems with historical detail.\textsuperscript{56}

However, on the whole, the picture of Hegel’s influence is extremely diffuse. As far as the very beginnings of the new art history in the 1820s were concerned, with Waagen and Rumohr, Hegel’s ideas had not yet been spread. Berlin’s most prominent historian, Leopold von Ranke proffered his belief in the equal validity of all epochs. The new art historians would then hardly accept the well-known complex hierarchical periodisation of Hegel’s system. Hegel had positioned the phase of history in which the visual arts provided the superior cultural expression quite early on within the overall development of history and culture, and the period of art was followed by phases in which other cultural manifestations, such as philosophy, constituted the highest achievement. Art historians would tend to replace all this with a simpler vision of a zeitgeist for each epoch within which the fine arts kept their relative rank. Neither could another thesis of Hegel’s, dubbed as ‘the end of art’, find much favour. For Prange it was overruled by ‘Schelling’s “construction of the universe of art”, which, in the spirit of Romanticism, resisted Hegel’s verdict.’\textsuperscript{57} The producers of the vast handbooks, especially Kugler, would find some inspiration in the apparent historical and geographical completeness of Hegel’s aesthetics and history, but they could hardly be adherents of the Hegel’s central constructions of the history of art. The position of Schnaase vis-a-vis the philosopher was somewhat more complex. Prange holds that he followed the idea that art history as a whole was going through ‘a predetermined development’, but Karge concludes that in spite of his strong philosophical interests Schnaase purposely left the sphere ruled by ‘Hegel’s system-dominated way of thinking’.\textsuperscript{58}

Most basically, as the century went on, art historians and many other academics could no longer share the general German idealist belief of the conflict between ‘geistige Natur’ and the ‘Prosa der Welt’.\textsuperscript{59} A major anti-Hegelian notion was that of the accidental happening (‘der Zufall’), within ‘a realm of changefulness and real accidentality … not deduced from concepts’, words from Alexander von Humboldt’s *Kosmos* (1845 ff.), cited as a motto by Kugler.\textsuperscript{60}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[57] ‘Dennoch wird eher Schellings “Konstruktion des Universums in der Kunst” für das Selbstbewusstsein in der Kunstgeschichte wirksam, die sich im Geist der Romantik gegen das Hegelsche Verdikt vom Ende der Kunst stemmte’, Prange, 94.
\item[58] ‘Notwendigen Entwicklungsverlauf’, Prange 138; ‘Bannkreis des Hegelschen Systemdenkens’, Karge in Niederländische Briefe, xvi, xxvii.
\item[59] Hegel, quoted in Rößler, 167.
\end{footnotes}
Style

After all these abstractions, it is time to reflect on art history’s actual instruments with which its artefacts could be investigated. Dan Karlholm in his earlier account of the first comprehensive German handbooks proposed the following: ‘Genre, style, period or culture’. By far the most important instrument was ‘style’. It must be rated as one of nineteenth century’s success stories. Provided one did not hit the wrong term, a single adjective could provide a sense of knowing something important about a small detail, such as a part of the decoration of a building, and something about the general character of a period spanning several centuries in all Western countries. The practice is closely related to general period labelling. For Karge, style-labelling comes under empirical and historicist procedures. Empiricist – historicist was the belief of the equal value of all styles. One needs to be aware, though, that some art forms lend themselves better than others to stylistic labelling; here clearly, at least in the nineteenth century, architecture comes first. According to Karge, much of Kugler’s ordering practice was derived from Arcisse de Caumont’s nomenclature for medieval buildings. During the later twentieth century these kinds of labels have been eclipsed, one major reason being that scholars became ever more conscious that most designations, such as ‘Romanesque’ or ‘Baroque’, would not have meant anything to those in the past who produced the works. As a result, the books reported here devoted very little to the issues of style. Locher purposely avoided what he calls ‘Stilgeschichte’. Moreover, from the 1880s ‘style’ merged partly with ‘form’. The term ‘Stilkritik’ gained coinage. A certain division took place. Plain period style labels were now mainly the province of the more popular kind of literature, while Stilkritik usually went into detailed formal description, whereby the basic style and period labels need no longer play a decisive role.

