

Max Dvořák, Rudolf Carnap and the question of *Weltanschauung* vs. *Weltauffassung*

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Introduction

This article will discuss Max Dvořák's *Kunsthistorische Weltanschauungsforschung* (world-view research in art history) in the context of the intellectual orientation crisis of the 1910s and 1920s. His work will be considered in relation to the early writings of Rudolf Carnap. By taking this comparative approach, I shall demonstrate that, although these two scholars had very different areas of interest—art history on the one hand, philosophy influenced by logical empiricism on the other—their approaches show surprising parallels. In retrospect, we can now understand the discussion around *Weltanschauung* vs. *Weltauffassung* (a term first coined in 1929 in a pamphlet issued by the 'Vienna Circle', with Carnap's support¹) as a pseudo-problem that inhibits rather than enhances understanding. In fact, Dvořák and Carnap's findings overlap to such an extent that a comparative approach is necessary in order to engage more deeply with the as-yet unresolved questions they raise.

The primary reference texts are Max Dvořák's lecture 'Idealismus und Realismus in der Kunst der Neuzeit' (Idealism and Realism in Modern Art),² given in Vienna in 1914, and the 1924 anthology *Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte* (Art History as the History of Ideas),³ edited by Johannes Wilde and Karl Maria Swoboda; in particular, the article 'Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei' (Idealism and Naturalism in Gothic Sculpture and Painting), published in 1918.⁴ These later writings by Dvořák will be considered in relation to selected early writings by Rudolf Carnap: *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (The Logical Structure of the World), published in 1928;⁵ and his article 'Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie. Das Fremdpsychische und der Realismusstreit' (Pseudo-Problems in

¹ The *Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung* (Writings on the Scientific World-Conception) were a series of volumes published by Moritz Schlick and Philipp Frank between 1928 and 1937. The manifesto *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Wiener Kreis* was published by the Verein Ernst Mach with Artur Wolf in Vienna in 1929 and was dedicated to Moritz Schlick. Cf. <http://neurath.umcs.lublin.pl>. 30. 7. 2021

² Max Dvorak, *Idealismus und Realismus in der Kunst der Neuzeit. Akademische Vorlesungen*, ed. Norbert Schmitz, Alfter: Verlag und Datenbank für Geisteswissenschaften, 21994.

³ Max Dvorak, *Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte. Studien zur Abendländischen Kunstentwicklung*, Artur Rosenauer ed., Berlin : Mann, 1995, first published 1924, Johannes Wilde, Karl Maria Swoboda eds.

⁴ Max Dvorak, *Studien zu Geisteswissenschaft*, Irma Emmerich ed., Leipzig: Reclam, 1989, 160-230.

⁵ Rudolf Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, Hamburg: Meiner, 1998.

Philosophy: The Problem of Other Minds and the Realism Controversy), also published in 1928.⁶

The texts discussed here belong to the pre- and interwar-periods, which were distinguished by the self-assertion of irrational tendencies in the face of a 'disenchanted world'⁷ experienced as senseless. This senselessness came to tragic expression in the murder of the philosopher Moritz Schlick — like Carnap, a member of the 'Vienna Circle' — at the University of Vienna in 1936.⁸ We might understand the term *wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung*, or scientific world-conception, as a conscious act of distancing from these irrational tendencies. The perception of a modern, knowledge-oriented attitude to reason, with its faith in science and in progress, as dichotomous to individual liberty and individual development has historic roots:

The search for a universal scientific language, which would later be taken up by the 'Vienna Circle', is grounded in Enlightenment thought. Diderot and other eighteenth-century thinkers believed that social development could be shaped on the basis of a more reliable form of knowledge than that dependent on tradition-based systems, which they viewed as semi-articulate and confused. 'Enlightenment' was held to be synonymous with the idea that improved knowledge could be an instrument of individual and social liberation. In this view, people of all cultures and classes should be given access to knowledge and to the 'tools' that would enable them to use that knowledge critically. The aim was to emancipate them from their cultures of origin in the sense of participation in a 'cosmopolitan republic'. However, the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century lacked the criteria by which to define 'real knowledge'. Moreover, it did not provide an answer to the question of how this knowledge could be brought to bear in reality, on practical concerns.

The Romanticism of the nineteenth century, which originated in Germany, was a consequence of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth. In general, Romantic thinkers rejected the cosmopolitan outlook. Rather, they invoked a pre-articulated sense of belonging, revived origin myths, put their faith in the indefinable 'something' of the 'intuition', and legitimised longing that could not be expressed in words. Clear knowledge, which lacked these aspects, seemed lifeless and empty to them; mysticism and spontaneous, unschooled 'inspiration' were viewed as more reliable sources of knowledge than science. The local and the authentic were exalted to the detriment of artificial, cosmopolitan thought. Greater value was accorded to 'popular cultures' (*Volkskulturen*) than to impersonal knowledge deemed to be 'imposed from above'. Like the eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers, the Romantics believed that their ideas were 'a doctrine of liberation'.⁹

⁶ Rudolf Carnap, *Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie. Das Fremdpsychische und der Realismusstreit*, Hans Blumenberg/Jürgen Habermas/Dieter Henrich/Jacob Taubes, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1971.

⁷ On the expression 'disenchanted world' (*entzauberte Welt*) cf. Max Weber, *Wissenschaft als Beruf*, Michael Sukale ed., Leipzig: Reclam, 1995, esp. 19.

⁸ Rainer Hegselmann, 'Logischer Empirismus und Ethik', in: Moritz Schlick, *Fragen der Ethik*, Rainer Hegselmann ed., Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002, 1-7.

⁹ André Carus, *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, 2007, 1-40.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Enlightenment and Romantic tendencies markedly diverged. Irrational beliefs asserted their independence over against the 'reasonableness' (*Vernunfthaltung*) of the Enlightenment thinkers; Oswald Spengler and Ludwig Klages are two examples of this. This self-assertion intensified the conflict between the two world-views.¹⁰ Since both claimed to be absolute, this meant a radical struggle between apparently irreconcilable attitudes.¹¹

As I shall now demonstrate, the writings of Max Dvořák and Rudolf Carnap cited here are informed by an attempt to overcome the cultural crisis of the period before World War II.

Max Dvořák's and Rudolf Carnap's conceptions of science: a critical confrontation with the cultural crisis of their context

Max Dvořák

The unified plan—as we have it from oral statements by Dvořák and those character sketches that have come down to us—consists in singling out the most important turning-points in the development of Western art from late antiquity onwards and characterising these according to their essence in a series of essays; at the same time, however, describing the roots of these artistic transformations within the general history of ideas (*Geistesgeschichte*).¹² As the first editors of the anthology *Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte* aptly remarked, this objective locates Dvořák's later work as a counterpart of the similar models proposed by Wilhelm Dilthey, Wilhelm Windelband, Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch. Dvořák's relationship to Dilthey is of particular interest for the subject of this paper. This section will present arguments in support of the hypothesis that Dvořák's later work was significantly influenced by Dilthey.

