

Lived and grasped experience in the aesthetics of Lars-Ivar Ringbom

Jan-Ivar Lindén

This essay is about neither the biography of Lars-Ivar Ringbom, including his role as an influential professor in art history and his contributions to Finnish modernism, nor the interesting relation between Lars-Ivar and his no-less influential son Sixten Ringbom, also a professor in art history.¹ Instead, I will focus on the topic mentioned in the title: lived and grasped experience. This thematically elaborated perspective has as its main purpose rendering the aesthetics of Ringbom accessible by stressing the plausible aspects and, in this way, the approach is nourished by what is often called the hermeneutic principle of charity. The older philosophical tradition plays an important role in this context, but at the same time Ringbom's seminal work on *The Battle Concerning Illusion in Painting (Kampen om illusionen i måleriet)*,² published in 1931, is one of the early Scandinavian texts making an original contribution to those currents of thought which were of great importance on the Continent in the first decades of the twentieth century (and that have found a revival in the contemporary interest in phenomenology and questions of embodiment).³ I also stress the parallels between the phenomenological concept of lived experience and central issues in the so-called philosophy of life, represented

¹ Concerning this relation, see Marja Väättäinen, 'From Ringbom to Ringbom: The Art of Art History of Lars-Ivar Ringbom and Sixten Ringbom: A Mythmaker and a Myth-Breaker in Åbo, Finland' *Journal of Art Historiography*, No. 7, December 2012.

² Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Kampen om illusionen i måleriet. Studier i måleriets väsen och utveckling*, Paris: Eithe, 2014 (first edition Helsinki: A. B. F. Tilgmann, 1931).

³ Concerning the phenomenology of embodiment, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, Paris: Gallimard, 1976 and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, Paris: Gallimard, 1964. Within phenomenology Merleau-Ponty is also one of those, who had particularly close connections to the philosophy of life, of which the most famous representative in France was Henri Bergson; see, for example, Henri Bergson, *Matière et mémoire*, Paris: PUF, 2012 and *L'évolution créatrice*, Paris: PUF, 2013. It should also be stressed that Merleau-Ponty was influenced by the forerunners of Bergson, Maine de Biran and Félix Ravaisson, a tradition in which embodiment or incarnation is also a central issue; see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *L'Union de l'âme et du corps, chez Malebranche, Biran et Bergson*, Paris: Vrin, 1968. If Maine de Biran in his philosophical psychology defends a voluntarist reinterpretation of Descartes, Ravaisson takes a quite different direction insofar as he is the main figure of the Aristotelian renaissance in French philosophy in the nineteenth century (cf. Jan-Ivar Lindén, 'Fin, finitude et désir infini. Quelques remarques sur l'aristotélisme de Ravaisson' in *Aristote au XIXe siècle*, Paris: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2004). When it comes to the rediscovery of Aristotle in contemporary philosophical psychology, the literature is vast. For references, see for example Martha C. Nussbaum & Amélie Oksenberg-Rorty, *Essays on De anima*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. The reason for this interest lies to a high degree in the Aristotelian definition of soul which takes the *psychê* as a principle of life present in all animals and even in plants.

by Henri Bergson in France and, for example, Ludwig Klages in Germany, who Ringbom invited to Turku (Åbo).⁴ Thematically there is, however, a more decisive influence from the Hungarian physician and philosopher Menyhért (or Melchior) Palágyi. This is also true for Klages who edited the works of Palágyi after the older colleague died in 1924.

In his *Naturphilosophische Vorlesungen* (1924),⁵ Palágyi offers a theory of consciousness which contests one major assumption in both pragmatist and phenomenological strains of thought, namely the idea that consciousness is a continuous *stream*. Palágyi instead wants to conceive of consciousness as a repetition of completely instantaneous 'intermittent' acts, as flashes enlightening the life process, which itself has no conscious character but only goes on in its vital directedness.⁶ This idea of a certain antagonism between lived and grasped experience is central to Ringbom, and he develops it in relation to aesthetics in both