A probing recent analysis of ‘style’, largely philosophical, forms the most substantial chapter in Schütte’s book. A new understanding of style was a key element in Winckelmann’s new art history. While, for him, the term retained its old normative power, it is now systematised, it can be applied as a geographical and a historical categorisation. In Goethe’s essay of 1789, concerning painting and sculpture, and entitled ‘Einfache Nachahmung der Natur, Manier, Stil’ (simple imitation, mannerism, style), the normative element is rendered more prominently again, as it signifies a state that comes above mimesis and the individual artist’s subjective input (‘manner’), but the essay also helped with the general spread of the term.

More radical changes came with Rumohr. For him ‘style’ signified less a generalised state of perfection than a plurality of individual modes, meaning in each case ‘an accommodation to the inner demands of the material which has developed

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61 Dan Karlholm, Handböckernas konsthistoria. Om skapandet av ”allmän konsthistoria” i Tyskland under 1800-talet, Diss., (Symposion, Stockholm/Stehag, 1996), 61 ff. 245
63 Karge in Espagne, Kugler, 2010, 92.
into a habit’. Rumohr was in turn attacked by Hegel, who chided him for his un-idealistic outlook and for his concentration of the artefact itself, on its formal and material conditions. Hegel changed the Goethean hierarchy again, for him it was now ‘Manier, Stil, Originalität’. Style was a mediator through which the artist could reach real originality. Further theorisations diversified greatly. A Hegel adherent and writer on aesthetics and art theory, Friedrich Theodor Fischer, restored ‘style’ again to the top of the hierarchy: ‘Talent, Manier and Stil’. He opened the door of appreciation to a wider range of expressions by postulating stylistic subcategories, such as ‘the simple beautiful’, ‘the exciting and touching’, ‘the high and sublime’.

With Gottfried Semper’s magnum opus, his two volume Der Stil in den technischen und tektonischen Künsten … of 1860, the title indicates that the word’s popularity must have reached its peak. But Semper’s book has nothing at all to do with the handbook-type of list of styles, nor with the emerging formalist Stilkritik for paintings. His principal interest was to analyse the origins, the ‘natural laws’, that is, the technical and environmental principles of various techniques in the textile, ceramic and building crafts. What Semper did push forward was the quest for the ‘origins’ of a style, which was something very different from the more static practice of just coining and sub-dividing labels. Schütte then goes on to two less well-known mid-century philosophers, Christian Hermann Weisse and Rudolph Hermann Lotze. The former came back to Buffon’s old psychological adage ‘le style c’est l’homme même’, the latter stressed diversity, ‘the exciting, attractive and always innovative formations’ of style.

Riegl’s concept, to put it at its briefest, related ‘style’ firmly to abstract forms and thus a ‘theory of style’, of signification, no longer appeared necessary. Finally, slightly back in time, Schütte finds – as to be expected – little overt systematicity in the writings of her hero, Burckhardt. Principally style signifies here a self-contained ‘total expression’, demanding order and the elimination of ‘Willkür’, of everything arbitrary, said here about Greek art which brings one back to the concepts of Winckelmann.

**Iconography / ‘Form’**

Formalist or Iconographic / Iconological was the dominant methodological alternative for art history during much of the twentieth century. Before the last decades of the nineteenth century this alternative did not exist, or was hardly formulated in this way.

Iconography itself could hardly be called a new subject. A definition of 1876 reads as follows: ‘Iconography serves the orientation for the imagery that occurs in works of art, especially of the pictures of saints which occur so frequently (for

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67 Schütte, 295.
70 Schütte 333ff.
72 Schütte, 368.
ancient art one uses the art mythology instead), a definition of 1876.\(^{73}\) Iconography was here grouped with palaeography, numismatics and heraldry as a ‘Hilfswissenschaft’ for the ‘Kunstwissenschaft’, as an auxiliary science. Springer, as Rößler records, showed some fatigue with the diligent identification of such crowds of saints, or with the philosophers in Raphael’s *Disputà*. At the same time Springer attacked what he saw as facile approaches in the coining of meaning and argues against attempts to ‘erect bridge[s] between great world events and the small world of art.’\(^{74}\) Instead one should try and investigate the less documented, ‘the popular sphere, the lasting elements in the formation of an epoch’\(^{75}\). For example, we cannot see direct relationships between the work of Dante and Giotto, but both of them took up the ‘perceptions which quietly chimed with popular consciousness’ and gave them ‘the poetic form and the artistic shape’\(^{76}\). It was with these definitions Springer took the step from iconography to iconology, something duly emphasised by Rößler and Prange.

