Otto Pächt and Albert Kutil: Methodological Parallels*

The relevancy of the evolutionary approach

In 1971, on the 50th anniversary of the death of Max Dvořák, the sixth issue of Umění published a number of articles in his memory. One of these was a piece by an outstanding Czech medievalist and professor at the University in Brno, Albert Kutil. In it Kutil expressed the belief that ‘generally, and on many in-depth research questions, Dvořák’s findings are unshaken and remain valid today’ and then added ‘this relevancy applies to all the stages it [Dvořák’s work] has undergone, not just the latter which is generally the focal point today’. Kutil had the following to say about the research method Dvořák employed in the early stage of his work: ‘The essence of this method was the genetic interpretation of an artistic event, where the individual plastic phenomenon is simply a link in an evolutionary chain subordinated to the inexorable law of causality … This principle of evolutionary causality … was intended to ensure the objectivity of art history and free it from the inadequacies and errors of the cultural historical approach…’.

Three years later, in honour of the centenary of the birth of Dvořák — successor to Alois Riegl at the University of Vienna and the most important Czech art historian — the Austrian journal, Wiener Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte, republished Dvořák’s study, ‘Über die dringendsten Methodischen Erfordernisse der Erziehung zur Kunstgeschichtlichen Forschung’, which had not been included in the five published volumes of his selected works. Other than that the article had only been published in the weekly Die Geisteswissenschaften, and then in Czech in Pečírka’s selected works of Dvořák, Dějiny umění jako dějiny ducha. In the foreword, dedicated to the republication of Dvořák’s study, Otto Pächt stated that the article was of ‘the greatest relevance and strategic significance’. As is evident, the statements by these two Brno and Vienna based professors of art history display a belief that Dvořák’s methodological approach, stemming from an era when evolutionary art history had not yet been superseded by art history as the history of Geist (the history of ideas or human mind), was still highly relevant in the 1970s. Kutil focused primarily on Dvořák’s Das Rätsel der Kunst der Bruder Van Eyck, published in 1903, demonstrating the validity of the evolutionary genealogical approach even in cases where the work was generally considered to be a rationally inexplicable, mysterious, completely unprepared, transcendental historical leap by a genius. While Pächt transported the relevancy of Dvořák’s work into an era transitioning from a formalistic, evolutionary approach to a conception of art history based on the history of ideas (or worldviews), which Dvořák formulated in full in his Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei (1918). Indeed, his article, ‘Über die dringendsten Methodischen Erfordernisse der Erziehung zur kunstgeschichtlichen Forschung’ tends to span both approaches.

There were two common incentives that led the two art historians to highlight the contemporary relevance of Dvořák’s work on the pre-‘Geistesgeschichte’ evolutionary art history: First, the desire to mount a defence in favour of the autonomy of art history, in which the history of art was seen as the development of form, and where the evolutionary genealogical approach to investigation was considered to be a suitable method of art history, if it were to be a ‘scientific’ discipline. This attempt to emphasize the continued relevance of this position was prompted by pressure at the time for a heteronomous conception, primarily that of iconology, which had ambitions of achieving dominance. However, there was also a trend
for the new social histories of art which had just started to take hold in the early 1970s. It is in this sense that we should understand Kutal’s emphasis on relevancy, which ‘applies to all the stages it [Dvořák’s work] has undergone, not just the latter which is generally the focal point today’. Kutal clearly had in mind the affinity between iconology and Dvořák’s conception of art history as the history of ideas and, specifically, the interest displayed in it by Czech Marxist iconologists.5 Much like Kutal, but in a more targeted and critical manner, Pächt explained the relevancy of Dvořák’s study of 1913–1914 thus: ‘Written 60 years ago, this article has greater relevance and strategic significance today at a time when, before we have even overcome the danger that iconology might monopolise interpretations of works of art, there is a risk that art history will be “subsumed within sociology”.’ Pächt was doubtlessly thinking of the clear distinction between art history and cultural history articulated by Dvořák in his article: ‘The history of art … has … its own autonomous position within the historical disciplines … This is especially true of cultural history, which has often been confused with art history.’ According to Dvořák, ‘Kunstgeschichte’ and ‘Kulturgeschichte’ are two distinct academic disciplines insofar as the cultural and historical processes (‘allgemeine Kulturvorgänge’) and the evolution of art (‘die Entwicklung der Kunst’) are distinct in nature (‘sind disparater Natur’). The relationship between them may, moreover, be one of external influences (‘das Verhältnis eines äusseren Anstosses’). Since cultural history and art history are ‘autonomous genetic series of evolution’ (‘selbständige genetische Entwicklungsreihe’), which can interact whilst maintaining their own autonomy, art history has the status of being an autonomous academic discipline whose ‘true subject’ is artistic form or style (‘die künstlerische Form, der Stil’). The second motivation for Kutal’s and Pächt’s emphasis on the relevance of Dvořák’s evolutionary perspective was to show not only that the evolutionary genealogical research method was a justified and legitimate approach but also that it was indeed the fundamental method for conducting art history research, and one upon which the specificity and autonomy of art history was based. Following Riegl, the young Dvořák expressed it thus: ‘Every historical formulation is a link in a specific historical chain of evolution and is conditioned by previous formulations of the same material. This is the premise and the justification of modern exact scholarship’.6 An evolutionary genealogical approach therefore meant not only that art history was a history of form, that its historical transformation was autonomous and immanent, but also that 1. art historical evolution was continual and universal.7 Nevertheless, in his article, Dvořák softened his premise of a strictly linear development. He introduced the notion that a number of developmental paths might exist simultaneously, and moreover, he relativised the idea of the universality of a global history of art. This was superseded by the notion of plurality, the simultaneous existence of mutually independent cultural circles (‘Kulturkreise’).8 He only acknowledged the notion of evolutionary continuity within individual cultural entities, considering the history of European art to be one such evolutionary entity. 2. He saw the continuity of development, its unceasing nature, as a consequence of the genetic dependence of works of art and their immanent causal links. One work follows on from another, developing or transforming the stimuli of the previous, and in this sense they are causally linked. Not even works of genius or innovation can be considered mysterious or inexplicably isolated instances, but rather are rationally deductible evolutionary chain-links. The identity of a particular piece of work lies in the position it occupies and the role it performs within evolution. This can be ascertained by placing the work of art in the evolutionary chain and identifying its developmental position and role. The aim of art history, then, is to seek out developmental paths and reconstruct the evolutionary series. Riegl and the young Dvořák believed that precisely this approach, based on visually controllable empiricism and the premise of immanent causality, justified categorising art historiography as rational and exact scholarship. In 1931 Otto Pächt stated that: ‘For neither of them [Riegl and Dvořák] was there any guarantee that art history would be cultivated as exact “scientific” discipline unless its evolutionary continuity could be demonstrated’.9 Dvořák accepted the neo-Kantian ‘ideographic’ concept of historical uniqueness and the consequences thereof for art history knowledge in his ‘Über die dringendsten Methodischen Erfordernisse der Erziehung
zur kunstgeschichtlichen Forschung’, recognising that art history knowledge involves an intuitive aspect and a subjective understanding of historical uniqueness. Nonetheless, he continued to consider the concept of a ‘history of style’ (‘Stilgeschichtliche Betrachtung’) and the ‘principle of a genetic historical understanding’ (‘Prinzip der genetischen Geschichtsauffassung’) to be the basis of the history of art as rigorous study. He was relying on the premise that only external similarities in phenomena were expressed in terms of an internal evolutionary relationship. When Dvořák could not sufficiently demonstrate the developmental continuity (van Eyck’s naturalism had the same problem), then, Pächt tells us, he decided to eliminate the leaps. Consequently, Dvořák turned to ‘Geistesgeschichte’. He departed from the idea of immanent development and accepted external determination, i.e. the intervention of a history of ideas or worldviews in the development of art. Instead of this ‘dualism’ and the premise of a ‘dynamic [emanating] from without’, which was, Pächt believed, ‘a rather crude attempt to patch up’ the problem, he proposed that one should begin from development in its entirety (‘Geschehensganzen’) and observe its internal direction.