⁴ The most influential work by Klages, *Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele*, was first published 1929: Ludwig Klages, *Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1981. Concerning the concept of life in the so called philosophy of life, some clarifications are probably useful. When one speaks of German *Lebensphilosophie*, this current of thought combines some insights of classical German Idealism, especially of F. W. J. Schelling, but also of G. W. F. Hegel, with an emphasis on the natural condition of man. This more naturalistic perspective is partly a consequence of the transformation of biology in the nineteenth century, which certainly contributed to the stress on the embodiment of the human being. In the philosophy of life, nature was, however, largely conceived of in the traditional sense of creative nature (*natura naturans*), which in this tradition was called precisely *life*: nature as it *expresses* itself in living beings and in a manner familiar to us in living human beings. This nature should not be confounded with the objective sphere, studied in biology, at least not when it comes to the major representatives of the philosophy of life. Wilhelm Dilthey was well acquainted with Hegel's philosophy and thus, like Hegel, stressed subjectivity, which for Dilthey came to mean incarnated subjectivity. One should not forget that German Idealism had its starting point in the Kantian conception of empirical reality as depending on 'conditions of possibility'. For Immanuel Kant, these conditions are however neither natural nor created by antecedent historical predetermination, but are necessary from a purely 'transcendental' perspective, searching for validity. This presupposition of Kantian thought changed in German Idealism, with Hegel stressing the historical process and Schelling the natural aspects of subjectivity. Keeping this in mind, one can describe the 'life' of the *Lebensphilosophie* as nature working inside us – in experience and in our practical and theoretical undertakings. The life meant is thus not the biological object sphere of a certain natural science. Some confusion around the philosophy of life however stems from the fact that some of the less philosophical and more 'biologistic' currents wanted to generalize precisely the objective results of modern biology and describe all human life in this light (Herbert Spencer). A well-known and rightly ill-reputed outcome of this tendency is so-called social Darwinism. There is little of such a view in Henri Bergson, Wilhelm Dilthey, Georg Simmel, Ludwig Klages, Menyhért Palágyi or Alfred North Whitehead. Neither should these thinkers be confounded with 'vitalist' currents in biology (Hans Driesch, Edouard von Haartmann), which tended to regard nature as an expression of a spiritual, intelligently planning force.

⁵ Melchior Palágyi, *Naturphilosophische Vorlesungen über die Grundprobleme des Bewusstseins und des Lebens*, Leipzig: Barth, 1924.

⁶ Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Kampen om illusionen*, 20.

senses of the word: as theory of perception and as theory of art. The key concept in this context is that of illusion.

An illusion is, in Ringbom's definition, not a hallucination, but a representation of something which does not necessarily fool us (even if being fooled is also possible, as in the famous example, told by Pliny the Elder, of Zeuxis trying to move a painted curtain). Principally illusion is, however, something which is available within a 'third world' of images, with a particular intermediary status between immediate sensing and explicit grasping. The corresponding faculty is imagination, which Ringbom calls in Swedish 'inbildning', to distinguish it from the common expression 'inbillning' which has the connotation of hallucination. What is meant is the capacity of illusion,⁷ the representing faculty of *Einbildungskraft* or *imaginatio*, which makes appearances possible. Our lived experience is constituted by an interplay between sensing and representing, and in every sensual experience there are intermingling images which render the world representable; hence a certain distance opens between somatic sensing and appearance. Thus, lived experience (*upplevelse*) is twofold, partly somatically sensing (*lekamligen förnimmande*) and partly representing through images (*åskådningsbilder*), but in both these cases the process still remains unconscious as is typical for vital phenomena. However, it is the representing capacity that preforms an experiential dimension, making it possible to grasp (*uppfatta*) in explicit perceptual acts. Representative imagination in lived experience is thus a mediating function.

Exactly this relationship is developed further in art. Ringbom's main examples come from painting, and he starts with an analysis of the traditional idea of the figurative representation of a real model, but only to show the limits of this way of describing the creative act. Even in figurative painting there is not necessarily an external motive. A conceptual vision can furnish the material from which to create. Creation can also stem from recollection, as in the case of Wu Tao-tsu who received an imperial order to paint the landscape of Chia-ling but returned without paint rolls and, when asked why, only gestured at his heart – and then in a day painted a whole landscape out of his memory. Ringbom also dwells on the fact that even a painter standing in front of his model, can never regard both the canvas and the model at the same time. For Ringbom it is especially important that even here there must be a mnemonic component. At the same time the necessity of turning the gaze away from the model to the canvas offers an occasion for the realization of more expressive tendencies, some aspects of which are more personal (character and affective states), other shared (artistic manners, world views etc.). However, to bring an image out of the canvas, the painter also has to *do* something, and his expressivity has to be moderated by a voluntary ambition. Perceived images are selected and emphasised and thus transformed into 'directing images' (*förebilder*), but even in this kind of intentional activity nothing could become real without the energy of unconscious strivings. These expressive sources spring forth even when the painter has no intention of showing them, and they permeate his undertakings. Consciousness is thus only a light falling on something which is already going on,