As Dvořák observed, ' [...] art does not only consist of developing and solving formal problems and tasks. It is also, primarily and always, an expression of the ideas that hold sway over humanity—history no less than religion, philosophy and poetry. It is part of the general history of ideas.'¹³ Dvořák's desire to anchor history-of-style analysis in the basis of the history of ideas, as manifested here—in other words, his rejection of all-too-narrow specialisation in favour of generalised connections—shows a relationship to aspects of Dilthey's writings. His *Geistesgeschichte* could therefore be understood as one of the two 'halves' of the sphere at the heart of Dilthey's philosophy, as demonstrated below.

That Dvořák's thought originates in Dilthey's philosophy of world-views becomes clear in his concept of the term 'world-view' (*Weltanschauung*). In comparison with his predecessor Alois Riegl, Dvořák is innovative in this respect. In

¹⁰ Florens Schwarzwälder, *Der Weltanschauungsroman 2. Ordnung. Probleme der literarischen Modellbildung bei Hermann Broch und Robert Musil*, Bielefeld: Transcript, 2019, 7-195.

¹¹ Carus, *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment*, 1-40.

¹² Johannes Wilde, Karl Maria Swoboda, 'Vorwort der Herausgeber' (1928), *Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte. Studien zu abendländischen Kunstentwicklung*, Artur Rosenauer ed., Berlin: Gebrüder Mann, 1995, IX.

¹³ Max Dvořák, 'Kunstbetrachtung, Vortrag gehalten am Denkmalpflegetag', Bregenz 1920, Belvedere no. 4: 1927, 91.

his *Historische Grammatik der bildenden Künste* (Historical Grammar of the Fine Arts), Riegl examined the 'will to art' as a function of world-views,¹⁴ but left the specific meaning of these two terms broadly open. Dvořák's innovation is connected with his critique of positivism: 'The achievements of the natural sciences, the understanding and the mastery of nature—in these something absolute is visible, something that is humanity's objective and its claim to glory. [...] The development of art was also judged from this perspective, which has dominated the whole of intellectual life. In place of that old, classical, dogmatic assessment of the development of art as a series of waves, with defined peaks, in which the true artistic ideal was realised, and defined troughs in which it fell into obscurity, a view has emerged in the last century according to which gaining knowledge of nature has also produced constant progress in art. [...]'.¹⁵

Dvořák dissociates himself from such views. He refers to the philosophy of the time, which is primarily based on the development of the historical sciences in Germany: 'This was a new philosophy of history represented by Windelband, Ritter, Dilthey. [...] It is this transformation of philosophy, this new grasp of historical values, that underpins our entire historical conception.'¹⁶ Here Dvořák can refer to Dilthey's conception, according to which world-views should not be regarded as products of thought. This means that the foundation of metaphysical systems must be sought in human life, in the countless nuances of life-purposes—their foundational layer—whereby their claims to objectivity emerge as relative.¹⁷ This approach allows Dvořák to resolve antinomies between world-view systems. In the spirit of Dilthey, he observes: 'The fact is that, in all fields of thought, we are faced with an entirely new situation. A situation that is teaching us to take correct account of the subjectivity of historical thought; that is teaching us to evaluate historical values in all their complexity, in their constant influence on the future, quite differently than was possible in the age of the positive sciences. Today, no one period is valued less than any other. All unite to form what Rickert calls historical cultural consciousness, the metaphysical result of humanity.'¹⁸

Dvořák expressly mentions the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert. Together with Wilhelm Windelband and Wilhelm Dilthey—despite all their differences in philosophical outlook—Rickert was influential in defending the independence of the humanities, which is evidently Dvořák's concern. Dilthey's later writings on structural psychology, logic and philosophy of values,¹⁹ which were inspired by

¹⁴ Alois Riegl, *Historische Grammatik der bildenden Künste*, Karl Maria Swoboda, Otto Pächt eds., Graz, Köln Hermann Böhlau, 1966.

¹⁵ Max Dvořák, *Idealismus und Realismus in der Kunst der Neuzeit. Akademische Vorlesungen*, 13.

¹⁶ Dvořák, *Idealismus und Realismus, in der Kunst der Neuzeit. Akademische Vorlesungen*, 14-15.

¹⁷ Sebastian Luft, 'Dilthey's Kritik an der Wissenschaftstheorie der Neukantianer und die Konsequenzen für seine Theorie. Das Problem des Historismus', in; Damböck and Lessing, *Dilthey als Wissenschaftsphilosoph*, 176-98. Dilthey was especially critical of the neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy project.

¹⁸ Dvořák, *Idealismus und Realismus in der Kunst der Neuzeit. Akademische Vorlesungen*, 15.

¹⁹ Gudrun Bertram Kuhne, introduction, in: *Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften*, XXIV, *Logik und Wert: Späte Vorlesungen, Entwürfe und Fragmente zur Strukturpsychologie, Logik und Wertlehre*, XVIII.

Rickert's neo-Kantian philosophy of values, were likely also relevant to Dvořák. Dvořák's desire not just to characterise the key turning-points in the history of European art, but to describe the roots of these transformations within the general history of ideas, is reminiscent of the conviction expressed by Dilthey in his later writings: The diversity of reality brought forth, not chaos, but specific types that express the attitudes of humanity towards the world.

Of Dvořák's writings collected in the volume *Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte*, it is perhaps his monumental 1918 essay 'Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei' that most strongly expresses his relationship to Dilthey's philosophy of world-views. As in his Vienna lecture of 1914, the claims of both idealists and naturalists in the 'realism controversy' — in Dilthey's terms, the inadequate 'controversy around the Thing-in-Itself'²⁰ (*Streit um das Ding an Sich*) between sceptics and optimists — assume relative value for Dvořák. As in the Vienna lecture, too, he is similar to Dilthey in viewing idealism and naturalism as 'life-purposes' rather than products of thought. Dvořák develops a model of comparison between idealism and realism (scepticism and optimism respectively). Looking both forward into the future and back into the past, his development model ensures that neither of these world-views, which are founded in 'life-feeling' (*Lebensgefühl*), can be evaluated as a decline.

An example: according to Dvořák, medieval art strove to shape the sensory characteristics of material objects into an adequate expression of the 'ideas' underlying them. However, this spiritual and idealistic path — the religious world-view of the Middle Ages, so to speak — would inevitably have had to distance art even further from nature, transforming it into conventional signs (*Zeichen*). This was averted, in his analysis, by the consistent intervention of classical objectivism. The foundation of classical objectivism during the Middle Ages, as opposed to classical antiquity, was likewise the hegemony of a spiritual and idealistic world view. Thus, Gothic art did not only look back in the idealistic and spiritual direction of post-antiquity; it also looked forward and anticipated the discovery of nature in the modern era.