An approach of this nature, Pächt argued, which allows for an internal relationship, even where there is no external similarity, also enables us to explain historical leaps as organic, evolutionary tendencies from within that affect the chain-links of development. In other words, seen like this, evolutionary continuity is not incompatible with artistic innovations that cannot be inferred from previous development. Previous development is, according to Pächt, essential to new creative possibilities and a source of potential historical change. The past is therefore imbued with anticipation of the future.

In 1970 Pächt returned to the subject of the evolutionary approach in his lectures on the methodological principles of art history in practice. He acknowledged the fact that the historical evolutionary approach was an excellent basis from which to interpret works of art. If a work of art is incorporated into the genealogical series, subjective explanation becomes objective explanation. Consequently, ‘the evolutionary approach’ can be considered a reliable method of verification.

Pächt considered it necessary to return to his critique of linear evolutionism. He repeatedly emphasised that ‘an evolutionary continuum does not necessarily imply a gradual, step-by-step evolution’ and that there is a difference between internal relations and external relations. He recognised that there is a ‘type of evolution in which changes in inner structure go hand in hand with changes in outward appearance’. However, in contrast to the young Dvořák, he also believed that: ‘It is no use trying to impose the image of a completely uniform evolutionary curve at all costs.’ Indeed, there are evolutionary situations where the most temporally proximal works of art superficially resemble a leap, and vice versa, ‘there are some processes in which an
inwardly consistent process of change leads to products that are outwardly very dissimilar.53 'True allegiance to tradition,' Pächt believed, ‘does not consist in adopting the whole or even part of any given vocabulary, design procedure or expressive technique. It consists in shared questions and shared demands — to which the artist feels obliged to respond.’54

As we have seen, Pächt viewed art historical evolutionism in epistemological, not ontological terms. He believed that the notion of evolutionary continuity and genealogical research method constituted, above all, effective and reliable cognitive instruments.

**Reviewing iconology**

We have also seen how the emphasis Pächt and Kutal placed on the continuing relevance of Max Dvořák’s evolutionary approach and the clear distinction between ‘Kunstgeschichte’ (art history) and ‘Kulturgeschichte’ (cultural history) was motivated by a desire to defend the autonomy of art history as an academic discipline. They did not believe it could be considered the same as cultural history, since it had its own particular subject and research method.44 Iconology — which became the predominant method of art history in the post-Second World War period fully capable of explaining problems in art history, as its adherents unabashedly hoped — was considered by Pächt and Kutal to be a modernised version of cultural history. Furthermore, in the 1950s and 1960s, iconology presented itself as the most scholarly method, which, its proponents were convinced, would surpass all previous methodologies owing to the objectivity and verifiability of the relations it identified. In response to iconology’s claim to total validity, Pächt’s and Kutal’s recalling Dvořák’s evolutionary perspective was not simply an apology in defence of the specificity of art history, but developed into a scepticism (in Kutal’s case) and into an explicit critique (in Pächt’s case) of iconological method. They both doubted iconology was capable of verifying the causal relationships between the work of art and the sphere of ideas, considering this to be mere analogising. In addition, they mainly criticised iconology for the fallibility of its fundamental premise, for overlooking the specific visual nature of a work of art and for ignoring its figurative specificity and non-discursivity. They objected to the fact that the content of a work of art was separated from its form and that the creative form was seen as an empty vessel into which the pre-conceived thinking was poured, whereby the artwork then became an illustration of a priori ideas or simply decoration to support the thinking.

The idea that iconology should become a generally applicable art history method was expressed by Erwin Panofsky in his book, *Early Netherlandish Painting*, published in 1953.60 Originally conceived of on the basis of an analysis of renaissance art,61 this method was extended to medieval art using the premise that a ‘concealed or disguised symbolism’62 was generally applicable to the history of art.63 Three years later Otto Pächt’s critical review of Panofsky’s book was published.64 In it, Pächt stated that the iconology does not see the creation of the work of art as an intuitive process during which the philosophical content is directly embodied in visual form. Rather, it regards it as a conscious projection of previously formulated theological, or philosophical ideas (pre-conceptions).65 Hence the meaning of the work of art is, according to iconologists, planned a priori and is deliberately obscured. Consequently, the meaning of an artwork cannot be revealed by analysing its form, but by decoding the author’s aims and intentions.66 However, according to Pächt, perceiving it like this involves fundamentally altering Panofsky’s original iconology: The artwork’s third layer of meaning, the layer of ‘intrinsic meaning’, which Panofsky originally saw as unintentionally documenting the ‘history of cultural symptoms or “symbols”’ and expressing the ‘essential tendencies of the human mind’,67 was eliminated. As a consequence, iconology was transformed into a ‘new, autonomous kind of iconographic research’.68 Pacht did not deny that art history owes a ‘wealth of information on the thematic background of the art’ to this ‘new type of iconography’.69 However, he did express the belief that ‘the stylistic approach rested on the belief that the stylistic data were more reliable guides to the inner meaning, to the true character of a work of art than the most perfect knowledge of its author’s intentions could provide.’70 He did not therefore consider a stylistic, formal and analytical approach to be outdated. He asked himself how these two diametrically opposed approaches — iconographic and stylistic — could be aligned.71 Since both approaches are based on entirely different conceptions of the nature of artistic creation,72 he remained sceptical as to the possibility of harmonising them. All the more so given that each approach contains within it the belief that it has a particular ability to capture the true essence of art; thus, both approaches claim total validity.73

The relatively moderate tone of Pächt’s criticism of iconology changed discernibly eight years later at the 21st world art history congress in Bonn, where he delivered a talk entitled, ‘Künstlerische Originalität und ikonographische Erneuerung’.74 The talk was part of a section on ‘Stilgeschichte und Ikonographie’ chaired by Jan Białostocki, a distinguished iconologist and historian of iconography and iconology.75 The first two talks were given by leading representatives of what were the two main methodological positions of the time.76 In his ‘The Genesis of Iconology’, Panofsky’s student, William S. Heckscher, introduced Aby Warburg as the ‘father of modern iconological methods’.77 Following this, Otto Pächt, professor at the University of Vienna and loyal follower of Alois Riegl, presented his critical analysis of iconological method. Pächt stated that iconography, originally conceived of as an ancillary branch to art history, had become the main, if not also, the ‘most exact’ contemporary art history discipline.78 Iconology, he said, had radically changed the way the ‘essence and values’ of artistic creations were...
seen. Pächt characterised this change as an ‘intellectualist grasp of the essence of artwork’. He based this on the unreflected premise that each exceptional work of art is a manifestation of the important, rationally formulable and iconographically articulable (!) ideas that an artist consciously puts into his or her work. The logical consequence of this conception was, in Pächt’s view, that every truly great work of art was thus automatically innovative and original as far as the iconography was concerned. In other words, the ‘new type of iconography’ assumed that the ‘essence of artistic originality lay in iconographic innovation’. It was precisely this assumption that Pächt considered unjustified. There are many great historic pieces of art which are not iconographically original. He therefore considered the claim that a new type of ‘iconography or history of symbols’ would capture the essence of a work of art
The target of Pächt’s criticism, however, was not the complete falsification of iconography, but merely the way in which ‘the limits of iconography’ might be determined, limiting its ambition to be a complete interpretation of the ‘the core of artistic phenomena’. ‘This important discipline’ was only completely legitimate, Pächt thought, for the study of the ‘intellectual ideas or subject matter’ of works of art. It is suitable only for investigating ‘external … not internal theme’ in art. Figuration, Pächt believed, was exactly what art history was all about.

Pächt was presumably not aware that his own position in his criticism of iconology was based on an unreflected assumption: On the a priori premise that the essence of art is originality and the essence of its historicity is permanent innovation. This premise does not deny that its origins lie in modern art. It is, as it were, modernism projected onto the history of art.