⁷ Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Kampen om illusionen*, 21.

conducted by hidden incentives, and our will is an instance of selecting and stressing.⁸

The expressive functions always remain fundamental. These are essential aspects of being which precede any intentional constitution of noematic contents and, in a decisive way, they contribute to the artistic process. In painting the expressive aspects may sometimes even have the particularity of preventing the representative illusion. On the other hand, successfully perceived illusions tend to render the expressive elements subordinated to representation. The expressed then only figures as a means of transmitting what is to be represented. There is thus a conflict between expression and representation which can, however, never be dissolved and, Ringbom adds, should not be. The aesthetic quality of a work lies exactly in the specific character of this tension.

The tension or 'battle' between representation and expression in art reflects a more general relation between voluntary teleology, with its logic of means and ends, on the one hand, and end-directed vital processes manifested in unconscious strivings, on the other. The instrumental relationship in representative painting means that expressive concretions like colours, lines, and shades are used to represent something intentionally which can *appear* only when the non-intentional concretion *disappears*. (We see a stone in the forest instead of a canvas with expressive coloured patches and lines.)⁹

This indicates a fundamental difference between the expressive and the intentional, which is often overlooked in phenomenological discussions with their stress on a subjective instance constituting its intentional objects, the *noemata*.¹⁰

⁸ This is also a topic in Aristotelian theory of action. A recent anthology is M. Pakaluk and G. Pearson (eds.), *Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

⁹ In a way Ringbom here takes up some motives from both Yrjö Hirn's aesthetics of 'autotelic' expression and the Kantian idea of aesthetic contemplation as an end in itself; but more than these authors, he stresses the crucial importance of the immanent tension between representation and the natural uncontrolled manifestations of expressivity, reflected already in the title of the work *Kampen om illusionen i måleriet* ('The Battle Concerning Illusion in Painting'). Concerning Kant, see *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Hamburg: Meiner, 1970 (first edition 1790) and concerning Hirn, see the references in J.-I. Lindén, *Sinnliga frågor. Om och kring Yrjö Hirn*, Paris: Eithe, 2010. In contrast to the theory of illusion of Konrad Lange, who understood the aesthetic experience as a conscious self-deception, Ringbom stresses that illusion in painting is born through a specific attitude towards colours, forms and shades, which lets them mean something more than just the expressed qualities they are. Lange's theory of conscious self-deception is different in that it regards the shifting between two attitudes as happening between the painting and the model or motive, not as in Ringbom's immanent version, between expressed qualities on the canvas and the illusion they suggest (which does not even presuppose a model or external motive). Konrad von Lange, *Das Wesen der Kunst. Grundzüge einer illusionistischen Kunstlehre*, Berlin: Grote, 1907.

¹⁰ This phenomenological conception is omnipresent in Husserl; see, for example, Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Haag: Nijhoff, 1952. Concerning expression and its role in the philosophy of life, Dilthey is a major reference. See, for example, Wilhelm Dilthey, *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, Gesammelte Schriften VII*, Berlin - Leipzig: Teubner, 1927 and Wilhelm