Dvořák uses the west portal of Chartres Cathedral — the Royal Portal — to prove this by way of example.²¹ 'The new discovery and artistic re-evaluation of nature occurred [...] on the basis of general spiritual truths, of which art was the herald. Progress in the natural sciences was referred back to these truths from that point onwards, even after they began to be assigned, not to divine revelation, but to natural, rational understanding of the connections at work in the world, which are intelligible only to the mind.'²² Dvořák believes that art developed into a freer expression of the artist's state of life. As I shall demonstrate below, this view constitutes a connection with aspects of Wilhelm Dilthey's philosophy of world-views. Both the philosopher and the art historian identify this freedom in the 'form'

²⁰ The Thing-in-Itself cannot be known, which is why Dilthey traces the controversy back to life-feeling, scepticism and optimism. See above.

²¹ Max Dvořák, 'Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei', in: Max Dvořák, *Studien zur Kunstgeschichte*, Irma Emmerich ed., Leipzig: Reclam, 1989, 168-228.

²² Max Dvořák, 'Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei', 194.

of artistic constructs: 'Like a geometric scheme in a Leonardesque triangular group, the statues were [...] composed into the ideal order of artistic connections. However, this was not based—as it was for the masters of the High Renaissance—on a formal external unity in which, through the power of artistic insight embodied in it, natural connections and sensory impressions were to be elevated to heightened artistic effect. Rather, it was founded on the assumption of a transcendent unity, [...].'²³ In other words, as Dvořák remarks elsewhere, '[...] the epoch of great imaginative art—which, according to Dilthey, extends from the mid-fourteenth century to the mid-seventeenth—was actually initiated earlier, by the Gothic.'²⁴

Dilthey applies his definition of poetical or artistic imagination, for example, in his paper 'Goethe und die dichterische Phantasie' (Goethe and the Poetical Imagination).²⁵ He draws a distinction between artistic imagination and the imagination that—for example, in dreams—creates a second world, different to that in which human beings operate.²⁶ 'Imagination is [...] woven into the entire intellectual context. Each everyday communication involuntarily transforms that which has been experienced. Wishes, fears, and dreams of the future transcend what is real; every action is determined by the image of something that does not yet exist. Life ideals [...] advance before humanity, leading it towards higher goals [...].'²⁷ According to Dilthey, the artistic imagination—the prerequisite of all the major metaphysical systems—is rooted in human life-connection and serves to orient humankind in action.

In summary, the life-connection of art—Dilthey's 'philosophy of life' (*Lebensphilosophie*)—appears to have a significant influence on Max Dvořák's writings, which prove to be strongly critical of metaphysics. We can see this, for example, in his essay on 'Idealism and Naturalism', in which he seeks to resolve the 'ideological' clash of world-views by rendering these metaphysical terms—antinomies in the controversy around the Thing-in-Itself—relative in their claims to objectivity. In the spirit of the German *Bildungsideal* (see above), Dvořák's attempt to establish 'art history as the history of ideas' therefore appears, not as an act of Romantic self-assertion in opposition to Enlightenment reason, but rather as the search for an indispensable correlate to the explanatory natural sciences.

Rudolf Carnap

The early works by Rudolf Carnap considered here are characterised by their pursuit of a new *Bildungsideal* appropriate to the modern era. In his introduction to *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (The Logical Structure of the World), Carnap strikes an emphatic note: 'We sense an inner kinship between the intellectual attitude that underpins the whole of our philosophical work and that currently influencing

²³ Dvořák, 'Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei', 229.

²⁴ Dvořák, 'Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei', 229.

²⁵ Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, XXVI, *Erlebnis und Dichtung. Lessing. Goethe, Novalis, Hölderlin*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2005, GS.XXVI, 113-144.

²⁶ Dilthey, Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, XXVI, *Erlebnis und Dichtung. Lessing. Goethe, Novalis, Hölderlin*, 119.

²⁷ Dilthey, Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, XXVI, *Erlebnis und Dichtung. Lessing. Goethe, Novalis, Hölderlin*, 119.

entirely different areas of life. We sense this attitude in the currents active in art, especially architecture, and in those movements that strive for the meaningful organisation of human life: of personal life and life in community, of education, of external order on a large scale.²⁸ Carnap speaks of a style of thinking that aims for clarity while, at the same time, recognising the never-quite-transparent interconnectedness of life; the interconnectedness of human beings as well as the free development of the individual.²⁹ Here, Carnap introduces the core essence of his advanced programme. His focus is the relation of the two halves of the ‘sphere’, in the sense of Dilthey’s philosophy addressed below. This means that the quest to overcome the antinomy between Enlightenment and Romantic tendencies—and the increasing absolutism of these two intellectual poles—is decisive.

Carnap’s ambitions in this regard have—correctly—been attributed to his background and upbringing. His grandfather, Friedrich Wilhelm Dörpfeld (1824–1893), was a known and respected educator in the spirit of the German *Bildungstradition*. Johannes Sebulon Carnap, Rudolf’s father, died as early as 1898; however, his personality had a formative effect on the logician. The sources describe Johannes as a puritanical self-made man who was able to acquire an extensive education, particularly in the field of languages, and build up an impressive business. Nonetheless, he never denied his origins. Johannes’s ‘down-to-earth’ rootedness had a not insignificant influence on the young Rudolf Carnap in his approach to the traditions conducive to human orientation—or rather, developed languages—and his attempt to relate these to universal claims.³⁰ Carnap’s mother Anna, meanwhile, raised him in the spirit of her father Friedrich Wilhelm Dörpfeld. Carnap describes his mother’s pedagogical style as follows: ‘She regarded it as especially important that everything that was learned, was really and completely understood by the child and was thoroughly digested and connected with other knowledge. Above all her aim was to stimulate our own thinking.’³¹

In view of this, it is no surprise that Carnap’s friends Wilhelm Flittner (1889–1990) and Herman Nohl (1879–1960) had a formative influence on his intellectual development. Flittner and Nohl were representatives of Human Sciences Pedagogy (*geisteswissenschaftlicher Pädagogik*). This term refers to a progressive educational approach that views education as a historical as well as an intellectual and cultural phenomenon. Educational work is viewed as the outcome of a historical and biographical process of development. Human Science Pedagogy employs a hermeneutical process, seeking to *understand* the reality of education from the overarching context of life and meaning. This hermeneutic-understanding approach to life goes back to Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophy: ‘We explain nature; we understand mental life.’³² Along with Dilthey, Human Sciences Pedagogy thus acknowledges the impossibility of deriving spiritual truths from the mechanical

²⁸ Rudolf Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, XV–XVI.

²⁹ Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, XV–XVI.

³⁰ Carus, 47–48.