One of those who read a paper as part of the ‘Stilgeschichte und Ikonographie’ section, was also Albert Kutal. His subject was ‘Ursprung und Sinn der horizontalen Pietà’. The Prague adherents to iconology considered his talk as proof that even those who represented the old formalist school acknowledged the superiority of the iconological method. A closer look at Kutal’s talk, however, convinces us that the opposite was in fact the case. Not only was the first major theme in his analysis the cardinal problem of the evolutionary approach — the ‘origin’; that is, the genealogy of a new kind of Pietà, but his second theme was the inner ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ of a horizontal Pietà, that is, the philosophical content within it could not be considered an iconological interpretation. Kutal was not looking for the genesis of the thinking or the particular idea, or theological or philosophical plan behind the horizontal Pietà. He was not pinpointing the intent nor the intellectual message of the work. Kutal used a structural and hermeneutic interpretation to identify the philosophical meaning of Pietà. He determined the meaning, the sense of the visual or plastic form of the artwork inherent in its formal rendering (the rendering of the figure and space). Thus the link is not with Panofsky’s iconological interpretation of the hidden intellectual meaning of the work but with the way in which Riegl and Dvořák determined the worldview inherent in the figurative form.

Meeting Otto Pächt at the Bonn congress might have strengthened Kutal’s belief that the content of an artwork need not necessarily be interpreted iconologically or by deciphering a deliberate rebus. Three years later, in 1967, Kutal completed his work on a comprehensive history of Czech Gothic art (published in Czech only in 1972). In this work the way he saw formal analysis underwent a shift. In his monumental history of Czech Gothic sculpture (published in 1962), Kutal focused on identifying the place of a work of art in the development so as to reconstruct the evolutionary series and evolutionary continuity. In the synthesis of Czech Gothic art (1972) he also presented the structural hermeneutic approach discussed in Bonn. From that moment on he paid equal attention to analysing the pictorial structure of a work of art and to reconstructing its evolution and continuity. Thus, Kutal came closer to an approach characteristic of Otto Pächt’s structuralist approach, without, it is true, letting the reconstruction of the evolutionary context slip into the background. The main affinity between the art history perspectives of Albert Kutal and Otto Pächt lay, however, above all in the belief that works of art were non-discursive and non-conceptual in nature. It was out of this persuasion that the sceptical, even critical, opinions that both researchers held on iconology grew.

Pächt’s criticism of iconology culminated in a series of lectures he gave at the University of Vienna in the 1970/71 winter term. He stopped asking whether it was possible to fuse two contradictory approaches such as a stylistic analysis and an iconological interpretation; this was a question which he left unanswered in his review of Panofsky’s book on early Netherlandish painting. He also left aside the argument on originality, which had been the trump card of his criticism at the Bonn congress. His criticism of iconology now focused on the intellectualisation of works of art. Intellectualisation, Pächt believed, contradicted the essence of visual art and denied it had the ability to invent, regarding works of art as mere illustration. The iconological method presupposed not
only that ‘the essence of a work of art’ is ‘a rational idea’ or ‘some other verbally expressible thought’, and that ‘a deeper meaning has been deliberately concealed behind the facade that is accessible to our senses’. In an iconological sense, ‘Works of art ... are not ... the expression or the guise of an idea: they are its disguise’, since the act of creation is itself considered to be purely rational. The work of art is thus reduced not merely to an ‘ideogram’, to a visually disguised philosophical idea or to a symbolic representation of rational content, but above all it itself changes into a secret pictorial script (‘Geheimschrift’) or cryptogram. Thus, ‘art as a cryptography’ can be ‘decoded only by those initiated into the secret language’. Understanding the essence of art in this way, however, fundamentally changes both the nature and the role of art historians, who become ‘revealers of occult things’ and whose mission is to ‘provide the key to enable us to decipher what is represented’.

The iconological view of art as a ‘garment of thought, with the purpose of facilitating communication or speeding dissemination’ results, however, in art losing its autonomy and simply becoming a purposeful medium, or one that has been reduced to a simple propaganda tool. But the moment the purpose of art is to ‘devise pleasing (and therefore effective) forms in which to convey ideas’, then art history loses its autonomy and becomes an ‘ancillary discipline’ of ‘general semantics or symbology’.

However, in his assessment, Pächt did not only relativise the iconological approach as inappropriate given the nature of visual art. This time he also doubted the reliability of the iconological method itself. Given the ‘uncertainties of [a] visual dimension’ based on ‘the shaky ground of sensory and aesthetic perception’, one could understand why, Pächt thought, iconology should seek foundation in ‘areas of research that rely largely on written sources and consequently seem to promise a greater measure of objectivity — or, at least, greater opportunities for rational formulation’. Nonetheless, since ‘artists’ own statements, however honestly meant’ about their work (and we might add — about their intentions as well) ‘are not a reliable guide’, the result is that ‘there is rarely proof positive of a connection between the visual evidence and a concept derived from a written source’, so ultimately ‘interpreters find themselves venturing onto ground far shakier than the terrain of stylistic phenomena ever was’. Pächt’s critical analysis of iconology thus leads to the belief that a stylistic analytical approach is both more appropriate given the nature of visual arts and also a more reliable method for art history research. This does not of course mean that Pächt denies iconography any kind of role in the historical interpretation of art. His critique simply relativises iconography’s (iconology’s) claim to a primary role and to total validity. Pächt supposed that the main aim of ‘iconography and iconology’ was not to ‘hunt for ... textual reference’, but to teach ‘us what knowledge we need to have in our minds when we look at historic works of art’ in order ‘to reactivate whatever was spontaneously known at the relevant historical moment’. In other words, ‘we need iconography’ so that we can ‘acquire these unfamiliar visual habits’ and see works of art ‘in the right light’.

Credo of Sensualism

Otto Pächt and Albert Kutal did not base their epistemological credo or their ontology of art on Platonic, neo-Platonic or neo-Kantian pillars but on nominalism, empiricism and sensualism. Picking up on Burckhardt’s belief that ‘If one could render in words “the profoundest thought, the idea of a work of art”, then art would be superfluous, and the work in question might as well have remained unbuilt, uncarved, unpainted’, the two critics of iconology stressed that visual art is irreplaceable, autonomous and specific. They defended the non-discursive and unique nature of works of visual art, highlighting their everlasting artistic quality or aesthetic value and the historical origins in which it comes about.

As we know, Pächt subscribed to sensualism, provocatively announcing: ‘In the beginning was the eye’
(‘Am Anfang war das Auge’). At first glance this might seem to boldly challenge the Old Testament’s ‘In the beginning was the word...’. However, Pächt’s full credo read: ‘I am convinced that, where the history of art is concerned, in the beginning was the eye, not the word’.118 It is thus clear that Pächt’s belief in the primacy of visual perception applied only to the visual art and its history. It was not a slippery slope to an extreme form of sensualism or a belief in the ‘innocent eye’. He adopted this insight from the ‘modern psychology of perception’ which holds that ‘there is no such thing as seeing without prior knowledge: there is, as it were, no innocent eye’,109 because ‘vision always incorporates knowledge; and this knowledge functions as a pair of spectacles’ through which we look.110 In other words, ‘we see with knowing eyes’, insofar as our eyes are ‘organs with earlier experiences built into them’.111 Despite recognising the importance of convention and stereotype in the history of the creative arts, Pächt did not adopt a position of extreme-conventionalism such as that pursued by Ernst Gombrich. This was because, as Pächt argued, he absolutised the ‘continuity of formal conventions’,112 narrowing art history down to the ‘transmission of formulas’,113 and consequently, ignoring ‘what is truly creative in those artists ... their originality’,114 and thus turning art history into a mere ‘history of copying’.115 Pächt may indeed have considered the ‘eye’, which is the source of every piece of visual art, to have been shaped by previous ‘habits of seeing and thinking’,116 but he also considered it to be a creative eye, not simply in relation to form, but also in relation to content. In this regard he relied, just as Kutal had, upon Wilhelm Dilthey’s claim, applied to art history by Max Dvořák in his Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte (1924), that articulating worldviews is not the exclusive concern of discursive thought.117