There is no such constitution of objects in expression as such. In this respect, Husserlian phenomenology still has something to learn from the *Lebensphilosophie*, which Maurice Merleau-Ponty well understood.¹¹ Already, from our behaviour, it is evident that we express more than it is our intention to do and expressivity can in a way be understood as a particular *non-intentional form of meaning*. One can call it *significance*. If so, we are led to assume that the frequent opposition of causal and intentionalist conceptions is insufficient. To understand expressions is neither to explain causal relations nor to dwell on intended meanings, but to sense animated presence. Ringbom conceives this dimension as something essentially adjectival, even if some initial passages suggest a certain confusion between materiality and expressive qualities. What disrupts the teleology of illusion is not the focus on a purely material surface, but on *essential attributes* of colours and forms; something which in our language has its equivalent not in substantives, but in adjectives and in participles used as adjectives. Ringbom's writing style is also marked by this and is rather exceptional in its scientific use of adjectives, which indicates a sphere of sense neither intentionally constituted nor causally produced (in the modern sense of the word causal) but rather inciting, arousing, pushing and playing with the vital function of our lived experience. Every intentional stance presupposes this dimension of irreducible qualities, which thus plays a fundamental ontological role. In Ringbom's words: the expression 'does not represent anything, but *is something*'.¹²

This does not mean that illusions as representations would stand for something unreal.¹³ Instead, only that the reality they allow to appear should not be understood as an external objective world but rather as something made up of those expressive qualities which become transformed into something representable and which through acts of grasping can be consciously perceptible. These acts offer us an opportunity for initiative, and it is thus no coincidence that representation is helpful in our voluntary projects. In gaining more opportunity for initiative, however, we lose our immediate apprehension of underlying essential qualities. This is how Ringbom conceives the battle about illusion, which is a battle between representation and essence, between apparent images and real expressions.¹⁴ It implies that there is a less constituted world of primary incentives (*eggelsebilder*) which attracts, repulses and determines how reality works in us before it gets adapted to intentional ends – that is to practical ends, epistemic ends and the ends of objectifying science.

Dilthey, *Die geistige Welt: Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens, Gesammelte Schriften V*, Berlin - Leipzig: Teubner, 1924.

¹¹ See footnote 3 above. These aspects have been further developed in the works of Bernhard Waldenfels; see, for example, B. Waldenfels, *In den Netzen der Lebenswelt*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994 and also Renaud Barbaras, *Introduction à une phénoménologie de la vie*, Paris: Vrin, 2008.

¹² 'den föreställer ej något, utan är något', Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Kampen om illusionen*, 41.

¹³ Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Kampen om illusionen*, 36.

¹⁴ In fact, Ringbom enumerates several forms of tension: the battle of comprehensibility in language, the battle of readability in handwriting and the battle of function in the world of technical civilisation. Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Kampen om illusionen*, 60-66.

Ringbom speaks of a reality, which 'shows, reveals and expresses' (*företeer, uppenbarar och uttrycker*) and describes it – in a way reminiscent of Aristotelian tradition – as a 'reality of essences' (*verklighet av väsen*) which precedes the more easily conceivable reality of things.¹⁵ At the same time, it renders both reified and other representations possible insofar as it incites us to determine what conducts us in our life process. Some references to Carl Gustav Carus even indicate a tendency to panpsychism, the view that reality is animated by a psychical force (which one should not confound either with idealism or with theological assumptions of a locus of divine planning).¹⁶

Ringbom seems to understand the relation between experience and reality in, approximately, the following way. Processual reality has essential expressions which can be sensed in the lived experience of finite creatures such as human beings and in this way show themselves as incentives. These are based on corporeal presence with its degrees of intensity, but also appear as essential significance (*innebörd*). Sensual experience is thus at every moment twofold, partly dependent on more or less intense arousal and partly on significance which, according to Ringbom, lies before the differentiation into five corporeal senses. There is a sensual dimension common to all the senses which manifests itself as a psychical force. The different senses have no specific contents but only increase our receptiveness to impressions.¹⁷ In this way, Ringbom tries to solve the philosophical problem of how different senses can refer to the same phenomenon. Because no specific sensual qualities exist, there is – according to him – in fact, no problem. Sight, sound, touch, smell and taste are organic media which enable the more or less intense appearance of something common (which one could perhaps attribute to the sense which Aristotle called *koinê aisthêsis*, the common sense).¹⁸

A linguistic analysis of how adjectives seemingly belonging to only one sensual sphere nevertheless figure in several sensual contexts is proposed as an argument for this point of view. Language is described as a 'characteristic of essential traits expressed by phenomena'.¹⁹ Ringbom gives several examples, which I cannot quote here. Some of them are certainly problematic, but the general idea is interesting: to show 'how the reality of essences is a world, where the sensual borders, figured out by human beings, do not exist'.²⁰

¹⁵ Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Kampen om illusionen*, 85-6.