³¹ Carus, *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment*, 43.

³² Wilhelm Dilthey, *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*, Berlin 1894, 1314; <http://dui.org/10.13109/9783666303067.139>.

natural order.³³

The following remark by Carnap makes it clear that Herman Nohl played a significant role in his turning to Dilthey's philosophy of life: 'With especial pleasure and gratitude I remember the seminars taught by Herman [...] Nohl (then a young lecturer at Jena) on philosophy, pedagogy and psychology, [...]. My friends and I were particularly drawn to Nohl because he took a personal interest in the lives and thoughts of his students [...] and, in his seminars as in private conversation, he sought to transmit to us a profound understanding of the great philosophers beginning from their attitude to life, their 'life-feeling' [sic.] and their cultural milieu.'³⁴

In his critique of metaphysics, therefore, the young Carnap is not insignificantly influenced by Dilthey's philosophy of world-views as mediated by Nohl. Dilthey, too, traced metaphysical systems back to the 'attitude to life' – the 'life-feeling' – thus relativising their claims to universal validity. Carnap, like Dvořák, also assumed that life-connections were the ultimate root of the 'realism controversy' between idealists and naturalists.³⁵ Carnap also speaks elsewhere of 'attitudes to life' in the context of his relativisation of the claim to objectivity on the part of metaphysical world-views: 'Metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability. Instead they have a strong inclination to work within the medium of the theoretical, to connect concepts and thoughts. Now, instead of activating, on the one hand, this inclination in the domain of science, and satisfying on the other hand the need for expression in art, the metaphysician confuses the two and produces a structure, which achieves nothing for knowledge and something inadequate for the expression of attitude.'³⁶

Carnap seeks to combine the two halves of Dilthey's sphere: life-feeling and the universal claim of science. In so doing, he refers to Dilthey's philosophy of science: 'Recently, the demand for a logic of individuality has been raised a number of times (following on from the thought of Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert); that is, a method of conceptual description that does justice to the specificity of individual circumstances, and does not attempt to grasp them by gradually narrowing them down into generic concepts (classes).'³⁷

Carnap views the relational logic that is constitutive for his *Der Logische Aufbau der Welt* as a suitable basis for meeting Dilthey's requirement: 'Such a method would be greatly significant for individual psychology and for all the cultural sciences, especially history. [...] Here, it is important to note that the

³³ Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften, I., Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften. Versuch einer Grundlegung für das Studium der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1962, 11.

³⁴ Rudolf Carnap, *Mein Weg in die Philosophie*, Willy Hochkeppel ed, Stuttgart: Reclam 1993, 6-7; cited in Gottfried Gabriel, 'Dilthey, Carnap, Metaphysikkritik und das Problem der Außenwelt', in: Damböck and Lessing, *Dilthey als Wissenschaftsphilosoph*, 120.

³⁵ Rudolf Carnap, *Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie. Das Fremdpsychische und der Realismusstreit*, eds. Suhrkamp,.

³⁶ Rudolf Carnap, 'The elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language', in: Alfred Jules Ayer ed., *Logical Positivism*, Glencoe, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959, 80.

³⁷ Rudolf Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, 15.

relation-theoretical concept of structure is a suitable basis for such a method. The method would have to be developed for the relevant field by adapting relation-theoretical means.³⁸ Carnap's large-scale endeavour in his early work concerns the elaboration of a universal, unified-science (*einheitswissenschaftlich*) 'constitutional system'. He also deploys the concept of experience here. One of the decisive aspects of his approach is the idea of 'elementary experiences' (*Elementarerlebnisse*). By 'elementary experiences', Carnap understands points in the continuous stream of experience: indivisible units of that which is experienced at a given moment, relating to the relevant subjective stream of experience. His assumption is that all concepts related to the physical and mental outside world can be traced back to these elementary experiences.

In his constitutional system, according to which every scientifically valid concept must be logically derivable from a system that precedes it, such experiences that belong to a single subject constitute autopsychological objects (*eigenpsychische Gegenstände*); that is the bottom level. The middle level is formed by physical objects. The highest level is defined by 'heteropsychological objects' – the experiences of others – and mental objects, e.g. cultural and social processes.³⁹ Carnap's constitutional system is built, among other things, on a relational logic between scientific concepts. This means that every sentence should be translatable into another sentence in such a way that the original signs have the same relation as the translated ones. The concretisation of the idea, based on Dilthey, of adapting the field of the humanities to this relation-theoretical model is largely left open.

Concerning mental objects, Carnap emphasises their independence, again referring to Dilthey: 'Only the more recent philosophy of history (since Dilthey) has worked out the specific methodological and object-theoretical character of the humanities.'⁴⁰ No doubt in the spirit of Dilthey's attempt to argue for the autonomy of the humanities as a complement to the natural sciences, Carnap continues: 'The mental objects agree with the psychological ones in that they, too, are subject-bound: in both cases, their 'carriers' are the people belonging to a specific circle. But in sharp contrast to the psychological objects, the carrier can change: a state or a custom can remain while its carrier subjects pass away and others take their place. Additionally, mental objects are not composed of psychological (or, say, physical) ones. They are a completely disparate kind of object. Mental objects belong to other spheres [...] than physical and psychological ones.'⁴¹

For Carnap, this means that no mental object can be meaningfully inserted into a statement about a physical or psychological object.⁴² In other words, like Dvořák and Dilthey, he asserts the relative autonomy of intellectual history. And, as for them, human beings are not integrated into the natural context. For Carnap, too, the starting point is life; consequently, humanities and natural sciences are

³⁸ Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, 15.

³⁹ Michael Heidelberger, 'Zerspaltung und Einheit: Vom logischen Aufbau der Welt bis zum Physikalismus', in Hans-Joachim Dahms ed., *Philosophie, Wissenschaft, Aufklärung. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Wirkung des Wiener Kreises*, Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1985, 145.

⁴⁰ Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, 30.

⁴¹ Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, 30.

⁴² Carnap, *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, 30.

interrelated. We could therefore understand Carnap's attempt to work out a universal, unified-scientific constitutional system as the radicalisation of a Diltheyan quintessence. His intent was to overcome the antinomy, ultimately rooted in the relationship of Enlightenment and Romantic thinkers (see above), that reached crisis point in the twentieth century; an antinomy that had already been generally overcome within the German *Bildungstradition* (see below). Admittedly, Carnap's 'scientific humanism'—his attempt to reconcile science with life—leaves many questions open.⁴³ He would work to address these questions for the rest of his life.⁴⁴

Like Rudolf Carnap, Max Dvořák probably also came to Dilthey's thought by way of the *Bildungstradition* as a German variant of Enlightenment.⁴⁵ Dvořák's affinity to this tradition may be one reason why Ernst Gombrich, who was born into a family closely linked to the *Bildungstradition*, was able to find inspiration for aspects of his own art-historical work in Dvořák's writings: 'Dvořák [...] convinced me that the art of the past offered an immediate and exciting access to the mind of bygone ages.'⁴⁶

In the next section, I will address the German *Bildungstradition*, which found its continuation in Wilhelm Dilthey.