In contrast to the epistemological individualism that rejected the historical evolution of art and absolutised the creative independence of geniuses (promulgated by Benedetto Croce and, following in his footsteps, Julius von Schlosser118), and in contrast to conventionalism, which only allows for variations in scheme and stereotype (even in the work of geniuses) (as Ernst Gombrich believed),119 Pächt was convinced that the evolutionary approach would help avoid the following dilemma: is there a free genius transcending all ties or a kind of superhuman development in which the individual creator merely exercises anonymous will or evolutionary direction?120 Pächt thought this dilemma might be overcome by introducing the concepts of ‘formal opportunity’ (Formgelegenheit), the ‘fulfilment of a brief’, (Aufgabenlösung),121 ‘an evolutionary tendency’ (Entwicklungstendenz), and a ‘sense of direction’ (Richtungssinn).122 They would help us see the history of art as an innovative process, and the great artist’s role within that process as creative, as executing an internal evolutionary direction having grasped the opportunity evolution presents — that of a ‘historic task’ to be fulfilled. This historic task or ‘brief’ supplies the link between individual and general evolution; between the style of the individual work and the style of its period; and ultimately between artistic creativity and the continuum of events in which it is embedded.123

It should be noted that Albert Kutal, unlike Otto Pächt, did not explicitly articulate his art history credo. Faced with the fact that visual art eludes verbal articulation or, as Jacob Burckhardt put it, ‘The internal life of the style of a work of art can never be aptly transcribed, only described’,124 Kutal deliberately avoided explicitly theorising on the subject. But, despite sticking consistently to his principle that ‘if we are going to start questioning the sense of art it is bad’,125 and his belief that theoretical generalisation always risks distorting the reality, he let his pupils talk him into privately looking at the theoretical basis of his research (‘Kunsthistorik’). In contrast to Pächt, he consciously avoided mapping out theoretical problems in detail.126

Kutal openly subscribed to the traditions of nominalism, empiricism and sensualism, saying: ‘What isn’t in the eye [in the senses], isn’t in the mind either’,127 which is not to deny its British (Scottish) inspiration. His statement is reminiscent of David Hume’s point that ‘All our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent’.128 Kutal’s statement, cited earlier, that ‘A work of art is something quite specific; words are conventions’129 also has its roots in late medieval nominalism. Ultimately, Kutal expressed the opinion that the enduring aesthetic value of a work of art was the most reliable empirical underpinning of art history analysis, saying, as we have noted, that ‘An artwork from the 15th century, let’s say, forever keeps its singularity’.130

However, although Kutal distrusted explicit theory since he thought it distorted the complex and unique nature of reality, this did not mean he completely rejected the idea of conceptual generalisation. In contrast to the idealistic axiom that concrete phenomena are simply ideas that have been specified or emanated, he thought that generalising particular reality into conceptual categories, despite all its imperfections, was an essential tool for making rigorous study. Agreeing with Pächt, and following in the footsteps of Riegl, he believed that it was possible to generalise into conceptual terms, mastering reality through works of art. In this respect, Pächt stated that ‘if art history is ever to be a scholarly discipline’, it not only has to voluntarily ‘base all its statements on specified criteria’ (Vorweisen von Kriterien) and ‘give reasons for all its insights and discoveries’ (Begründen aller Einsichten), but it also has to ‘formulate its insights and discoveries in conceptual terms’.131 By conducting a formal and structural analysis of art investigating the relationship between figure and space, volume and movement, form and expression, the vertical and horizontal, body and clothing, light and shadow, or the plane of a picture and the space projected onto it, the two anti-iconological empiricists sought to capture
the either structure of development, the evolutionary chain or the structure of the work of art and the fundamental ‘principles of design’ upon which it was based.

**Continuity and constants**

Despite being loyal to empiricism, and having a respect for detail and a principled inductive approach to works of art, Pächt and Kutal supposed the existence of superindividual art historical entities. Pächt looked for structures that went beyond the individual work of art, the structural invariants and constants. Kutal searched for the evolutionary continuity that was the basis of the uniqueness of the artistic organism. By ascertaining the genealogical links and evolutionary relationships between works of art, he discovered local or regional schools of art, evolutionary series and chains, which together formed the structure of evolution and led to the establishment of a domestic art tradition. The concept of evolutionary continuity, conceived of by the main representatives of the Vienna School as evidence of the universality of art history and as a tool for rational causality-based art history knowledge, was transformed, in the hands of the Pächt and Kutal, into proof of the existence of a particular national or nation-state artistic entity. The vanishing point of Kutal’s art history research was the reconstruction of domestic evolutionary continuity as the result of the ‘active assimilation of foreign stimuli’ and composed of a number of evolutionary chains. He saw it as proof of the relative autonomy of the artistic organism.

Pächt was concerned to establish the design principles (‘Gestaltungsprinzipien’) which not only formed the basis of individual works of art or the life work of individual artists but which, he thought, created the nuts and bolts of a particular national art history entity, the structural core of ‘driving force’ of the national art history constant and its ‘meaningful evolution’. Despite the fierce penetrating criticism by Meyer Schapiro and other art historians, Pächt brushed aside the objection that constants are metaphysical personifications of abstract concepts or spiritualist hypostases. He remained convinced that national constants are true, scientifically verifiable artistic structures. These historical invariants, he believed, had to be understood as dynamic entities. They should be identified directly in the artwork and in the evolutionary series using a strictly inductive method and not externally introduced into the art and its evolution as the nationalist and racist theory of constants had done.

**The modesty of knowledge**

Both Pächt and Kutal were undoubtedly epistemological optimists. They were convinced that empiricism of the senses, the reconstruction of evolutionary causality and an empirical-based conceptual generalisation were the reliable foundations of art history knowledge. Nonetheless, both were fully aware of its hypothetical character. As Kutal pointed out: “It concerns knowledge of the past as it was; even though we know that it is impossible to capture it.” And “So long as it only concerns hypotheticality ... there is a certain truth to it, if it considers hypothesis to be a state of knowing that does not guarantee absolute certainty. But often art history simply has to rely on a semblance of truth. What we are concerned with here is the degree of probability.”

Pächt also accentuated the hypothetical nature of art history knowledge and the associated need for verification. However, he considered the evolutionary genealogical method to be ‘the most reliable test’ in art history research even if it were not the only legitimate approach. This epistemological caution or modesty was perhaps also why, when summarising his lifelong methodological principles and beliefs, he was not interested in developing a ‘true’ art history method as Hans Tietze had been in his time. It may also explain why he did not strive for an authoritarian theory of art history as Hans Sedlmayr had done, and why he did not attempt to produce a scholarly theory as had Kurt Badt.

Pächt’s lectures, *Methodisches zur kunsthistorischen Praxis*, were deliberately not intended to be a collection of uncontested truths or as a compendium of binding rules and principles. They were simply conceived of as a methodological guide as to how to most reliably conduct art history research. In this respect, Pächt followed Dvořák’s approach as articulated in his essay, ‘Über die dringendsten methodischen Erfordernisse der Erziehung zur kunstgeschichtlichen Forschung’.

Continuity and constants were not only key methodological categories but were also characteristic elements in the investigative road taken by Otto Pächt and Albert Kutal. The two representatives of structural-genealogical art historiography remained loyal to the evolutionary approach throughout their professional careers. No turn emerged to cast doubt on their methodological constancy; there was nothing to rupture the continuity of their research paths. The paths they chose led to a systematic and continual increase in knowledge, to an increasingly synthesised perspective and to a continually expanding research area.