¹⁶ Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Kampen om illusionen*, 104-6. Concerning Carus, see his magnum opus *Psyche. Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Seele*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964 (first edition 1846). Heavily influenced by Goethe and Schelling, the physician Carus has also left an impressive body of work as a painter.

¹⁷ Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Kampen om illusionen*, 101-102.

¹⁸ For example *De memoria* 450a.

¹⁹ 'en karaktäristik av i företeelserna yttrade väsensdrag', Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Kampen om illusionen*, 93.

²⁰ 'huru verkligheten av väsen är en värld, där av mänskoanden utfunderade sinnesskrankor ej finnas', Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Kampen om illusionen*, 102-3; further 'It should not be contested that the colours in a painting really are warm and cold, precisely as a human character can be. Raw is the surface of stone in a mine, but raw is also the climate in the highland of Pamir, colours can be raw. The sensual properties of tones have nothing in common with those of

In a quite phenomenological way, Ringbom attributes to the essences mentioned above a capacity to render apparent what would be only more or less corporally intense without them. Contrary to Edmund Husserl, essential significance must, however, be seen as a primordial dimension of reality, which evokes experience, and not as the basic structure of the phenomenological constitution of intentional objects. Affirming the claim of Palágyi and Klages, Ringbom stresses the ontological primacy of expressivity, which is the precondition of both corporeal influence and intuited significance and also of the *explicit* grasping of the *implicit* appearances in lived experience.²¹ The crucial function is the mediating significance, which can be intuited in imagination and then preforms something which occasionally becomes obvious in the instantaneous moments of conscious 'flashes'.

Painting is a voluntary act with the capacity to show the interplay of all these functions. Both expression and representation are fundamental. It is thus unsatisfactory to discuss these aspects only as a difference between, for example, expressionism and naturalism. Ringbom's theory of art is influenced by the views on perception presented above, and the complexity of the perceptual phenomena and attitudes studied is reflected in the large spectrum of exemplary material in his work. The interest in the expressive function is particularly evident in Ringbom's early reception of Hans Prinzhorn famous book, *Bildnerei der Geisteskranken*, a work that gave publicity to the artistic work of patients in psychiatric hospitals.²² Prinzhorn's book had a decisive influence on the movement called *Art Brut*. Jean Dubuffet, Paul Klee and several others were familiar with this attempt to show how aesthetic quality profits from obscure psychic drives and in this way can manifest a true dimension of unconscious life – ideas which seemed to contest established conceptions of aesthetic quality, especially beauty, radically. This should not imply a one-sided mythology of the unconscious, taken as something like the true self in us.²³ Human life seems everywhere to be in constant relation with both expressivity

colours, but still without hesitation we speak of tone colours and [in some languages like Swedish and German] of shades as colour tones. Mountains are high and valleys deep, but the same also applies to tones. There are peoples, who call our high tones 'sharp' and our deep or low tones 'large', others speak of 'bright' and 'dark' tones or of 'light' and 'heavy' tones – but in no language are our high tones called low, deep, dark, large or heavy! ('Det må ej bestridas, att färgerna i en målning verkligen äro varma och kalla, likasom människans sinnelag är varmt och kallt. Rå är ytan i bergsbrottet, men rått är även klimatet i Pamirs högland, råa kunna färger vara. Tonernas sinnliga egenskaper ha intet gemensamt med färgernas, och ändå tala vi utan betänkanke om klangfärger och färgtoner. Höga äro bergen och djupa äro dalarna, men samma kännetecken tillmätas olika tonkvaliteter. En del folk kalla våra höga toner 'spetsiga' och våra djupa eller låga toner 'breda', åter andra tala om 'ljusa' och 'mörka' toner eller om 'lätta' och 'tungå' toner – men i intet språk kallas våra höga toner låga, djupa, mörka, breda eller tungå!').

²¹ Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Kampen om illusionen*, 85, 95-6, 103.

²² The works collected by Prinzhorn are currently situated in the *Sammlung Prinzhorn* in Heidelberg (www.prinzhorn.ukl-hd.de).

²³ Some texts of Dubuffet tend in this direction, for example Jean Dubuffet, *Asphyxiante culture*, Paris: Pauvert, 1968. A quote about the limits of understanding beauty from Thomas Thorild, given as the theme at the beginning of Ringbom's book, does not seem to fit directly

and representation, and this is true for artistic creation too. Expression alone is not sufficient.