***Bildung*:⁴⁷ a German variant of Enlightenment. Overcoming the dichotomy of 'freedom' and 'reason'**

Bildung is one of those German terms that is almost impossible to translate into English.⁴⁸ Depending on context, it could mean education, formation, culture, shaping or development. In the abstract sense, *Bildung* refers to personal development or self-cultivation, with emphasis on the intellectual or spiritual (*geistig*) dimension.⁴⁹

The goal of *Bildung* is the self-empowerment of the individual. Of course, in this context the development of the personality—with all its unique wealth of

⁴³ Michael Heidelberger, *Zerspaltung und Einheit*, 144-189.

⁴⁴ For Carnap's later thought, see Carus's monograph *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment*.

⁴⁵ Given Dvořák's roots in the German *Bildungstradition*—a special form of the Enlightenment—via his reception of Dilthey, it is no surprise that numerous students and successors of his took on educational posts at the Volkshochschulen (further educational colleges) in Vienna. Three of his immediate successors were Dagobert Frey (1883—1962), Karl Maria Swoboda (1889—1977) and Johannes Wilde (1891—1970); archiv.vhs.at/index.php?d=archiv-suche&no-cach=1, 30.07.2021

⁴⁶ Quoted after Richard Woodfield, 'Ernst Gombrich and Max Dvořák', in: *Ars* 44, 2011, 1, 125. See Ernst Gombrich, 'Focus on the Arts and Humanities', in: Ernst Gombrich: *Tributes: Interpreters of our Cultural Tradition*, Oxford 1984 14. This article provides some interesting insights into Gombrich's relationship to Dvořák.

⁴⁷ The idea of thematising *Bildung* originates from a contribution by Richard Woodfield to a discussion during a conference in 2021.

⁴⁸ Since *Bildung* is invested with a number of different (and specific) meanings, I have left the word and any associated terms untranslated throughout this paper.

⁴⁹ Carus, *Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment*, 41-65.

experience, talents and inclinations—should not be understood in purely individualistic terms. Rather, the concept of *Bildung* includes recognising that human beings are socially conditioned. *Bildung* in this sense is characterised by the self-reflective relationship of the individual to themselves and to the world. So *Bildung* does not mean ‘being a know-it-all’, and it is also more than a mere command of specialist knowledge. Rather, it requires knowledge to be grasped and placed in larger, meaningful connections. In this respect, it can be understood as a holistic ‘world-knowledge’ that ought to equip the *Gebildete*—the self-cultivated person—to deal productively with both existential and subject-specific challenges. This means that *Bildung* includes the skills of self-determination, co-determination, and solidarity. Since it aims at the reflexive examination of the self in the social context and the generalisation of logical connections, *Bildung* also includes self-understanding as a historical being, a historical subject.⁵⁰

All this means that the *Gebildete* should not understand a hierarchical social order as antagonistic to currents of pluralism, or ‘freedom’ as the direct opposite of ‘reason’; thus working to overcome the dichotomies, described above, which were definitive of the twentieth century. Therefore, the *Bildungsideal*—as a German variant of Enlightenment—could not understand developed languages rooted in tradition, which could be useful to human life praxis and orientation (*praxis*), as antagonistic to the search for the one, universal and therefore constructed language of (natural) science(s) as a means to particular ends (*technē*). Rather, in this context, praxis and *technē*⁵¹ were to be seen as two complementary halves of a single sphere.

This approach is also determinative in the writings of Wilhelm Dilthey. As I shall now demonstrate in detail, these were a source for both Dvořák and Carnap. Whatever one thinks of *Bildungsidealen*, they form a connection between Max Dvořák’s thought and that of the young Rudolf Carnap.

Aspects of Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophy as a source for both Dvořák and Carnap *Weltanschauungslehre*

Both Dvořák and Carnap follow Dilthey’s philosophy in understanding and handling the ambiguous concept of *Weltanschauung*. For Dilthey, the key to understanding this concept lies in the term ‘life’ (*Leben*), which is inextricably bound up with ‘experience’ (*Erlebnis*).

Dilthey conceived of experience as a smaller part of life. His chief concern was to understand life on its own terms, with the ‘whole’ person—with all their life-connections (*Lebensbezüge*)—at the centre. Dilthey’s aim was to complement and supplement the natural sciences with the humanities or human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*). While natural phenomena were to be explained, in Dilthey’s view, an attempt should be made to understand the intrinsic logic and autonomy

⁵⁰ www.ubik.oc.at (30/07/2021) provides a general definition of the term *Bildung* together with further reading.

⁵¹ Helmut Jobach, ‘Tatsachen, Normen, Werte in Diltheys Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften’, in: Christian Damböck and Hans Ulrich Lessing, *Dilthey als Wissenschaftsphilosoph*, Freiburg, München: Karl Alber 2016, 25.

(*Eigengesetzlichkeit*) of human rational life (*Vernunftleben*). His central idea was to re-establish the freedom and autonomy of the human being, understood as a rational being. Applying a causal-mechanical understanding of nature to human inner life would render these qualities moot. Therefore, Dilthey tried to place humans in their historical and cultural context rather than viewing them in the context of the natural world.⁵²

Dilthey tried to apply his life-based methods in his philosophy of world-views (*Weltanschauungslehre*). His aim was to show that all contradictory world-views—that is, metaphysical systems—originate in human life. In doing this, he radically questioned metaphysics as a theoretical approach. On his search for the laws of formation (*Bildungsgesetzen*) of world-views, he observed: ‘Every big experience shows a person life from one particular side; the world is illuminated in a new way; as such experiences repeat and combine, our feelings (*Stimmungen*) towards life emerge. From a single life-connection, the whole of life takes on a colouring and an interpretation in affective and contemplative minds; the universal feelings emerge. These change as life continues to show the person new sides [...] Among the major life-purposes (*Lebensbestimmungen*), the most comprehensive are optimism and pessimism [meaning realism and idealism: B.C.]. But these differentiate themselves into manifold nuances. [...] These life-purposes, the countless nuances of attitudes to the world, are the base layer on which world-views are formed.’⁵³

Like Dvořák and Carnap, Dilthey thus emphasises that world-views are not products of thought. They are not merely created by the will of the cognition: ‘The perception of reality is an important moment in [the] creation [of world-views], but it is just one moment. World-views emerge from life behaviour, from life experience, from the structure of our psychological totality. Elevating life to consciousness in the perception of reality, the appreciation of life and the achievement of the will is the hard, slow labour humanity has carried out in developing its views of life.’⁵⁴ In his philosophy of world-views, Dilthey strives to identify the structure of different world-views. According to him, they develop under the influence of a number of circumstances. These include climate, ‘race’, nations—which are conditional upon history and the formation of states—and the segregation into different epochs and ages within which these nations interacted.⁵⁵ Faced with this unquiet impression of the outside world, humans strive to achieve stability. Thus a nomological relation asserts itself according to which—as it were, for the practical orientation of humankind—‘the soul’ forms determined goals ‘from the flow and glide of the

⁵² For an overview, cf also e.g. Florian Reuther, *Was bedeutet ‘Erlebnis’ bei Dilthey?*, München, Ravensburg, Grin, 2011, 1-16.