**Coda**

It is forty years since Pächt and Kutal engaged in a debate against iconology. Today one might be surprised to find parallels, and at times consensus, in the methodological approaches of the two art history professors from Vienna and Brno, who lived for many years on either side of the ‘Iron Curtain’. However, the two scholars are not just linked through the common genetic source of their research methods (the legacies of Alois Riegl and Max Dvořák to which they loyally adhered and developed), they were also related generationally. Their experiences of classical modern art informed their formalist and
structuralist conception of works of art and the way in which they saw the evolution of art as the process of constant innovations. It was through these lenses that they viewed medieval art. Their response to the political instrumentalisation of art under totalitarian regimes, both fascist and communist alike, gave rise to their deep mistrust of all idea-based and ideological conceptions of art and their consistent emphasis on art autonomy. Clearly, Otto Pächt and Albert Kutal were able to reconcile these artistic and political projections with the scholarly knowledge and use them to its favour.153

TRANSLATION FROM SLOVAK BY CATRIONA MENZIES

NOTES

1 This article was written on the 110th anniversary of the birth of Albert Kutal and the centenary of the publication of Dvořák’s article, Über die dringendsten methodischen Erfordernisse der Erziehung zur kunstgeschichtlichen Forschung. Part of the Slovak version of this article will be published in a volume commemorating the 70th birthday of Kutal’s disciple, Antonín Dušek.

2 Die Geisteswissenschaften, Band 1, Leipzig 1913–1914, Heft 34, 35.

3 Dvořák’s article was published in Jaromír Pečírka (ed.), Dějiny umění jako dějiny ducha, Prague 1936, as O nejnáležávejších metodických problémech ve výchově k uměleckohistorickému badání, pp. 187–205.

4 Wiener Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte XXVII, 1974, p. 7: ‘… grösste Aktualität und programmatiche Bedeutung’.


8 Ibidem, pp. 13–14. On the issue of the relationship between art history and cultural history, Dvořák relied completely on Alois Riegls view: ‘Diesen Zusammenhang zwischen bildender Kunst und Weltanschauung im einzelnen nachzuweisen, wäre nun nicht die Sache des Kunsthistorikers, sondern diejenige … des vergleichenden Kulturhistorikers.’ Alois Riegl, Naturwerk und Kunstwerk I (1901), in: Alois Riegl, Gesammelte Aufsätze, Augsburg — Wien 1929, p. 63. Riegl based his view on the premise that the relationship between art and contemporary worldviews was based on parallelism: ‘… die bildende Kunst (ist) zwar nicht durch die jeweilige gleichzeitige Weltanschauung determiniert, wohl aber mit ihr schlechtweg parallel läuft.’ (Ibidem) In Dvořák’s conception of art history as the history of ideas (‘Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte’), this dualistic notion was later superseded by a monistic one (that of expressing a worldview through art).

9 In the late 1920s, Russian literary critic Jurij Tynjanov expressed a similar opinion on the development of literature, albeit within the perspective of literary history: ‘A literary series system is above all a system of the functions of a literary series in continual mutual relation with other series,’ Jurij Tynjanov, O literarnom vývine, in: Mikuláš Bačok (ed.), Teória literárity: Výber z ‘formálnej metódy’, Bratislava 1971, p. 143.

10 Max Dvořák, Das Rätsel der Kunst der Brüder van Eyck, München 1925, p. 14: ‘Jede geschichtliche Bildung ist ein Glied einer bestimmten geschichtlichen Entwicklungskette und bedingt durch die vorangehenden Bildungen derselben Materie — so lautet die Voraussetzung und der Berechtigungstitel der modernen exakten Wissenschaft…’


14 Dvořák (note 7), p. 17: ‘die stilgeschichtliche Betrachtung zur wichtigsten Quelle der kunstgeschichtlichen Kritik und Erklärung erhaben …, wodurch
das Prinzip der genetischen Geschichtsaussage auch darauf übertragen wurde'.

15 Ibidem, p. 19: ‘Die Ausbildung einer eigenen, in ihren Aufgaben und Beweisen prägnant begründeten und exakten stilgeschichtlichen Methode auf historischer Grundlage, nicht nur als notwendigen Korrektiv aller kritischen Untersuchungen, sondern auch als der Voraussetzung aller kunstgeschichtlichen Forschungen, die über die kritische Zusammenstellung und Ordnung der Denkmäler hinausgehen.’


20 Pächt (note 13), pp. 304–305: ‘… das äußерordentliche nicht ausserhalb der Kausalität stehend erscheinen Lassen.’

21 Ibidem, p. 304: ‘… eine Distanzverringerung zu den Vorstufen.’

22 Ibidem, p. 61: ’… der allmählichen, schrittweisen Evolution.’


24 Ibidem, p. 61: ‘… den Gedanken der Kontinuität retten zu müssen.’

25 Ibidem: ‘… den Sprung hinwegzuintepretieren.’

26 Ibidem: ‘… die Immanenz der kunstgeschichtlichen Erklärungsweise nicht aufrecht halten zu können.’

27 Ibidem: ‘… ein ziemlich grober Flickungsversuch.’


30 Ibidem: ‘… fundamentale Wandlung der Gestaltungsprinzipien.’

31 Ibidem, p. 63: ‘Die vorangegangene Entwicklung bleibt Voraussetzung, aber nicht so, dass das Neue aus ihr als zwangläufiges Produkt hervorgeht, sondern als Disposition zu neuen Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten.’


35 Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 225: ‘Gelingt die Einordnung in eine genetische Reihe … dann können wir unseren Befund mit gutem Gewissen als verifiziert ansehen.’ ‘— Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 61: ‘If we can manage to locate the work within a genealogical sequence … then we can safely regard our findings as verified.’


38 Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 298: ‘… die Immanenz der kunstgeschichtlichen Erklärungsweise nicht aufrecht halten zu können.’

39 Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 298: ‘… das Äusserordentliche nicht ausserhalb der Kausalität stehend erscheinen Lassen.’

40 Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 298: ‘… die Ausbildung einer eigenen, in ihren Aufgaben und Beweisen prägnant begründeten und exakten stilgeschichtlichen Methode auf historischer Grundlage, nicht nur als notwendigen Korrektiv aller kritischen Untersuchungen, sondern auch als der Voraussetzung aller kunstgeschichtlichen Forschungen, die über die kritische Zusammenstellung und Ordnung der Denkmäler hinausgehen.’

41 It is true that Albert Kural did not explicitly distinguish between art history and cultural history in his writing; however, he did not hide
this belief in his teaching. He considered the emergence of new genres of art to be the exclusive realm of the cultural history of art.


44 See Panofsky (note 42), Reality and Symbol in Early Flemish Painting 'Spiritualia sub metaphoris corporalium', p. 131, onwards: '… concealed or disguised symbolism as opposed to open or obvious symbolism,' p. 141.


47 Pacht (note 46), p. 276: 'the creative act is placed on the level of consciousness and is imagined to be of non-intuitive nature … its ultimate aim being no longer to understand the philosophy embodied by, and implicit in, the visual form, but to discover the theological or philosophical preconceptions that lie behind it.'

48 Ibidem: 'Not the "documentary significance" of the phenomenon is shown, but a meaning is revealed that was consciously imparted to it by the artist. If, however, this intentional meaning is at the same time a deliberately concealed one, iconographic analysis inevitably develops into a kind of decoding.'


51 Ibidem.

52 Ibidem.

53 Ibidem. Pacht spoke of an acute need 'for reassessment of the mutual relationship of iconographic and stylistic approach and for synchronization of their methods.'

54 Ibidem: '… one implying a rational, the other an irrational structure.'

55 Ibidem: 'I fail to see how they can be co-ordinated if each is based on a different notion of the nature of artistic creation and each claims it can seize the very essence of the artistic phenomenon and grasp it in its totality.' On these, see Ján Bakóš, Einige Kritiken der Ikonologie und Albert seizes the very essence of the artistic phenomenon and grasp it in its totality.