Otherness has several forms and there is no reason to suppose that, for example, the strangeness of culturally remote art would somehow be closer to unconscious drives, as the concept of primitive art often suggests. In this context Ringbom has certainly taken some of his ideas from his forerunner in the chair in Turku, the Viennese professor Josef Strzygowski, who had as one of his central interests the Eastern influences in Western cultural history. In this context, the presence of Chinese art in Ringbom's *Kampen om illusionen* has to be noted. The same orientation has another manifestation in Ringbom's work on Iranian art.²⁴ One can also notice a connection with the comparative approach in the sociological research of Edward Westermarck who, from his chair at the London School of Economics and Social Sciences, was at this time also an eminent figure in Finnish cultural life.

It is however regrettable that Ringbom's later work on Eastern tradition has somewhat overshadowed the early work on the theory of perception, which seems to contribute insights of particular thematic relevance. It also seems that a very general and simplifying sociological concept of 'philosophy of life' has, for a long period, hampered the systematic and thematic study of authors like Henri Bergson, Georg Simmel and Menyhért Palágyi. Through the new interest in this current of thought, especially among phenomenologists working on Bergson and Wilhelm Dilthey and through the important new edition of the works of Georg Simmel, the core ambition of the so-called philosophy of life (i.e. to offer a concept of nature, which manifests itself not only in the objective sphere of experimental science, but also inside human experience) has, however, become evident.²⁵ The work of

into such a context, but could suggest an equally problematic romanticist view. The lines from Thorild are: 'Begrip ej för tydligt skönheten /.../ förlora dig ej för mycket i delarne, klyv ej för mycket -- så att *hela skönheten* försvinner för dig och du endast känner dess stoft -- de små, trånga, svaga sjäalars allt' ('Don't understand beauty all too distinctly /.../ don't lose yourself too much in the parts, don't exaggerate distinctions -- letting the *whole beauty* disappear for you and feeling only its dust -- all there is for small, narrow-minded, weak souls'). Thomas Thorild, *Samlade skrifter*, Uppsala: Palmblad/A. Wiborgs förlag, 1820, 316. The passage concerns the role of critique. This point of departure does not however seem to entail that Ringbom would argue against understanding, an anti-intellectualist position which would certainly be inconsistent with his own conceptual approach to art. Following the hermeneutic principle of charity, perhaps the tenor could be read like a defence of inclusive reason, a familiar topic also in the German tradition, important for Thorild, who was professor at the (in those days still Swedish) University of Greifswald in northern Germany. This is, however, not the place to discuss the Hegelian critique of romanticism. See G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes (Werke, Bd. 3, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979)*, especially the chapters in the section A 'Bewußtsein'.

²⁴ Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Graltempel und Paradies*, Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1951. See also Lars-Ivar Ringbom, *Paradisus terrestris. Myt, bild och verklighet*, Helsingfors: Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennicae (Nova Series C. 1), 1958. The relation to Strzygowski is however a problematic one. The topic has not been possible to deal with in this article, but the intention is to this in a forthcoming work on Ringbom.

²⁵ Concerning the contemporary discussion, see, for example, M. Kelly (ed.), *Bergson and Phenomenology*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010 and references in this work and also Hans

Ringbom has the advantage of offering a thorough analysis of the essential tension in such experience without falling into the ideological trap of social Darwinism or any other one-sided interpretation of drives as mainly violent forces.

Jan-Ivar Lindén directs the *Centre for Historical Ontology* and teaches philosophy at the universities of Heidelberg and Helsinki. The publications are in German, French, English, Swedish and Finnish. Recent works are for example *Aristotle on Logic and Nature*, (ed. J.-I. Lindén), Leuven: Peeters, 2019 and *Prolegomena zur historischen Ontologie* (Hg. J.-I. Lindén), Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2019.

Jan-Ivar.Linden@urz.uni-heidelberg.de



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Blumenberg, *Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben*, Stuttgart: Reclam, 1999, especially the two first chapters and Manfred Sommer, *Evidenz im Augenblick: eine Phänomenologie der reinen Empfindung*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987. See also footnotes 3 and 10 above.