⁵³ Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, VIII, *Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, Stuttgart and Göttingen: Teubner, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 1991, 81-82.

⁵⁴ Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* VIII, *Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, 86.

⁵⁵ Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* VIII, *Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, 84.

outside world'.⁵⁶ The world-views that give rise to useful life goals remain and displace those that do not.

As in Dvořák and Carnap, the claim to absoluteness of world-views is radically questioned. World-views are subordinate to different life circumstances; they serve the practical orientation of humanity.

'The most profound secret of their specification lies in the regularity (*Regelhaftigkeit*) the teleological coherence of inner life imposes on the particular constructs of world-views. In each of these constructs, amidst all their apparent randomness, is a complex of ends arising from the interdependence of the questions contained in the riddle of life; and, in particular, from the constant relationship between the image of the world (*Weltbild*), the appreciation of life, and the goals of the will.'⁵⁷ Dilthey emphasises the aspect of continuity in the formation of world-views.

Here one might be reminded of Dvořák's conception of artistic development, which emphasises continuity and forestalls the idea of artistic 'periods of decline'.

'Shared human nature and a given order of individuation exists [sic.] in fixed life-connections to reality; this is the same always and everywhere. Life always shows the same sides.'⁵⁸ According to Dilthey, in spite of the unpredictable moments in life—epochal shifts, changes to the state of science, etc.—the logical regularity of world-views and their profound structural conformities (*Gesetzmäßigkeiten*) make them, not aggregates, but coherent entities (*Gebilde*).⁵⁹ This means that they can be ordered into kinship groups through a process of comparison. For Dilthey, therefore, it is a matter of typologising these world-views.

This may have provided inspiration for the idea—important to both Dvořák and Carnap—that the multiplicity of reality produces, not chaos, but different types.

In times characterised by religious world-views, Dilthey argues, people and things were invested with meaning through the belief that a transcendent, active force was present in them. In contrast to this spiritual fixation on the transcendent sphere, the spirit of progress seeks to take a more liberated attitude to life and the world.⁶⁰ This means that the significance of a given artwork consists in that '[...] an individual thing that we perceive with the senses is separated from the causal link of acting and being-acted-upon (*Nexus des Eingewirkteins und Wirkens*) and elevated to an ideational expression of the life-connections as apparent to us through colour and form, symmetry and proportion, mental processes and event.'⁶¹

⁵⁶ Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften VIII, Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, 84.

⁵⁷ Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften VIII, Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, 85.

⁵⁸ Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften VIII, Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, 85.

⁵⁹ Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften VIII, Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, 85.

⁶⁰ Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften VIII, Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, 90-91.

⁶¹ Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften VIII, Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, 91.

According to Dilthey, the historical course of the relationship of art and world-views comprises a religious deepening of art, following which the artist's state of life (*Lebensverfassung*) comes to freer expression. This can be seen not in the imposition of a particular life-view onto the artwork itself, but 'in the inner form of the artistic construct'.⁶² With life as the starting-point of life-connections to people, things and nature, the need to bring experiences together gives rise to universal life-purposes. The coherence of that which is experienced across individual life-connections is the artistic consciousness of the meaning of life. From here, it is just a step to the types of world-view found in metaphysics; accordingly, it is in metaphysics that the threads linking philosophies of structure, type and development of world-views come together.⁶³

Like Dilthey, Dvořák also believed that art developed from a spiritual-idealistic world construction into a freer expression of the state of life, which he likewise believed to have identified in the form of artistic constructs. He regarded this as a prerequisite of metaphysical systems.

This is probably one of the roots of Dvořák's desire to anchor history-of-style analysis in the basis of the history of ideas; which, in turn, connects his thinking with Carnap's understanding of the specific methodological and object-theoretical character of the humanities. Metaphysical systems are thus understood with reference to the state of life, which implies a critique of metaphysics.

Dilthey's principle of 'individual logic' and the relation of natural sciences and humanities in his work

For the reasons outlined above, Dilthey aims to draw a distinction between the humanities and the natural sciences. However, his ultimate ambition is to bring the two together into a complementary whole of knowledge, for which he aims to establish an anthropological basis.⁶⁴ We can see this, for example, in his later writings on structural psychology, logic and theory of values. As Dilthey remarks: 'Based in the humanities, philosophy undertakes to investigate the coherence realised in the individual sciences. Thus, the system of sciences emerges as the second part of philosophy. All the sciences are united by a *single* connection. All sciences are interrelated in that they bring us to awareness of the development of the universe. It would be good if we could arrive at a conclusion about the ultimate cause, etc. Were it possible, we would have metaphysics as the third part of philosophy. What we do have, however, is the philosophy of world-views [...].'⁶⁵

⁶² Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* VIII, *Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, 92.

⁶³ Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* VIII, *Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, 93.

⁶⁴ Gudrun Kühne-Bertram, 'Zum Verhältnis von Naturwissenschaften und Geisteswissenschaften in der Philosophie Wilhelm Diltheys', in: Christian Damböck and Hans Ulrich Lessing, *Dilthey als Wissenschaftsphilosoph*, 246.

⁶⁵ Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, XXIV, *Logik und Wert: Späte Vorlesungen, Entwürfe und Fragmente zur Strukturpsychologie, Logik und Wertlehre*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2004, 4.

He continues: 'Every philosophy has brought *one* facet of reality to knowledge. The diverse nature of reality has created a diversity of systems. Not chaos, but specific types that express humanity's attitude to the world.'⁶⁶ Dilthey identifies the basis for the coherence he seeks across the sciences in the structure of inner life. According to him, it is this that produces knowledge of the natural world and dominion over it, economic life, law, art and religion, and binds them together in an external organisation. The coherence between them encompasses all these operations in accordance with the degree to which reflection elevates them above the philosophical horizon. However, it will only be truly complete when it encompasses every aspect of human activity reflected in the sciences.⁶⁷ Thus, Dilthey seeks to resolve the contradictions between world-views by bringing philosophy to the awareness that the diversity of its systems arises from the diversity of life. In his analysis, these contradictions are created by the claim to exclusivity of different metaphysical images of the world. Regardless of their claims to objectivity, however, these world-images emerge as relative.⁶⁸ Clearly, this aspect is also relevant to Dvořák's and Carnap's conception of science.