57 Białostocki (note 45), pp. 769–785.

58 Białostockis intention was perhaps to bring the two opposite approaches closer together, as he himself had tried to do in his own work. See Jan Białostocki, Stil und Ikonographie: Studien zur Kunstwissenschaft, Dresden 1966.

59 Stil und Überlieferung in der Kunst des Abendlandes (note 56), pp. 239–262.

60 Pacht (note 56), p. 262. Pacht included iconology within iconography: 'Unter Ikonographie verstehe ich hier auch die zur Ikonologie aufgewertete Inhaltsexegese, soweit sie sich mit gedanklichen Konzepten befasst,' p. 271.

61 Ibidem, p. 263: '… ein radikaler Wandel in den Anschauungen vom Wesen und Wert der künstlerischen Schöpfung.'

62 Ibidem: '… diese intellektualistische Anschauung vom Wesen des Kunstwerks.'

63 Ibidem: '[Man ist] stillschweigend davon überzeugt, dass jedes hervorrangende Kunstwerk im Grunde eine Manifestation bedeutender Gedanken … darstelle, die der Künstler bewusst in seine Schöpfung eingebaut und die deshalb rational formulierbar und ikonographisch erfassbar sind.'

64 Ibidem: '[Man kam] auf den Gedanken, das Wesen künstlerischer Originalität in ikonographischen Neuerungen zu suchen oder sich künstlerische Neuschöpfung automatisch mit ikonographischer Neuerung zuvorzustellen.'

65 Ibidem, p. 271.

66 Ibidem, pp. 264–270. He cited Giotto’s frescoes in Padua (the Arena Chapel) and the Mèrode Altarpiece by the Master of Flémalle as proof of this.

67 Ibidem, pp. 271, 263: Since there was no inevitable connection between ‘von künstlerischer Grosse und ikonographischer Originalität’, ‘der Anspruch von Ikonologie und Symbolgeschichte, einen Zugang zum Kern des künstlerischen Phänomens zu bieten, wohl kaum zu Recht besteht.’

68 Ibidem, p. 271: ‘… endlich die Grenzen der Ikonographie zu erkennen.’

69 Ibidem, p. 271: ‘… diese wichtige Disziplin /hat/ legitim nur die gedankliche Vor-stellung, den Vor-wurf zu ihrem Gegenstand.’


71 Otto Pächt, Alois Riegl, in: idem, Methodisches (note 33) p. 150, talks of ‘the realm of originality — of true art’. However, it should be noted that the iconological concept of the historicity of art was not based on the premise of permanent innovation but on emphasizing tradition as the decisive dimension of art history, which ranges from survival to revival. On the iconological conception of history, see Jan Białostocki (note 45), pp. 779–780.

In relation to Riegels interpretation of works of art Benjamin Binstock states as follows: Riegl does not approach artworks as a means to convey a message (what), but interprets the cultural and historical content of formal or visual elements (how). Benjamin Binstock, Alois Riegls, Monumental Ruin: Why We Still Need to Read Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts, in: Alois Riegls, Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts, New York 2004, p. 20. — In Wood, Introduction (note 18), p. 35, Christopher Wood considers Riegl’s and Dvořák’s conception of the relationship between form and content, that is, the identification of the internal meaning inherent in form as intuitive. He refers to Riegls ‘intuitionism’ and states that any cultural analysis grounded in formal analysis will have to rely at some point on intuitive links between form and world. In his opinion, Pächt, as a representative of the ‘New Vienna School’, following Riegls, found entire world-views crystallized in pictorial structure. Wood, Introduction (note 18), p. 10. — Hans Aurenhammer, Max Dvořák (1874–1921), in: Ulrich Rosenauer, Otto Pächt — Bemerkungen zu seinen frühen Schriften, Braunštejn, Bratislava 2000, pp. 69–107. Thus it is logical that Kutal was also the author of books on two Czech cubist painters: Antonín Procházka, Praha 1959 and Jaroslav Král, Praha 1962.

73 Albert Kutal, Umschlag zum Artikel: ‘St Thomas’ Pietà’, which was the first ‘horizontal’ type: ‘What it characterises in a particularly striking way is the enclosed mass of the two bodies, lying motionless as if torn from the passage of time. The bulky figure of Mary towers above upright and alone, eye contact the only connection with her son. The two solitary masses are simply placed together and suddenly the main lines come together. Mary’s head is disproportionately large … There is something in the face that is suggestive of the Madonna in the parish church in Žebrák. However, it is more powerful in expression and also more Italian … The shape of her eyes could of course have come about through Czech painting from around mid-century … His [Christ’s] head with Parléř’s half-open mouth is similar in arrangement to that of the statue on the Bridge Tower … its importance for the history of Czech sculpture has yet to be appreciated.’ Ibidem, pp. 83–84.

76 Kutal, ibidem. This time Kutal described the Pietà at the Church of St Thomas in Brno thus: ‘St Thomas’ Pietà is the most notable example of the “horizontal type” that emerged in Parléř’s Brno or Prague circles and then spread rapidly … This was the great achievement of Parléř’s sculptures — that in contrast to the “vertical” type … he constructed a new type, thereby achieving a correspondence between art and the material world. The perfectly balanced vertical of Mary’s figure and the horizontal of Christ’s figure, the enclosed mass, precise, being a magnificently simply description of body parts … using strict geometric planning together create a completely self-sufficient artistic organism … The geometric outline, based on precise squares and predominantly right angles, expresses the material earthliness of the story … and the way it is bound to the conditions of the material world and yet contributes to its representative character, torn from the passage of time and therefore static.’ Ibidem, pp. 108–109.


78 According to Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 249: ‘die bildende Kunst [kann] … in ihrem Medium Dinge sagen, die in keinem anderen Ausdrucksbereich gesagt werden können. … die Aufdeckung von Inspirationsquellen ausserhalb der bildenden Kunst, etwa der sprachlichen, [kann] das Spezifische der künstlerischen Schöpfung nie erhehlen ’ because the specificity of a work of art ‘liegt‘ primär im bildkünstlerischen Medium, … in ihr gewachsenen Gestaltungen, der Wortsprache fremden Neuformungen.’ — Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 84: ‘visual art … can say things in its own medium that cannot be said in any other. … the discovery of sources of inspiration outside visual art — in word-based art forms for instance — can never illuminate the specific quality of artistic creation. What is more, it is perfectly possible to conceive of new formal creations that arise and grow within the medium of the visual image: new formulations, alien to the language of words.’ Kutal believed that ‘A work of art is something quite specific; words are inventions.’ See Bakoš, Štýri trasy (note 72), p. 69.

79 See note 33.

80 Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 264, talks of ‘Die totale Intellektualisierung des Kunstwerks, die das Bild für eine Bilderschrift nimmt’. — Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 100: ‘By treating the image as a pictograph, the writer can totally intellectualize the work of art…’


Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 236: ‘... die Kunswerke ... seien nicht ... der Ausdruck einer Idee oder Ihre Einkleidung, sondern Ihre Verkleidung.’ — Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 71. — Iconology, according to Pächt, Methodisches, p. 249, situates ‘... das Operieren der künstlerischen Einbildungskraft vollkommen in die Zone des Bewussten und rational Intendierten.’ — Idem, The Practice, p. 85: ‘... to relegate the operations or effects of the artistic imagination entirely to the zone of conscious, rational intent.’

Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 249: ‘... die hervorragendsten Schöpfungen /sind reduziert/ zu visuellen Einkleidungen von Philosophen, zu Ideogrammen, zu Symbolisierungen rationaler Sinngehalte.’ — Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 85: ‘... to present the most outstanding creations of pictorial art as visual aids for the presentation of philosophemes; to make them into ideograms, symbolizations of rationally definable meanings.’


Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 236: ‘Die Kunsthistoriker ... Enthüller von okkulten Dingen.’ — Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 71. ‘Art historians are at hand to lift that artfully woven veil: their true function and mission is as the revealers of occult things.’


Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 237: ‘Kunst ist hier Gedankeneinkleidung zum Zweck der leichteren Kommunikation oder schnelleren Verbreitung, ist Mittel zum Zweck, nicht Selbstzweck... Die Rolle, die Kunst nach dieser Auffassung spielt ... kommt ... nahe ... bis zur Degradierung zum Propagandamittel.’ — Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 72: ‘It is a means to an end, not an end in itself ... it dwindles into a means of propaganda.’

Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 237: ‘erschöpft sich die raison d’etre künstlerischer Schöffens in der Erfüllung gefälliger und darum wirksamer Formen der Ideenvermittlung, dann ... könnte Kunstgeschichte ... als Spezialgebiet einer umfassenden Semantik oder Symbolforschung [betrieben werden], es kann dann aber keine autonome Kunstwissenschaft oder Kunstgeschichte mehr geben, sie wäre nur noch als Hilfswissenschaft zulässig...’ — Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 73: ‘If it were true that the raison d’etre of artistic creation is to devise pleasing (and therefore effective) forms in which to convey ideas, then ... art history might be practised as part of the history of ideas, a special case of general semantics or symbology. But there could be no autonomous discipline of art studies or art history. Such an interest would have its place only as an ancillary discipline, serving to sort and sift the raw material for delivery to other fields of study.’

Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 238: ‘Angesichts all dieser Unfestigkeit ist die Verlockung verständlich, von dem schwankenden Grund der sinnlich-ästhetischen Wahrnehmung in Forschungsgebiete auszuweichen, die im wesentlichen mit Schriften operieren und so anscheinend ein höheres Mass von Objektivität oder zumindest von rational Formulierbarkeit versprechen.’ — Pächt, The Practice (note 33), p. 73: ‘In the face of all this uncertainty, there is an understandable temptation to beat a retreat from shaky ground of sensory and aesthetic perception into areas of research that rely largely on written sources and consequently seem to promise a greater measure of objectivity — or, at least, greater opportunities for rational formulation.’


Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 315: ‘Ikonographie ... ist in den letzten Jahren grossartig geworden und stellt als Ikonologie gewisse Herrschaftsansprüche, indem sie behauptet, die entscheidenden Aufschlüsse über den Sinngehalt der Kunstwerke erbringen zu können.’ — Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 141: ‘For iconography, which as late as the beginning of this century was still regarded as an ancillary discipline of art history, has come of age over the last few years and, under the name of iconology, stakes a claim to hegemony by asserting its ability to supply the central insights into the meaning of works of art.’

Pächt, The Practice (note 33) p. 84. — Idem, Methodisches (note 33), p. 248: ‘... die Jagd nach dem Textzitat.’

Pächt, The Practice (note 33), p. 81. — Idem, Methodisches (note 33), p. 246: ‘... die Kenntnis dessen zu verschaffen, was im Sehen historischer Kunstwerke mitwesentlich werden muss. Wir brauchen Ikonographie zur Relativierung des in dem betreffen historischen Moment spontan Geweissenen.’


Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 268: ‘Wissen um Formkonventionen, um ikonographische Konventionen müssten erarbeitet werden, damit wir das Kunstwerk in der richtigen Optik sehen.’ — Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 104: ‘the formal and iconographical conventions that we need to know about before we can see the work in the right light...’

Pächst thus completed his structuralist premise of a timelessly valid, objective approach suited to the structure of the work of art ‘adäquate Einstellung’, Pächt, Methodisches, p. 233, translated into English as an ‘ideal approach’, idem, The Practice, p. 69 and indirectly accepted the iconologist objection that a formal (and one might add structural) analysis rests on a metaphorical conception of form and perception. It seems this was the reason Pächt admitted that iconology had a role.
to play in complementing the structural genetic method. See Günther Bandmann’s critique of the ahistorical or presentist view of art in formal analysis in his Das Kunstwerk als Gegenstand der Universalgeschichte, *Fahrtrichter für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, Bd. 7, 1962, pp. 152–155.


103 Pächt, *Methodisches* (note 33), p. 249, refers to visual art as ‘autonome Ausdrucksphäre.’ — Idem, *The Practice* (note 33), p. 84: ‘... is spoken of as an “autonomous expressive sphere.”’


105 In the words of Albert Kutil: ‘An art work from the 15th century, let’s say, forever keeps its singularity.’ See Bakoš, Štyri trasy (note 72), p. 69.

106 Pächt, *Methodisches* (note 33), Vorwort: ‘Den meiner Überzeugung nach gilt für die Geschichte der Kunst: Am Anfang war das Auge, nicht das Wort.’ — Idem, *The Practice* (note 33), Preface, p. 7: ‘For I am convinced that, where the history of art is concerned, in the beginning was the eye, not the word.’


123 Bakoš, Štyri trasy (note 72), p. 69.


125 Bakoš, Štyri trasy (note 72), p. 69. The noticeable similarity in the credos of Kutil and Päch did not arise because one borrowed from the other, but because they developed in parallel owing to a common intellectual genealogy (i.e. sensualism). Kutil made his statement in 1973, while, although Pächt articulated his credo in his 1970–1971 university lectures, it was not published until 1977.


127 Bakoš, Štyri trasy (note 72) p. 69.

128 Ibidem.

129 Pächt, *Methodisches* (note 33), p. 231: ‘Will die Kunstgeschichte eine Wissenschaft sein, so muss sie aber ausnahmslos auf dem Vorwissen von Kriterien, dem Begründen aller Einsichten und Erkenntnisse sowie auf ihrer begrifflichen Formulierung bestehen.’ — Idem, *The Practice* (note 33), p. 67: ‘All the same, if art history is ever to be a scholarly discipline at all, it really must base all its statements on specified criteria. It must give reasons for all its insights and discoveries, and it must formulate them in conceptual terms.’


131 See Kutil’s opus magnum, *České gotické sochařství 1350–1450* (note 75).

132 The main representatives of evolutionary approach who saw continuity as an expression of the universality of art history and as founded on the causal relationship between works of art were Alois Rieg and the young Max Dvořák. In his writing on the art of van Eyck brothers from 1903 (Das Rätsel der Kunst der Bruder van Eyck), Dvořák described the evolutionary relationship as uninterrupted and founded in the affinity between works of art. Like Rieg, he considered this evolutionary relationship to be proof of the rational identifiability of the historical evolution of art. However, by 1913 Dvořák had already (in his review of M. L. Gothein’s Geschichte der Gartenkunst, note 12) radically altered his previous conception. The notion of linear development was replaced with one of the plurality of different genetic series, which could occur in parallel, cross over or even return to previous stages, so the idea of...
unitary evolution was possible ‘only from a great historical distance’. (See note 12.) Thus Dvořák cast doubt on the very existence and ontological nature of evolutionary continuity. In the early 1930s Otto Pächt revised Dvořák’s original idea of continuity by introducing the notion of ‘internal affinity’, where similarity and external continuity are not determining (Die historische Aufgabe Michael Pachers, Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen I, 1931). Internal affinity is seen as an evolutionary tendency (‘Entwicklungstendenzen’) relating to the sense of direction (‘Richtungssinn’). (See Pächt, Methodisches (note 33/ pp. 269–270).