In contrast to iconography, the term ‘form’ and its origins are characterised by an utter vagueness, at least before Fiedler and Wöfflin supplied their rigidly formalist definitions. ‘Form’ can be used synonymously with ‘style’ and in most cases where one refers to the form of an ornament that form serves as the carrier of the stylistic designation. In Rößler’s book the issue of form is omnipresent. Locher and Prange trace its rise in the nineteenth century principally through the development of the theories of decorative art. One could undertake a parallel study for the writings on the history of architecture. Most detailed architectural descriptions could be characterised as ‘formal’. When we read Springer in 1881: ‘… the types and characters [the artist] chooses for the principal actors … the lines and forms [the artist chooses]’ we get a sense of the iconographic and the stylistic-formal methods emerging side by side as reasonably distinct.\(^{77}\) But as Springer also declares, the choice of forms happens ‘almost unconsciously’, we realise that there is still a Morellian purpose of just identifying names and we are still some way away from a notion of formalism which assumes a conscious and aesthetically evaluated intent on the part of the artist.

Once more one may reflect on Rößler’s construction of a three-tier concept of meaning in Springer’s work on Raphael’s *Disputà*, foreshadowing Panofsky: 1) recognising the object for what it is in everyday terms, 2) the specific iconographic signification and 3) the iconology of the broadest cultural context. Rößler here lays particular stress on the way in which Springer defines no. 1) as the plainest description of what one sees, for instance the colours of a dress. At times it appears that Springer’s reduction to the ‘registering of the seen’ also means that it is ‘de-

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\(^{74}\) ‘…Grossen Weltereignisse und dem kleinen Künstlerreich …’, Springer 17.

\(^{75}\) ‘Das Volkstümliche, wahrhaft herrschende und dauernde in der Bildung eines Menschenalters’, Springer, 18.

\(^{76}\) ‘…Anschauungen, welche bereits leise im Volksbewusstsein anklangen … gaben ihnen die poetische Form und die künstlerische Gestalt’, Springer, 20.

\(^{77}\) ‘…welche Typen und Charaktere [der Künstler] für die Hauptpersonen wählt … welche Linien und Formen …[er] gebraucht benahe unbewusst …’, Springer, 5.
semanticised’, although Rößler (and his arguments have been somewhat simplified here) does not want to go as far as claiming that Springer hereby undertakes ‘a formanalytische Präzisierung’.78 Concluding Rößler on Springer’s analysis of the Disputà, one may however be tempted to speculate on a curious coincidence, a combined origin of Wölflin’s concept of a ‘de-semanticised’ form and Panofsky’s new systematisation of meaning.

Practices I

After accounting for some of the theoretical propositions which never ceased to be challenged, one may take a different angle and study more directly what was actually being produced. What types of writings were now being published? What was new about them? There were indeed two fundamentally new types of work, the all-comprehensive history and the monograph of a single work of art. Naturally, most broadly speaking, these genres were not without precursors, but their systematisation took place during the course of the nineteenth century. This systematisation happened in accordance with the two general methodological beliefs outlined above. There was, firstly, the massing of individually examined detail, based on a notion of the individuality of each object, its non-repeatability and, secondly, the belief in the need for explanations though delving into the broadest backgrounds, going well beyond the actual object. Both the handbook and the monograph operated with these principles. Most of the works discussed here, and Locher in particular, with Karlholm having drawn attention to it before, pointed to the importance of the genre of the handbooks, and the very high importance of the first ones by Kugler and Schnaase in particular.