Dilthey locates the common origin of the natural sciences and humanities – in other words, of all knowledge and all understanding – in primary and elementary logical operations such as comparing, identifying similarities and differences, gauging degree, separating, etc. He concludes that the methods of induction, analysis, construction and comparison are applied across the whole of the sciences.⁶⁹ This means that the difference between 'understanding' (the humanities method) and 'explaining' (the natural-sciences method) is only a matter of degree.

Thus, Dilthey's concern is to establish the humanities as an indispensable correlate to the empirical natural sciences. It is this that makes his work a starting-point both for the art historian Max Dvořák and the logician Rudolf Carnap. Viewed in relation to Dilthey, Dvořák's and Carnap's respective approaches appear not so much opposed as they are two halves of a single sphere.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I contend that we can understand the writings of Rudolf Carnap and Max Dvořák, not as direct opposites, but on the basis of a shared source of inspiration: Wilhelm Dilthey's philosophy of life. Indeed, a contemporary synthesis of these two thinkers' approaches is a desideratum to this day. In retrospect, the debate around *Weltanschauung* versus *Weltauffassung* reveals itself as a historically conditioned, polemical dispute around terminology: an unproductive 'pseudo-

⁶⁶ Wilhelm Dilthey, XXIV, *Logik und Wert: Späte Vorlesungen, Entwürfe und Fragmente zur Strukturpsychologie, Logik und Wertlehre*, 4.

⁶⁷ Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften VIII, Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie*, 185.

⁶⁸ Gottfried Gabriel, 'Dilthey, Carnap, Metaphysikkritik und das Problem der Realität der Außenwelt', in: Damböck and Lessing, *Dilthey als Wissenschaftsphilosoph*, 121.

⁶⁹ Gudrun Kühne-Bertram, 'Zum Verhältnis von Naturwissenschaften und Geisteswissenschaften in der Philosophie Wilhelm Diltheys', in: Christian Damböck and Hans Ulrich Lessing, *Dilthey als Wissenschaftsphilosoph*, 247.

problem’.

Rooted in the German *Bildungstradition*, the attempt to overcome the radicalised conflict between Enlightenment and Romantic attitudes is thus central to the thinking of both Dvořák and Carnap. Dilthey’s philosophy of life is among their significant influences. Like Dilthey, both researchers radically question the claim to absoluteness of competing world-views on the basis of a critique of metaphysics. Their reference to Dilthey – or, rather, their confidence in the German *Bildungstradition* continued by Dilthey – can therefore be understood as an antidote to the cultural crisis that preceded the Second World War.

Translation by Kirsty Jane Falconer.

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Appendix: German primary sources

footnote 13

„[...] besteht nicht nur in der Lösung und Entwicklung formaler Aufgaben und Probleme; sie ist auch immer und in erster Linie Ausdruck der die Menschheit beherrschenden Ideen, ihrer Geschichte nicht minder als ihrer Religion, Philosophie oder Dichtung, ein Teil der allgemeinen Geistesgeschichte.“

footnote 15

„Die Errungenschaften der Naturwissenschaften, die Erkenntnis und die Bewältigung der Natur, darin sieht man etwas Absolutes, etwas was das Ziel und der Ruhmstiel der ganzen Entwicklung der Menschheit geworden ist. [...]. Von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus, der das ganze geistige Leben beherrscht hat, wurde auch die Entwicklung der Kunst beurteilt. An Stelle jener älteren, klassischen, dogmatischen Beurteilung der Kunstentwicklung als einer Wellenbewegung, welche bestimmte Höhepunkte hatte, in denen das wahre Ideal der Kunst verwirklicht wurde und gewisse Niederungen, in denen es in Vergessenheit geraten ist, tritt im vorigen Jahrhundert eine Auffassung, der zufolge auch die Naturerkenntnis einen steten Fortschritt der Kunst gegeben hat. [...].“

footnote 16

“ [...]. Diese Wandlung der Philosophie, dieses neue Begreifen der historischen Werte ist es, die unserer ganzen historischen Auffassung zugrunde liegt.“

footnote 18

„Tatsache ist, dass wir auf allen Gebieten des Denkens vor einer ganz neuen Situation stehen, vor einer Situation, die und lehrt, den Subjektivismus des historischen Denkens richtig in Rechnung zu stellen, die uns lehrt, die historischen Werte in ihrer Kompliziertheit, in ihrem ständigen Einwirken auf das Kommende,

ganz anders zu beurteilen, als es im Zeitalter der positiven Wissenschaften möglich gewesen ist. Es wird heute keine Periode niedriger eingeschätzt als die andere. Alle vereinigen sich zu dem, was Rickert als historisches Kulturbewußtsein bezeichnet, als metaphysisches Resultat der Menschheit.“

footnote 22

„Die neue Entdeckung und künstlerische Bewertung der Natur erfolgten [...] aufgrund von generellen geistigen Wahrheiten, deren Verkünderin die Kunst geworden ist und auf die von da an der Fortschritt in den Naturwissenschaften bezogen wurde, auch dann als man sie nicht mehr auf göttliche Offenbarung, sondern auf natürliche, rationelle Erkenntnis der in der Welt waltenden, nur dem Geiste erkennbaren Zusammenhänge zurückzuführen begonnen hatte.“

footnote 23

„Wie in ein geometrisches Schema bei einer leonardesken Dreiecksgruppe wurden die Statuen [...] in die ideale Ordnung künstlerischer Zusammenhänge hinein komponiert, die jedoch nicht wie bei den Meister der Hochrenaissance, auf einer äußeren formalen Einheit beruhte, in der durch die Kraft der in ihr verkörperten künstlerischen Einsicht [sic.] natürliche Verbindungen und sinnliche Eindrücke zur gesteigerten künstlerischen Wirkung empor gehoben werden sollten, sondern auf der Annahme einer transzendenten Einheit aufgebaut wurde, [...]“

footnote 24

„[...] die Epoche der großen Phantasielkunst, die nach Dilthey von der Mitte des XIV: Jahrhunderts bis zu der des XVII reicht, tatsächlich schon früher durch die Gotik eingeleitet worden.“

footnote 27

„Phantasie ist – [...] – in den ganzen seelischen Zusammenhang verwoben. Jede im täglichen Leben stattfindende Mitteilung bildet unwillkürlich das Erlebte um, Wünsche, Befürchtungen, Träume der Zukunft überschreiten das Wirkliche, jedes Handeln ist bestimmt durch ein Bild von etwas, das noch nicht ist: die Lebensideale [...] schreiten vor der Menschheit her und führen sie höheren Zielen entgegen [...]“