134 Milena Bartlová, Nale, národné umenie. Studie z dějin dějepisu umění, Brno 2009, p. 33, reduces Kutal’s interpretation of Czech Gothic art to a nationalistic perspective, reliant on Kutal’s reference to the ‘national psychology of the era’. See Ivo Hlobíl’s critical review of Bartlová’s book in Umění LVIII, 2010, pp. 255–256. — In his synthesis, České gotické umění, Praha 1972, p. 8, Kutal characterises ‘active assimilation’ as the ‘ability to absorb foreign stimuli and transform them into a locally determined specific form’. Kutal considered this ability along with the ‘creation of specific values emanating... into near and distant lands’ as evidence that Gothic art was not imported into ‘the Czech lands’ but emerged as an autonomous artistic organism characterised by its specific nature, internal evolution and moreover an ability to enrich international artistic developments. Hence his proposal that one should speak of ‘Bohemian Gothic art’ rather than of ‘Gothic art in Bohemia’. That Kutal’s conception of a relatively autonomous artistic organism was not nationalistic but state or territorially derived is evidenced in the introductory passage in his synthesis (ibidem, p. 8), in which he characterises the struggle between the Czechs and the Germans on Czech territory as a positive factor in the development of art: ‘This competition also had positive consequences’, and not only ‘in the unusual growth in the spiritual culture of Czech... including the arts’, but also in the fact that ‘the [multinational] cultural milieu that was created was resilient enough to be capable of absorbing foreign stimuli and transforming them into... specifically determined forms.’ Evidence of this was found in the German version of his synthesis of Gothic Kunst in Böhmeln, Prag 1971, p. 7, where the author did not use the term ‘schechische’ but ‘böhmische gotische Kunst’: ‘Der Begriff einer „böhmischen gotischen Kunst“ erfasst... diese Situation eigentlich besser als... Begriff “gotische Kunst in Böhmeln.”’ Thus Kutal used ‘böhmische’ as an adjective to identify a geographical area or state territory. See also Bakoš, Paths and Strategies (note 133), p. 105.


138 Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 228: ‘... diese Konstante oder Invariante (uit) etwas Dynamisches, Lebendiges.’ — Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 124: ‘... this constant, this invariant, is a dynamic, living entity.’

139 Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 299: ‘Man muss die Definition der Konstanten aus den Kunstwerken und den genetischen Reihen, die sie bilden, herausarbeiten, nicht in sie aus anderen Gebieten hineinbringen.’ — Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 136: ‘The definition of the constants must arise from the works themselves, and from the genealogical sequences that they come from; it cannot be imported from other fields.’ Despite this statement, it is not altogether clear whether Pächt tended more towards a ‘nominalist’ or an essentialist conception of constants. Or whether he saw constants (as a common ‘Gestaltungsprinzip’ of a national artistic entity, such as Austrian Gothic panel painting) in the sense of a territorial tradition that underwent gradual formation (i.e. as in the wider sense of a geographic ‘school’), or as a stable creative principle, which basically belongs to ‘is inherent in’ a particular national community (nation-state)!. In relation to Pächt’s conception of constants, Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann notes in his Toward a Geography of Art, Chicago 2004, p. 82, that: ‘Otto Pächt demonstrates that one can believe in national constants without subscribing to racial explanations for them.’ Compared to this Kutal’s understanding of constants is clearly ‘nominalist’: The constant of ‘Bohemian Gothic art’ is founded in evolutionary continuity, which not only develops from each work of art, but also gradually becomes particular to the domestic (regional) tradition. This then affects further occurrences. Moreover in Kutal’s theory, as already stated (note 134), he is concerned not with an ethnic but with a territorial state definition of an artistic entity.


141 Bakoš, Štyri trasy (note 72), p. 69.


143 Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), pp. 202–203: ‘... jede wissenschaftliche These, also auch jede Stilerklärung oder Bildinterpretation ist zunächst nur eine Hypothese, und auf ihre wissenschaftliche Haltbarkeit überprüft werden muss.’ — Idem, The Practice (note 33): ‘I said earlier that any scholarly thesis... begins as no more than a hypothesis and has to be tested to determine its validity.’

144 Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 196: ‘Das wissenschaftliche Verhalten unterscheidet sich nun von blass privaten Meinungsbildungen und Äußerungen dadurch, dass es die Verifizierung aufgestellter Hypothesen als unabdingliche Pflicht betrachtete.’ — Idem, The Practice (note 33), p. 30: ‘The rigorous approach, both in the natural sciences and in the humanities, differs from the formulation and enunciation of purely private opinions in that it implies an absolute obligation to verify hypotheses once stated.’

For Otto Pächt this was a road leading from Österreichische Malerei der Gotik (Augsburg 1929) and his pioneering Die historische Aufgabe Michael Fachers (1931) and Gestaltungsprinzipien der westlichen Malerei des 15. Jahrhunderts (1933, see footnote) to his knowledgeable Aufgabe Michael Pachers (1931) and Gestaltungsprinzipen der westlichen Tafelmalerei der Gotik, Hamburg 1958. This distinct difference in the perspectives held by Pächt and Sedlmayr was pointed out in Rosanower, Zum Gedenken (note 19), p. 6.


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Addenda


138 Pächt, Methodisches (note 33), p. 228: ‘… diese Konstante oder Invariante (ist) etwas Dynamisches, Lebendiges.’ — Idem, The Practice. In 1934 (see a letter to Meyer Schapiro, 4 October 1934) Otto Pächt defined ‘national constants’ as follows: ‘This constant factor … is a kind of common ideal that the artists have in vague forms in their minds. This ideal more or less consciously guides the formation process … and gives the impetus for further development.’ (Persinger, note 137). Consequently, Pächt conceived of ‘national constants’ as transpersonal artistic intentions i.e. identical to Riegl’s national ‘Kunstwollen’ (e.g. ‘holländisches Kunstwollen’).


153 In this respect as well, Pächt and Kutal were loyal followers of the Vienna School. While the iconologists considered the projection of modernity onto the history of art to be a distorting presentism, ‘falsifying historical sources’ (see Bandmann /note 101/, 152), representatives of the Vienna School considered it to be a legitimate and constructive epistemological resource, a means of ‘opening up one’s eyes’ to the values of old art that had gone unnoticed. (See Max Dvořák’s lectures Geschichte der abendländischen Kunst des Mittelalters (1917/18): ‘Es ist eine alte Bindenwahrheit, dass die Gegenwartskunst uns (...) die Augen für die künstlerischen Absichten der Vergangenheit öffnet.’ Quoted according to Hans H. Aurenhammer, ‘Max Dvořák und die Revision der Mittelalter-Kunstgeschichte’ in: Die Etablierung und Entwicklung des Faches Kunstgeschichte in Deutschland, Polen und Mitteleuropa, ed. Wojciech Balus & Joanna Wolanśka, Warszawa 2010, 300.) In this respect, Jeremy Tanner stated: ‘Where Panofsky saw contemporary artistic inclinations as potentially distorting our understanding of the art of the past … Riegl sees affinities and tensions with the art of the past rooted in contemporary taste as being the very condition of productive engagement with the past.’ Jeremy Tanner, Karl Mannheim and Alois Riegl, ‘From Art History To The Sociology Of Culture’, Art History, 32 (4), September 2009, 760. As we know, it was impressionism that enabled Franz Wickhoff to rehabilitate the optical values of late antiquity and expressionism enabled Max Dvořák to discover Mannerism. Indeed, even Alois Riegl, despite his being aware of the impossibility of achieving his ideal of an impartial art historian with no sense of taste owed his ability to appreciate the ornamental values of late Roman and early medieval art to Jugendstil and Secessionism. While for Wickhoff and Dvořák, projecting contemporary art onto old art meant gaining an awareness through affinity, for Riegl it was not just about awareness through affinity but also about projecting difference. Margaret Olin in Forms of Representation in Alois Riegl’s Theory of Art, Pennsylavnia 1992, 171–172, characterises Riegl’s model of art history knowledge as a ‘dialogue with the past’ based on ‘the disjunction between his [Riegl’s] historical position as a subjective modern and his speaking position as an advocate of objectivity.’ Julius von Schlosser noted that the representatives of the Vienna School projected modernity in their investigations into art history in his Die Wiener Schule der Kunstgeschichte, Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung, Ergänzungs-Band Innsbruck 1934 XIII, H.2, 117, 189, 199–200. On the relationship between the Vienna School and modern art trends, see Edwin Lachnit, Die Wiener Schule der Kunstgeschichte und die Kunst ihrer Zeit, Wien — Köln — Weimar 2005.