A little more emphasis might have been put on the handbook’s opposite, the monograph, ‘the source-critically-founded analysis of the individual artefact’ (Rößler).79 In the already cited article ‘Kunstwissenschaft’ in Meyers Konversationslexikon’s, the edition of 1876, presenting what we might assume the then ‘official’ definitions, we read; ‘the available material must be gathered and every individual piece must be investigated according to its characteristics and then it has to be brought into a systematic overview according to various points of view’.80 Springer explicitly made ‘Spezialforschung / specialised research’ his major task from 1860-1870 onwards.81 Conducive to the shorter kind of monograph was, from the 1870s, the new medium of the art history periodical which was exclusively devoted to historical topics, not mixing them with issues of contemporary art, as all earlier art journals had done.

A vitally important sub-category of the monograph is the biography. Karin Hellwig has recently revealed the surprising complexity of this genre. She traces its

78 ‘Auf die Registrierung des Gesehenen, Rößler’, 86; ‘entsemantisiert, Roesler, 71; ‘formanalytisch …’, Rößler, 88.
development from the Renaissance custom of the vita, principally written by artists with celebratory and didactic aims in mind, to the new eighteenth century types of biography with their new systematic treatment of life and work, their desire to provide ‘truth’ and ‘completeness’ as well as broad historical backgrounds. Hellwig here largely confirms Bickendorf’s account of the same period with regard to the scientificness of the eighteenth century contributions to art history. The first half of the nineteenth century diversified approaches, introducing more psychological slants and the notion of genius. Germany’s major art periodical, ‘Schorns’ Kunstblatt conducted long methodological deliberations on the issues of the life-work relationship and the use of the concept of the ‘künstlerischer Character / artistic character’, aimed to lend a sense of unity to each biographical work. Some of the most important new works of the new art history were biographies, such as Waagen’s on the van Eycks and Johann David Passavant’s on Raphael in 1839. The new emphasis on an all-comprehensive art history in the 1840s and 1850s brought a slight eclipse of the genre; it was argued that the concentration on individuals cannot provide comprehensive historical explanations. But from the 1860s and 1870s the genre returned with great prominence and the new works by Grimm and Justi excelled through their length, their psychological concentration and the breadth of their contextual explorations. Moreover, a striking new kind of heroisation was introduced here which suited the long-established grandeur of a Michelangelo or a Raphael. Finally through their sheer literary quality these major works formed a group of their own – and this literary success, the very popularity of these books, led to a new reduction in the genre’s estimation, at least as far as the great names were concerned, and within the strictly academic environment.

Practices II

What nineteenth century general debates on the natural sciences underlined was the way those sciences showed a continuous and rapid progress, or at the very least one could speak of a continuous, tangible, material advancement. In art history, too, one may speak of advancement. With Dilly, one may stress the instalment of so many institutions, especially of art museums and university chairs; with Prange one can pay respects to the art historians’ familiarity with major philosophical currents, with Rößler on one can foreground their close involvement with the broader cultural and literary scene.

One may also chose the simpler level of purely quantitative factors and point to them as practical tasks. It now appeared that ‘the stock of monuments is overwhelming’. Part of the new desire for completeness led Springer to stress that lesser works can have explanatory power as well. All narrow aesthetic preferences should be pushed aside. With regard to architecture, there was the added urgency to help with assuring its conservation. The decades from 1850 saw a new dynamic, a massive ‘Empirieschub’, meaning a sudden push to supply empirical detail, or even an ‘Empirisierungsdruck’, a veritable pressure to produce empirical work, or, just

82 ‘Der Denkmälervorrat is überwältigend’, Thausing, 3.
work.\textsuperscript{84} A few decades later most of the important old buildings had received at least some kind of monographic treatment in a journal or in the new genre of the 'inventory'. Its volumes, later to be entitled 'Bau-und Kunstdenkmäler' (monuments of building and art), provided area-wide information for the use of everybody (though, admittedly few of the series were ever completed).

Finally, attention must briefly be drawn to the fundamental matter of providing pictures of the works of art discussed. Principally the nineteenth century is the crucial period for the full development of the published reproduction. It started with the last examples of copper plate engravings and ended with the kind of reproductions of photographs of a quality that has been taken for granted until today. Only colour was still largely missing. One may trace the linear progression as regards both the verisimilitude of reproduction as well that of the cost factor. Very simply, many early nineteenth century publications had to make do without illustrations while by the end of the century that could not happen any more.