footnote 28

„Wir spüren eine innere Verwandtschaft der Haltung, die unserer ganzen philosophischen Arbeit zugrunde liegt, mit der geistigen Haltung, die sich gegenwärtig auf ganz andere Lebensgebiete auswirkt; wir spüren diese Haltung in Strömungen der Kunst, besonders der Architektur, und in den Bewegungen, die sich um eine sinnvolle Gestaltung des menschlichen Lebens bemühen: des persönlichen und des gemeinschaftlichen Lebens, der Erziehung, der –äußeren Ordnung im Großen.“

footnote 32

„Die Natur erklären wir, das Seelenleben verstehen wir.“

footnote 34

„Mit besonderem Vergnügen und Dankbarkeit erinnere ich mich an die Seminare von Hermann [...] Nohl (damals junger Dozent in Jena) über Philosophie, Pädagogik und Psychologie, [...]. Meine Freunde und ich waren von Nohl darum besonders angezogen, weil er sich für das Leben und die Gedanken seiner Studenten [...] persönlich interessierte, und uns in seinen Seminaren, wie in privaten Gesprächen, ein tiefes Verständnis für die großen Philosophen zu

vermitteln suchte, indem er von ihrer Einstellung zum Leben, ihrem „Lebensgefühl“ [sic.] und deren kulturellem Milieu ausging.“

footnote 37

„Neuerdings ist mehrfach (in Anschluss an Gedanken von Dilthey, Windelband Rickert) die Forderung nach einer Logik der Individualität erhoben worden; d.h. nach einer Methode begrifflicher Beschreibung, die der Besonderheit individueller Gegebenheiten gerecht wird und nicht versucht diese durch schrittweise Einengung in Gattungsbegriffe (Klassen) zu fassen.“

footnote 38

„Eine solche Methode würde für die Individualpsychologie und alle Kulturwissenschaften, besonders für die Geschichte, große Bedeutung besitzen. [...]. Es sei hier darauf hingewiesen, daß der relationstheoretische Strukturbegriff eine geeignete Basis für eine solche Methode bildet. Die Methode müsste durch Anpassung relationstheoretischer Mittel an das jeweilige Gebiet entwickelt werden.“

footnote 40

„Erst die neuere Geschichtsphilosophie (seit Dilthey) hat die methodische und gegenstandstheoretische Eigenart des Gebietes der Geisteswissenschaften herausgearbeitet.“

footnote 41

„Die geistigen Gegenstände stimmen zwar mit den psychischen darin überein, dass auch sie subjektgebunden sind: ihre ‚Träger‘ sind jeweils die Personen eines bestimmten Kreises. Aber im scharfen Gegensatz zu den psychischen Gegenständen können die Träger wechseln: Ein Staat, eine Sitte kann bestehen bleiben, während die tragenden Subjekte vergehen und andere an ihre Stelle treten. Die geistigen Gegenstände sind auch nicht aus psychischen (und etwa physischen) zusammengesetzt. Es handelt sich um völlig disparate Gegenstandsarten; die geistigen Gegenstände gehören anderen Gegenstandssphären [...] an, als die physischen und die psychischen Gegenstände.“

footnote 53

„Jeder große Eindruck zeigt dem Menschen das Leben von einer eigenen Seite; dann tritt die Welt in eine neue Beleuchtung: indem solche Erfahrungen sich wiederholen und verbinden, entstehen unsere Stimmungen dem Leben gegenüber. Von einem Lebensbezug aus erhält das ganze Leben eine Färbung und Auslegung in den affektiven oder grüblerischen Seelen – die universalen Stimmungen entstehen. Sie wechseln, wie das Leben dem Menschen immer neue Seiten zeigt. [...] Unter den großen Lebensbestimmungen sind die Umfassendsten der Optimismus und der Pessimismus [gemein sind Realismus und Idealismus B.C.]. Sie spezialisieren sich aber in mannigfachen Nuancen. [...]. Diese Lebensbestimmungen, die zahllosen Nuancen der Stellungen zur Welt, bilden die unterste Schicht für die Ausbildung der Weltanschauungen.“

footnote 54

„Die Auffassung der Wirklichkeit ist ein wichtiges Moment in ihrer Gestaltung. Aber doch nur eines. Aus dem Lebensverhalten, der Lebenserfahrung, der Struktur unserer psychischen Totalität gehen sie hervor. Die Erhebung des Lebens zum Bewußtsein in Wirklichkeitserkenntnis, Lebenswürdigung und Willensleistung ist

die langsame schwere Arbeit, welche die Menschheit in der Entwicklung der Lebensanschauungen geleistet hat.“

footnote 57

„Das tiefste Geheimnis ihrer Spezifikation liegt in der Regelmäßigkeit, welche der teleologische Zusammenhang des Seelenlebens der besonderen Struktur der Weltanschauungen aufdrückt. Mitten in der scheinbaren Zufälligkeit dieser Gebilde, besteht in jedem derselben ein Zweckzusammenhang, der aus der Abhängigkeit der im Lebensrätsel enthaltenen Fragen voneinander, insbesondere aus dem konstanten Verhältnis zwischen Weltbild, Lebenswürdigung und Willenszielen entspringt.“

footnote 58

„Eine gemeinsame Menschennatur und eine Ordnung der Individuationen, steht in festen Lebensbezügen zur Wirklichkeit und diese ist immer und überall dieselbe, das Leben zeigt immer dieselben Seiten.“

footnote 61

„[...] das ein Singulares, in den Sinnen Gegebenes aus dem Nexus des Eingewirkteins und Wirkens ausgesondert und zum ideellen Ausdruck der Lebensbezüge erhoben wird, wie sie aus Farbe und Gestalt, Symmetrie und Proportion, Tonverbindung und Rhythmus, seelischen Vorgängen und Geschehnis zu uns spricht.“

footnote 62

„[...] in der inneren Form der künstlerischen Gebilde“.

footnote 65

„Die Philosophie stellt sich auf die Grundlage der Geisteswissenschaften und unternimmt; den in den Einzelwissenschaften realisierten Zusammenhang zu untersuchen. So entsteht als zweiter Teil der Philosophie das System der Wissenschaften. *Ein* Zusammenhang geht durch alle Wissenschaften. Alle Wissenschaften hängen miteinander zusammen, indem sie die Entwicklung des Universums uns zum Bewußtsein bringen. Es wäre schön wenn wir einen Schluss machen könnten auf den letzten Grund etc. Wäre es möglich so hätten wir als dritten Teil der Philosophie: Metaphysik. Wir aber: Lehre von den Weltanschauungen. [...]“

footnote 66

„Jede Philosophie hat *eine* Seite der Wirklichkeit zur Erkenntnis gebracht. Die Vielseitigkeit der Wirklichkeit hat die mannigfachen Systeme hervorgebracht. Kein Chaos, sondern gewisse Typen, in denen die Stellung des Menschen zu Welt zum Ausdruck kommt.“



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