A new important work on the subject of the illustrated art book, edited by Kataarina Kraus and Klaus Nier, Kunstwerk, Abbild, Buch. Das illustrierte Kunstbuch von 1730 bis 1930, provides a number of very diverse aspects of the topic.\textsuperscript{85} Nier’s incisive introduction points to a number of more complex issues, such as the changing relationships between the illustrations and the text. He also states that illustrations cannot simply be understood merely as passive reproductions, but that they also have their own agendas. A world lies between the serial spread of illustrations, each of them simplified in order to arrange them in large groups for didactic purposes, as, most notably early on in Seroux d’Agincourt’s early monumental work of 1823, already mentioned, and those publications which make the greatest effort to reproduce high-ranking works in major museums, such as Dresden or the Louvre, often entitled ‘Masterpieces of …’ For a recent excellent investigation into the late nineteenth century advances in late nineteenth century techniques of reproduction one may turn to a volume published by Iris Lauterbach, entitled Die Kunst für Alle ….\textsuperscript{86} All in all, the rapidly increasing use of photographic reproductions from the 1850s onwards was, according to Rößler, fundamental for the disciplinary independence of the subject.\textsuperscript{87}

Should one, at the very end, allow the new art historians to voice some of their new pride, their convictions about the superiority of their whole enterprise? One may start with Schelling: ‘The realm of art is thus the place where ideality is realised in perfect, crystalline forms ….’\textsuperscript{88} Schnaase, following Hegel in spirit, but not in detail, held art to be, as Prange puts it, the permanent highest authority of the expression of the human spirit.’ If one does not go for the philosophers’ universalism one might turn to Justi’s excitement about the paradox of the lousy political situation in Spain producing an artist of the eminence of Velázquez.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item \textsuperscript{84} ‘Empirieschub’, Rößler 117; Karge in Espagne, \textit{Kugler}, 2010, 89. ‘Empirisierungsdruck’, Rößler, 339.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Cf. also articles by Locher and Kilian Heck in Espagne, \textit{Kugler}, 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{86} \textit{Die Kunst für Alle (1885-1944) Zur Kunstpublizistik vom Kaiserreich bis zum Nationalsozialismus}, Munich: Zentralinstitut für Kunstgeschichte, 2010 (Veröffentlichungen des Zentralinstituts für Kunstgeschichte, 26), cf. also Dorothea Peters in the volume Labuda, \textit{Etablierung}.
\item \textsuperscript{87} Rößler, 39.
\end{thebibliography}
However, from what has been told in this second part of the review one could also conclude that intellectually, the new art history did not have all that much to offer. The tracts by Springer and Thausing seemed to be concerned predominantly with how not to proceed. But, such a conclusion would miss out on the essential infrastructural value of the concerns outlined here: Springer’s and Thausing’s articles were, in fact, addressed not so much to their colleagues but to a wider audience. It was vital to draw the line between the pursuits in academe and the more mundane world of the connoisseurs whose activities might have appeared similar. Hence Springer and Thausing would tie in academic probity with art history’s moral probity. The reiteration of the basic laws of empirical procedure was crucial, norms that sound simple on paper, but were often perceived to be difficult to achieve in practice.

But how much does all this pertain to the actual, to the particular scientific contents of the new Wissenschaft? A very recent volume, its title beginning with German Art History and Scientific Thought deals with a selection of ideas and methods from about 1890 onwards, that is, with the work of Riegl, Wolfflin and Schmarsow and others. The book does this chiefly by tracing their general affiliations to, and even co-operation with new directions in the sciences of psychology, physiology, phenomenology and other academic fields of their time. A somewhat hasty conclusion might well state that art history’s striving for independence during the nineteenth century had been of limited importance, after all, and that the real Kunstwissenschaft was about to begin only now.

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89 Mitchell B. Frank and Daniel Adler, eds., German Art History and Scientific Thought. Beyond Formalism, Farnham: Ashgate 2012.